


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JPRS Report

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-90-040

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10 July 1990

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Pros, Cons of Draft Law on Public Organizations Examined

90UN1900A Moscow *OGONEK* in Russian No. 16,
14-21 Apr 90 p. 25

[Article by Ernest Ametistov, doctor of juridical sciences, member of the Public Commission on International Humanitarian Cooperation and Human Rights of the Soviet Committee for European Security: "What Should the Law on Citizens' Associations Be Like?"]

[Text] At the end of March, several public organizations received for discussion the government's draft of a law on citizens' public associations. It is hoped that the law, eagerly awaited by society, will be adopted by the current session of the Supreme Soviet. Bearing in mind the content of the official draft, I would like to discuss what the future law should and should not be like.

Let's start from the fact that this law, like all other normative acts regarding citizens' rights and freedoms, must fully conform to the Soviet Union's international legal obligations in the field of human rights. This is not only with respect to the formal principle of "pacta sunt servanda" ("treaties must be observed"), but also because international standards of human rights are the true essence of the experience of the world's democracy, so necessary to us today when we are struggling to free ourselves from the legal and psychological bonds of totalitarianism.

According to Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 22 of the International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, each person has the right to freedom of association with others. The content of this concept—freedom of association—is defined in detail in another international agreement: the Convention of the International Labor Organization No. 87 "On the Freedom of Association and the Defense of the Right to Organize," also ratified by the Soviet Union. According to the Convention, the freedom of association includes: the right of citizens to create organizations as they choose without requiring prior permission; the right to join such organizations on the sole condition of accepting their charters; the right of organizations to write their own charters and administrative rules, freely choose their representatives, organize their own leadership and activity and draw up their own agenda; the right of organizations to create federations and confederations, to join the same and to join international organizations; the responsibility of government authorities to refrain from any type of interference which would limit the right to association or prevent its legal realization. The Convention also states that organizations may not be dissolved or temporarily banned by administrative fiat, and that they may obtain the rights of a juridical person under conditions which cannot prevent enjoyment of the right to association.

Naturally, a basis for the new law must also be the USSR Constitution, which in Article 51 grants citizens the right

"to form public organizations promoting the development of political activity and independence, and the satisfaction of their various interests."

So if we think about the international legal and constitutional formulations on which the new law must be based, then its very concept must be fundamentally changed. Its subject of regulation must be **the right of citizens to freely join together in public organizations** as a basic human right. Accordingly, the future act should be titled "The USSR Law on Freedom of Association," where the right to free association must be the starting point for all its remaining provisions. In particular, regulation of the creation and activity of public organizations must not be an end in and of itself in the new law, as in the official draft, but merely a means to ensure the citizens' rights cited above.

In the prelude to the upcoming fundamental reforms in relations among republics, aimed at ensuring their genuine sovereignty, the future law must formulate only the basic principles of the right to association, and guarantee the minimum levels of rights granted and the maximum levels of responsibilities imposed. All remaining regulation within these limits should be at the republics' discretion. The following version of the new act is thus possible: The Foundations for Legislation of the USSR and the Union Republics on the Right to Association.

In contrast to the official draft, the new law must clearly apply to all public organizations, regardless of their importance and range of interests, including the CPSU, trade unions, and any other existing or future parties, organizations and societies. If the activity of individual types of such organizations is regulated by some sort of special legislation (for example, legislation on parties or trade unions), then it must fully comply with the Law on the Freedom of Association, which in this case should be considered "organic," i.e., constitutional, possessing a higher legal force.

This, like any other well-drafted law, must start with basic definitions of the subject of regulation. These, by the way, are also absent in the official draft. The first thing that should be defined is the right to association. The definitions of this right in both international documents and in foreign legislation can be summarized in the following proposed version: the right to association is the possibility, guaranteed by the state, for a citizen to freely join together with other citizens in public organizations of forms and types which they have freely chosen, to pursue common political, social, economic, professional and other interests and to achieve corresponding goals.

The official draft also lacks a definition of a public organization, which is also necessary. All public organizations, from a group of Persian carpet lovers to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, have the same nature from the legal standpoint, characterized by the following three essential features: voluntary membership; self-management; and a permanent nature. All

other features which distinguish them from each other, especially their goals, methods of operation, internal structure and so forth (assuming, of course, that they function within legally defined bounds, discussed below), must be outside the law's purview and outside of legal regulation.

Taking the above into consideration, the following version of a definition of a public organization can be suggested: it is a voluntary, self-managed, permanently functioning association of citizens organized on a not-for-profit basis. This wording, which takes in the basic features of a public organization, makes it possible to include all their multiple forms (political parties, trade unions, scientific and athletic associations, associations for any possible interests), while distinguishing public organizations from cooperatives, joint stock companies and other such organizations whose activity is regulated by other legislation.

If we thus agree that the law must not regulate issues belonging to the internal competence of public organizations (and we must agree with this if we want to comply with the obligations undertaken by the Soviet Union in the international agreements cited above), then the law is left with regulating only three groups of relations occurring between public organizations and the state: the procedure for legalizing public organizations; the procedure for their obtaining the rights of a juridical person; and the procedure for financially monitoring their activity and taxation.

The procedure for legalizing public organizations should be as follows. In accordance with the USSR's obligations under international law, the law grants any given number of citizens (say, not less than 10 persons) the right, without any prior permission, to convene a founding conference, vote for creating the organization, and adopt its charter. After this, the founders' only obligation to the state is to publicly announce the organization's creation, its goals, methods of operation, principles, and the contents of its charter; for example, by publishing all this information in an official publication of the place where the organization is created (at the founders' expense, of course). If, in the course of a period of time set by law (say, one month) from the day of publication the appropriate court receives from law enforcement agencies, other organizations and agencies, or individual citizens a valid lawsuit to prevent such organization, such a suit shall be considered under the ordinary procedures of civil law, including the possibility of appeal to higher courts.

The law must set clear criteria, with the maximum possible specificity, giving the court grounds to prohibit a public organization, while eliminating the possibility for arbitrary interpretation. For example, a public organization can be declared illegal and banned if it pursues goals or uses methods in its activities aimed at: the violent overthrow or alteration of the existing public and governmental order; incitement to racial or national

hatred and enmity; the threat of violence against particular agencies, organizations or persons; damage to the environment; damage to the health of citizens, public morals and morality; constraints on or violation of the lawful interests and rights of the organization's members; or creation of any rights or obligations for persons who are not members of the organization.

Public organizations which have given proper notification of their formation and have not been the subject of a lawsuit during the established period shall be considered to be operating on a legal basis (legalized) and can freely engage in their activities in accordance with their charters. The law must guarantee the right of such organizations to elect their own leadership, organize their own staff and forms of activity, draw up their own charter and agenda, and print and disseminate their own publications. And it is not the law's place, as in the official draft, to exhaustively regulate what should and should not be in the organization's charter. Government authorities and other public organizations must refrain from any interference which could limit or prevent the right to association. Legalized public organizations must not be subject to dissolution or prohibition by administrative fiat; such questions must be decided only by a court. They must be granted the right to create unions, federations and confederations both within the USSR and with foreign public organizations.

Registration of public organizations as juridical persons must not be connected with their legalization. Such registration must be recognized by the law as noncompulsory (elective). A public organization's decision not to register as a juridical person must not incur any restrictions on its rights or on the rights of its members, if such rights do not accrue solely to juridical persons. For example, the members of a public organization must have the right to conduct demonstrations, meetings or conventions of their organization regardless of whether or not it is a juridical person.

If a legalized public organization elects to acquire the status of a juridical person, the following procedure could be suggested for doing so. The registration is performed by the court of the region where the organization's managing agencies are located by entry in a special register of public organizations.

The only basis for registration must be a declaration signed by the organization's directors, appended by a copy of the official publication in which the organization's creation was announced. A refusal to register can be appealed to higher courts. The court registration document will be the basis for receiving a seal and stationary and opening a bank account. A refusal to provide these services can be appealed to the same court.

Financial agencies must monitor public organizations' financial operations and income only for the purposes, and within the limits, necessary to establish the legality of the sources and means of obtaining financial resources and the amounts of income received, and to determine

the amount and type of taxes due. The types of monitoring, reporting requirements, amount and types of taxation, and the procedure for complete or partial tax exemption for public organizations should be defined in accordance with existing law.

Any other activity of public organizations, their rights, competencies and obligations, are not to be subject to special regulation and can be undertaken by them in

accordance with their own rules and the laws of the USSR and the union republics. It is time to solidly establish a basic truth: the country can only be led out of the profound crisis into which the totalitarian regime has led it through the efforts of free people whose political and civil rights are reliably guaranteed by the state.

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Baltic Council Requests CSCE Membership

90UN1956B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 13 May 90 p 2

[Joint Statement: "On Participation in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe"]

[Text] Inasmuch as the Council of Baltic States considers restoration of the state independence of the Baltic States of utmost importance, we make a request to all the National Commissions of the member states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] that representatives of the Baltic States be granted the opportunity to present an appropriate declaration and make a statement in the name of our National Commissions with regard to granting the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian Commissions the opportunity to become members of the CSCE.

Anatoliy Gorbunov, chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet.

Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council.

Arnold Ruutel, chairman of the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet.

Baltic Governments Urged To Be Relistic

90UN2033B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
24 May 90 p 2

[Article by A. Koshchuyeva: "Arrogance and Accouterments"]

[Text] So, the goal that the people's fronts of the Baltics aimed for from the moment of their beginnings has been reached (true, in the first phase under the cover of verbal camouflage about the defense of perestroika in the country). Immediately following Lithuania, Latvia, also contrary to the USSR Constitution, announced the restoration of its own state independence; that is, its actual secession from the USSR. Well, thank goodness, an end has come to totalitarianism, and each republic has a right to decide its own fate, but, to be sure, after first asking the opinion of the people. And although a referendum is a very undesirable matter for today's governments of the Baltic states, it would be best of all to start on the road to independence precisely with a referendum. For it is only this way that each resident of the republic himself would assume responsibility, and not someone for him, to choose a future for himself and his children. Because, to declare independence, and in fact to become fully independent, as they say in Odessa, are two very different things. The best argument for corroborating this is the situation in and around Lithuania. It took one night for independence to be born there. The announcement was bold and decisive: We are a free state, and the laws of the USSR are not for us.

I wonder whether any of the parliamentarians that night thought, perhaps, that they at least should give advance

notice about their intentions to the government of the country, under whose roof the republic lived for half a century, sharing with its people both bad times and years of enthusiasm?

For it is no secret to anyone today that it is precisely this haste by the rulers of Lithuania and the blunt reluctance to confer first with the people that forced the president and the government of the country to take a retaliatory step in the form of economic sanctions. There is no denying that the burden of the sanctions, naturally, fell mostly on the shoulders of the working people of Lithuania, without national discrimination. And it is already making itself felt in Latvia, because we are all in one boat. But the question now is not one of the difficulty of these sanctions, but rather about their competence. And no matter how the latter-day politicians juggle slogans, it is necessary to recognize that the government of Lithuania left no other recourse to the Government of the Union to protect the interests of all of its fellow citizens.

Lithuania, not reckoning with Moscow's warnings, is conducting a counterattack by cutting off the delivery of its agricultural products to union stocks. But, moreover, it is screaming to the entire world: "Help, blockade!" And it is seconded then and there by those who do not take the trouble to think about the real state of affairs and to admit the truth to themselves and to the people. Instead of this, appeals are heard which are similar to those that were recently addressed to the workers of Latvia by the very vigilant defenders of its interests—the Presidium of the Latvian Republic Council of Trade Unions. It expresses "sincere bewilderment" over this USSR behavior, and it speaks "with alarm and indignation" about the worsening living conditions of the population of Lithuania, and it demands that this outrage be stopped. No more and no less. But, perhaps it would be more sensible in the interests of the people to call the governments to realism in positions.

If the present Lithuanian parliament committed a rash act, ringing the bell without checking the church calendar, then should it now be indignant because the USSR, in response to an insufficiently considered action, responded with a similar action, after deciding that it had a complete right, as it saw it, to be in charge of its own property?

It is naive to think that the leaders of the people's fronts of the Baltics, comfortably settling themselves in parliamentary seats, do not understand the essence of what is happening. But to a great degree they are clearly counting exactly on the naive, or on those who, rightly desiring a fitting life for themselves, believe that the desired goal can be reached only by breaking all ties with the USSR. "You see, it is easier to make a tasty soup in a small pan than in a large pot," they say, while standing in a picket line at the building of the Latvian Supreme Soviet. Quite so, but you have to have all the ingredients for a soup. However, if something is lacking, you must earn it, and by yourself.

Recently, Vladimir Maksimov, the editor of the Paris journal KONTINENT, whom official propaganda designated an inveterate anti-Soviet as far back as 10 years ago, appeared in the central press. And, nevertheless, this is the way he expressed himself about the events in the Baltics: "Independence? Perhaps. But only at their own expense. When I am told about the unjust economic sanctions of the government, I think of this as a generally accepted economic measure in the world... Let the Lithuanians pardon me, but compare their life and the life of the Tatars, from where the oil comes, not to mention the small nations of the Tyumen area of the North. These people could live like sheiks on their oil. If it is to be independence, gentlemen, then realize that you must do this at your own expense, and not at the expense of the people who can put their own wealth to good use themselves."

"But we do want to maintain friendly relations with the USSR and to build them on the basis of mutually beneficial agreements," assert the supporters of independence. But was it not because of this that the 4 May Declaration, adopted by the Latvian Supreme Soviet, split the republic, alas, into two camps, and that future agreements for some people are an indisputable axiom, and for others they are a very questionable prospect, engendering uncertainty in tomorrow?

All relations between the union republics in our state were built on the kind of an anti economic basis which gave the workers no incentive and did not limit the loafers. But everything looked "tip-top" in the summaries of the State Committee for Statistics. The prices for basic raw materials that existed up until now also contributed to this situation to a large degree. To compare them with world prices is simply upsetting.

Well, judge for yourselves. A ton of oil costs R30 on the union market, and on the world market, \$120; diesel fuel, R70 and \$160, respectively, and a thousand cubic meters of gas, R30 and \$90, respectively. Everyone understands that not one state can exist without these energy resources. An independent Latvia that is forced to buy them at world prices (and no one will give them in any other prices no matter how friendly the relations) will spend, according to preliminary estimates, up to R1 billion in foreign currency annually for their acquisition. Because their own fuel resources constitute only six to eight percent of the need. But, on what basis, for example, can they construct their own base of agricultural machine building, about which our new Prime Minister, Ivars Godmanis, spoke so confidently in their own government program, if four of the Latvian branch plants for the production of agricultural machinery in the republic have only their own workhands, and even those until recently were enticed from neighbors. Can Mr. Godmanis not know that the transportation of products into Latvia exceeds shipments out of Latvia on average by R1.5 billion at world prices. For example, in 1987 the negative balance for foreign trade activity was 314 foreign currency rubles, and, as before, this gap in the Latvian budget was filled up from the Union purse.

On what will Latvia earn money to provide for itself under the new conditions? The questions are "gaps" in the government program. So, why shouldn't the residents be alarmed? And, nonetheless, what the rulers of our destinies are hoping for is no secret. Let us call things by their own names... The warm assurances of a desire to maintain the friendliest political and economic relations with the Union are nothing other than confidence that the economic relationship will be very favorable for Latvia. And, in other words, that the USSR will continue to be a market for the sale of Latvian goods. Because today their exports to the West barely reach three percent. Now the governments of Lithuania and Latvia are betting on horizontal friendly ties between independent enterprises which, of course, will be absolutely extricated from the maternal embrace of central bureaucratic departments. But those products that are produced in Latvia can be bought on the world market, and, besides, they are better and cheaper. Of course, it is not our products that will get preference. And here, no one can be blamed even for group selfishness, since, as the saying goes, each hut has its own trinkets.

But these agreements are functioning today, and the ties are quite firm, opponents will exclaim, and they will add: Even the president of the country does not tire of repeating that it is not possible to painlessly break the economic ties that have developed. Indeed, they are strong, as long we are in one harness, and as long as there is hope of together pulling the economic wagon out of the deep rut of the former system of leveling poverty. But if in the most difficult moments the Baltics, as they say, trip the entire Union, then, as the Russian deputy representative of the Siberian delegation put it, "We have been and will be internationalists and ready for any cooperation. But only with those who, together with us, will move out of the situation into which we have all gotten." And the delegate from Novgorod announced outright that he cannot understand "what kind of sanctions these are against Lithuania, if that republic began to interrupt contracted deliveries of industrial products, but we, as previously, continue to make deliveries there. We have had enough of putting up with slaps in the face. A law is needed on sanctions against partners." Overly emotional? Possibly. But, frankly speaking, these words more than anything are a sign of awakening national pride (for this, honor and praise to the people's fronts of the Baltics that played the role of catalyst). And, apparently, not only the Novgorod residents think this way. Not long ago, the Lithuanian enterprise "Tulpe," finding itself without woolen yarn, decided to pursue the appeal of K. Prunskiene and by itself to find suppliers by expanding horizontal ties. After assembling a knapsack with gifts, they set out for their suppliers in Morshansk. The managers there, sensing the disastrous state of "Tulpe," decided to share their limited reserves. But the work collective intervened, and the newly-made agreement was under threat. The Morshansk workers did not understand those who confused independence with dependence. And so, go ahead and pin your hopes here on future contracts that rely only on horizontal ties.

Thus, who is to be blamed for the fact that "great opposition" began today among the residents of Latvia or Lithuania, despite the promise of a permanent bright future? It would not hurt those in the parliament who make premature decisions to find out about what is happening with the Eastern neighbors not only from the pages of ATMODA, which paints too glowing a picture of the support of separatists in the Union.

But the supporters of secession from the USSR have one argument, to which many delegates from the NFL [Latvian People's Front] referred in their election campaign for deputy seats. Briefly, it is formulated this way: The Baltics, Latvia in particular, can live comfortably because of their ports! The argument is serious and, if one does not dissect the statistics and can trust them, one can sleep for once without anxiety and calmly. Not making any claims of profound economic research, we will try to look into the "church calendar" of our steamship line. Its specialists confirmed: "Yes, the Latvian steamship line overall, and the ports in particular, are a good source of hard currency. Not every economic unit can give about R215 million foreign currency profit annually. For Latvia, this is a reliable source of income."

And this is actually the case, because the value of fixed capital of the steamship line is about R1.3 billion—this is a substantial part of the value of the republic's fixed capital. Port employees process about 4 million tons of grain alone. Moreover, 1 million tons of this remains in Latvia itself. And out of 500,000 tons of transported sugar, 350,000 tons are transferred to the republic. So it cannot be said that Latvian seamen and dockers work only for a foreign uncle. On the whole, the freight turnover of Latvian ports is 40 million tons. If the volume of freight turnover is maintained in the event of Latvia's secession from the USSR, then the republic has something it can count on. But will it be maintained? You see, as they said in the shipping line, there is already a possibility now of reducing a substantial volume of transshipments by distributing part of the freight to other ports of the Union. And if the carrying capacity of the Leningrad port alone is doubled (and there is this possibility), without sparing money on its modernization, then the freight flow to Latvian ocean ports, of course, will not dry up altogether, but it will become shallow. Indeed, it is doubtful that the maritime department of the country will agree to leave to Latvia the 105 ships purchased with oil rubles in the event of Latvia's secession from the USSR. As the specialists have stressed, it is impossible not to take this fact into account. A complete distribution to the Ventspils and Riga ports can be conducted. But even a cursory knowledge says that Riga will not become a second Rotterdam, where ships from the whole world come. Will there be anything to transport? Because Latvia's own export commodities are a matter for the distant future. And it is hardly possible to rely only on ports as the basis of prosperity for the country. Even in The Netherlands

(with all of the luster of its maritime wealth), the share of the ports constitutes only 1.1 percent of the gross national product.

No, whatever you say, you will not be sated with just a declaration of independence. Invocations about future mutually beneficial contracts without the verified calculations of the economists and well-reasoned steps of farsighted politicians are a disguised "with luck, we will make it" approach. Slogan euphoria, born of arrogance, is directing the dance in parliament. If the dance also had all of the accouterments, it would be possible to believe the beautiful words about our future. But, alas, a "trifle" is interfering: We have arrogance and accouterments not only in different weight categories, but they also occur in different departments.

Sokolov, Kamay Visit Striking Collective

90UN18421 Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 29 Apr 90 p 3

[BELTA report: "When Emotions Go Over the Brink..."]

[Text] On 27 April, First Secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee Ye.Ye. Sokolov and Second Secretary of the Belorussian CP Central Committee A.S. Kamay visited the "Gomselmash" Production Association. The purpose of the visit was to analyze and discuss the course of accomplishment of the program for enterprise development and production intensification of equipment needed by agriculture, and to analyze and discuss the resolution of social problems, primarily those connected with the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant accident.

A strike was conducted in the collective the day before in connection with delays in adopting a program for the elimination of the accident's aftereffects.

Workers of the first shift gathered near the association's administration building for the arrival of Sokolov and Kamay. A spontaneous, hard-to-control rally took place, focusing on the demands of the collective directed toward Union and republic organs. Among these: accelerated accomplishment of the program to eliminate the aftereffects of the Chernobyl catastrophe, and the establishment of a supplementary payment to all persons residing in territory contaminated by radionuclides.

There was no businesslike discussion at the rally, unfortunately—many of its participants listened only to themselves. One speaker replaced another, stating claims, heaping insults without sparing any kind of language—this compels us once again to comment on the low political culture of such rallies. Appeals resounded for the resignation of the Central Committee and the republic government.

Following the rally a discussion took place in the association's party committee, in which representatives of the party committee, administration, trade union committee, and councils of the enterprise labor collectives

took part. Ye.Ye. Sokolov and A.S. Kamay answered questions posed in the strikers' demands. Over the course of the meeting participants arrived at the conclusion that it would be necessary to establish a commission including representatives of the government, in order to resolve the conflict.

The rally and discussion showed that in the zone subjected to radioactive contamination people were still poorly informed, especially concerning the content and course of accomplishment of the program to eliminate the aftereffects of the Chernobyl accident, and often were given to relying on all kinds of rumor and conjecture.

Still another conclusion emerges. It is apparent that the strikes could have been avoided. The answers to most of the questions posed by the strikers could have been given earlier, prior to the flare-up of emotions. A conciliation or compromise commission could also have been established earlier, as required by law. But the rayon and city authorities failed to give the requests of collective workers the serious attention these deserved, and allowed events to unfold of their own accord. Also of no help in normalizing the situation was the fact that telegrams of alarm sent by the "Gomselmash" Association to republic state institutions went unanswered.

The strike took place. According to information provided at the rally by S.S. Drozd, general director of the "Gomselmash" Production Association, losses resulting from the strike amount to about 2.5 million rubles. On the whole, losses across Gomel from strikes conducted 26 April surpassed the 3 million rubles mark—which amount, incidentally, is almost one-fourth of what was earned by the entire republic at the recent Lenin Volunteer-Labor Saturday for the Chernobyl Fund.

Sokolov Addresses Gomel Obkom Meeting

90UN1908A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 1 May 90 pp 1, 2

[BELTA report: "Meetings of the Belorussian Communist Party Gomel Obkom"]

[Text] A meeting of leading oblast and city workers took place on 29 April in the Belorussian CP Gomel Oblast Committee [Obkom]. The focus of attention was an analysis of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation in the region and the search for ways to hasten the resolution of tasks relating to the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station.

There was a broad exchange of opinions, during which great concern was voiced about the fact that there are delays in the resolution of a whole series of problems, first and foremost the evacuation of people from the most seriously contaminated territories and providing the population with clean food products, medical services, and community amenities. It was noted that sometimes this delay is being caused by sluggishness and lack of coordination in the actions of oblast, republic,

and all-Union departments and the local soviets of peoples deputies. Quite sharp criticism was directed against republic and Union science with respect to lack of any sound comprehensive concept for safe living on territories contaminated with radionuclides and restructuring agricultural production on such territories, and also with respect to the slow compilation of the radiation document for each populated point.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary, spoke at the meeting.

In his speech he dealt with questions relating to the prompt assimilation of funding earmarked for this year and next for the cleanup program following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, and to providing the population with dosimeters, and health maintenance for children and others.

Belorussian CP Central Committee Secretary A.S. Kamay, First Secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Gomel Obkom A.A. Grakhovskiy, and Chairman of the Gomel Oblast Executive Committee N.G. Voytenkov took part in the discussion.

On the same day leaders and secretaries of party organizations, the chairmen of the trade union committees and city labor collective councils, the first secretaries of the party city committee and rayon committees, and the chairmen of the city and rayon executive committees met in the building of the Gomel party obkom.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov, Belorussian CP Central Committee first secretary, delivered a brief introductory statement. The purpose of this meeting, he emphasized, is to exchange opinions on the steps needed in the development of the city and on possible measures relating to switching the economy to market principles.

Dealing with these problems, those who spoke noted the need for in-depth scientific work on decisions in the pipeline, including prediction of the possible consequences of adopting legislative enactments providing social protection for people, particularly the low-income strata of the population.

Then the talk moved to problems pertaining to the cleanup following the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. As the director of the motor transport combine of the oblast consumer union V.V. Parkhomenko noted in his statement, this is the one subject that we have no right to avoid in any discussion. Those present at the meeting talked about medical services for the population and health maintenance for children in sanatoriums, the proper provision of foodstuffs, and the rational use of funding allocated for the accident cleanup. City, oblast, and republic services and departments were criticized.

Those speaking raised the question of responsibility for the mistakes allowed in adopting a decision in the first days following the accident. A.S. Kamay, Belorussian CP Central Committee second secretary, emphasized in this

connection that we are looking at the entire set of problems that have arisen as a result of the Chernobyl accident from the standpoint of present knowledge about this great misfortune. Yes, much more is known about it now and much can be better seen. But unfortunately, the decisions that were made have not fully justified themselves and were reached on the basis of the knowledge available to Soviet and world science. And they were subsequently fulfilled by the authorities in the republic and in Gomel Oblast.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov responded to those who spoke during the course of the questioning.

A.A. Grakhovskiy, first secretary of the Belorussian CP Gomel Obkom, and N.G. Voytenkov, chairman of the Gomel Oblast Executive Committee, attended the meeting and spoke at it.

Belorussia's Sokolov to Attend CPSU Congress

90UN1920B Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 8 May 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Pre-Election Meetings"]

[Text] Some of the Baranovichskiy Rayon primary party organizations nominated E.E. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, as their candidate for delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress. The party district electoral committee registered him as such.

E.E. Sokolov spent three days in the rayon where he visited most of the farms and met with over 2,000 Communists. At every meeting they talked openly about the future of perestroika, about ways to revive the party, about the CPSU Central Committee Platform, and about developing the economy of Baranovichskiy Rayon.

The Central Committee first secretary is well acquainted with the places he visited. He knows the farms, he has met with the managers and farmers, with teachers and party and soviet officials dozens of times. In Baranovichskiy Rayon they have accumulated a lot of experience in intensive animal husbandry, in organizing subsidiary rural trades, and in businesslike cooperation among the kolkhozes [collective farms] and industrial enterprises. For that reason certain expertise and a special interest were noticeable in the conversations about the present times and the future perspectives at the farms "Krasnoye Znamya", "Volno-Chenikhovo," "Mir," "Druzhiba," imeni Dzerzhinskiy, and "Teplivody." E.E. Sokolov visited the shops of the "Torgmash" plant where he examined samples of new equipment and answered Communists' questions. A meaningful conversation with the representatives of the rayon industries took place in the party raykom [rayon party committee]. E.E. Sokolov spoke about the most critical problems of Belorussia's economy, of its health care system, its science, culture, and education. He outlined the measures taken by the Central Committee and by the government of the

republic to increase the production of consumer goods and to protect and strengthen the market.

Everybody who spoke at the meeting called upon rayon Communists to send E.E. Sokolov, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee, to the party congress as their delegate.

New Belorussian Deputy Chairman Appointed

90UN1799A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukase of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Appointment of Comrade M.A. Knyazyuk as deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR resolves:

—to appoint Comrade Mikhail Aleksandrovich Knyazyuk deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers.

N. DEMENTEV, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
L. SYROYEGINA, secretary,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.
7 April 1990, Minsk.

Comrade M.A. Knyazyuk, a Belorussian, was born in 1940. A CPSU member since 1963, he completed the Belorussian Polytechnic Institute and Higher Party School (External) of the CPSU Central Committee. He is a mechanical engineer.

He began his career in 1958 at the Minsk Instrument Manufacturing Plant imeni V.I. Lenin as a design technologist. From 1959 through 1962 he served in the ranks of the Soviet Army. From 1962 through 1967 he worked in engineering positions at the Minsk Instrument Manufacturing Plant imeni V.I. Lenin. Beginning in 1967 he engaged in party work—as instructor in the industrial transportation department of the Sovetskiy Raykom [rayon party committee] of the Belorussian Communist Party, City of Minsk; as instructor and deputy head of the organizational department of the Minsk Gorkom [city party committee] of the Belorussian Communist Party; instructor and chief of the Instrument Manufacturing Section of the Department of Heavy Industry and Transportation of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee.

In 1974 he was elected first secretary of the Leninskiy Raykom of the Belorussian Communist Party, City of Minsk, and in 1975—second secretary of the Minsk Gorkom of the Belorussian Communist Party. From 1977 through 1984, he served as secretary and second secretary of the Minsk Obkom [oblast party committee] of the Belorussian Communist Party. From 1984 through 1985, he worked as an inspector in the apparatus

of the CPSU Central Committee. From 1985 to present, he has been working as first secretary of the Ivanovo CPSU Obkom.

Comrade Knyazyuk is a member of the CPSU Central Committee. He has twice been awarded the Order of the Red Banner of Labor, and is a medal recipient.

Belorussian Official Released from Position

90UN1799C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 1

[Ukase of the Presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet: "On the Discharge of Comrade A.I. Trutnev from the Position of Deputy Chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers"]

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR resolves:

—to release Comrade Artur Ivanovich Trutnev from the position of deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers in connection with his transfer to other work.

N. DEMENTEV, chairman,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium;
L. SYROYEGINA, secretary,
Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium
7 April 1990, Minsk.

Belorussian SSR Repeat Election Results

90UN1823A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 1

[Report of the Central Commission for Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies: "Repeat Election Results"]

[Text] The Central Commission examined the results of repeat elections conducted 22 April in 18 electoral districts. Balloting had taken place 4 March in these districts, where at most two candidates were contending for Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy, and neither candidate was elected. Nomination of candidates for deputy took place again in these districts, based on Article 57 of the Law "On Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies," and repeat elections were held.

The list of voters comprised 439,830 individuals, of which 350,423 (79.6 percent) took part in the voting.

In accordance with the Law on Elections, district electoral commissions registered 67 candidates for Belorussian SSR people's deputy. Three or more candidates were in contention for a seat in 11 of the electoral districts, one or two candidates—in seven districts.

Elections took place in all 18 electoral districts. Nine individuals were elected people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR. All are CPSU members. Of those elected, one is a kolkhoz [collective farm] worker, one—a

scientific worker, four—workers in party or soviet organs, two—employees of law enforcement organs, and one serviceman.

Based on Article 53 of the Law on Elections, the Central Commission on Elections of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies registered all Belorussian SSR people's deputies elected during the 22 April repeat elections. The list of elected deputies is published below.

In eight districts where no candidate obtained the necessary majority of votes, runoff elections will take place. A repeat election will be held in Loyevskiy Electoral District No. 217.

List of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies Elected in Repeat Elections Conducted 22 April 1990

Nikolay Grigoryevich Gushel, first secretary of Gomelskiy Belorussian Communist Party Raykom [rayon committee], CPSU member, city of Gomel, Tereshkovichskiy Electoral District No. 200.

Mikhail Antonovich Komar, ispolkom [executive committee] chairman of the Rogachevskiy Rayon Soviet of People's Deputies, CPSU member, city of Rogachev, Gomel Oblast, Dovskiy Electoral District No. 230.

Gennadiy Vladimirovich Kuzyuk, chairman of Voronovskiy Rayon Agroindustrial Association, CPSU member, city-type settlement of Voronovo, Grodno Oblast, Voronovskiy Electoral District No. 250.

Gennadiy Mikhaylovich Lavitskiy, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR KGB, CPSU member, city of Minsk, Lepelskiy Electoral District No. 166.

Vadim Andreyevich Myadelets, chairman of "1 May" Kolkhoz, Sharkovshchinskiy Rayon, CPSU member, Sharkovshchinskiy Rayon, Vitebsk Oblast, village of Yody, Sharkovshchinskiy Electoral District No. 164.

Valeriy Vladimirovich Pavlov, serviceman, CPSU member, city of Minsk, Vostochnyy Electoral District No. 32.

Gerard Vladislavovich Sivitskiy, director of the Internal Affairs Administration of Brest Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee], CPSU member, city of Brest, Antopolskiy Electoral District No. 118.

Mikhail Aleksandrovich Slemnev, department head at Vitebsk Teachers College, CPSU member, city of Vitebsk, Vitebskiy-Chernyakhovskiy Electoral District No. 183.

Vasiliy Sergeyevich Trofimenko, first secretary of the Vitebsk Belorussian Communist Party Raykom, CPSU member, city of Vitebsk, Surazhskiy Electoral District No. 146.

Belorussian Runoff, Repeat Election Results

90UN1920D Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 8 May 90 p 4

[List of Belorussian SSR people's deputies elected in the runoff and repeat elections on 28 April and 5 May 1990]

[Text] Bolotin, Mikhail Andreyevich, manager of the Suzorye enterprise for arts and crafts; CPSU member; City of Grodno. From Grodnenskiy—Dzerzhinskiy Electoral District No. 239.

Borshch, Aleksey Afanasyevich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] State Planning Committee; CPSU member; City of Minsk. From Koptevskiy Electoral District No. 244.

Bocharov, Evgeniy Mikhaylovich, military; CPSU member; City of Vitebsk. From Vitebskiy—Pravdinskiy Electoral District No. 179.

Burachkov, Valentin Fedorovich, general manager of the Veyno agricultural-trade firm Mogilevskiy Rayon; CPSU member; City of Mogilev. From Veynyanskiy Electoral District No. 281.

Velichko, Valentin Vladimirovich, secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Gomel Obkom [oblast party committee]; CPSU member; City of Gomel. From Kormyanskiy Electoral District No. 215.

Vertinskiy, Aleksandr Edmundovich, ispolkom [executive committee] deputy chairman of the Smorgon City Soviet of people's deputies; CPSU member; City of Smorgon, Grodno Oblast. From Smorgonskiy Electoral District No. 269.

Gyunter, Boris Davidovich, foreman of the fitters' team at the casts and standards plant of the Gomselmash industrial association; CPSU member; City of Gomel. From Gomelskiy-Selmashevskiy Electoral District No. 190.

Drobyshevskiy, Petr Ivanovich, manager of the Gorki machine building plant; CPSU member; City of Gorki, Mogilev Oblast. From Goretskiy Electoral District No. 190.

Zakharenko, Vladimir Vasilyevich, manager of the Vitebsk silk fabrics combine; CPSU member; City of Vitebsk. From Vitebskiy—Gorkovskiy Electoral District No. 182.

Kozlov, Gennadiy Ivanovich, deputy chief of the Minsk militia special school imeni Frunze of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs]; CPSU member; City of Minsk. From Slep'yanskiy Electoral District No. 26.

Kokoreko, Georgiy Georgiyevich, general manager of the Orsha flax-processing combine; CPSU member; City of Orsha, Vitebsk Oblast. From Orshanskiy—Zadneprovskiy Electoral District No. 170.

Kolodko, Aleksandr Stepanovich, head of the capital construction administration under the Grodno Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee]; CPSU member; City of Grodno. From Slonimskiy Electoral District No. 268.

Kurbayev, Vladimir Durdievich, senior physician of the Grodno Leninskiy Rayon territorial medical association No. 1; CPSU member; City of Grodno. From Grodnenskiy—Boldinskiy Electoral District No. 236.

Litvinov, Viktor Kuzmich, manager of the Brest dairy combine; CPSU member; City of Brest. From Brestskiy—Zavodskoy Electoral District No. 103.

Nikonchuk, Aleksey Semenovich, principal of the Drogichin secondary school No. 1; CPSU member; City of Drogichin, Brest Oblast. From Drogichinskiy Electoral District No. 117.

Pavlovskiy, Aleksandr Ivanovich, deputy chairman of the Grodno Oblast agroindustrial committee; CPSU member; City of Grodno. From Ratichskiy Electoral District No. 246.

Pisarevich, Stepan Konstantinovich, first secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Ivatsevichi Raykom [rayon party committee]; CPSU member; City of Ivatsevichi, Brest Oblast. From Kossovskiy Electoral District No. 123.

Rusak, Viktor Leonidovich, chief of the department of internal affairs of the Minsk Central Rayispolkom [rayon soviet executive committee]; CPSU member; City of Minsk. From Novovilenskiy Electoral District No. 48.

Rusakevich, Vladimir Vasilyevich, Executive Committee chairman of the Gantsevichi Rayon soviet of people's deputies; CPSU member; City of Gantsevichi, Brest Oblast. From Gantsevichskiy Electoral District No. 116.

Sayenko, Aleksey Petrovich, second secretary of the Belorussian Communist Party Brest Obkom [oblast party committee]; CPSU member; City of Brest. From David—Gorodokskiy Electoral District No. 141.

Sapronov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich, chairman of the workers' council at the Beloruskaliy association; CPSU member; City of Soligorsk, Minsk Oblast. From Soligorsk—Leninskiy Electoral District No. 89.

Studentsov, Vladimir Mikhaylovich, chief of the state motor vehicle inspectorate of the Minsk Gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee] UVD [Internal Affairs Administration]; CPSU member; City of Minsk. From Plekhanovskiy Electoral District No. 4.

Trusov, Ivan Ivanovich, manager of the "Krasny Metalist" plant, CPSU member; City of Borisov, Minsk Oblast. From Borisovskiy—Western Electoral District No. 51.

Chernysh, Vladimir Grigoryevich, chief of the Brest Oblast section of the Belorussian SSR KGB Administration; CPSU member; City of Brest. From Brestskiy—Zheleznodorozhny Electoral District No. 100.

Chirun, Vladimir Ivanovich, military medical service commander of the Gomel section of the Belorussian SSR KGB Administration; CPSU member; City of Gomel. From Gomelskiy—Volotovskiy Electoral District No. 186.

Shevnin, Aleksey Nikolayevich, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR KGB; CPSU member; City of Minsk. From Slonimskiy Electoral District No. 267.

Shidlovets, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, senior physician of the Gomel Oblast hospital for the disabled from the Great Patriotic War; CPSU member; City of Gomel. From Gomelskiy—Novobelitskiy Electoral District No. 192.

Sholodonov, Vasily Ivanovich, Gomel Oblast deputy procurator; CPSU member; City of Gomel. From Terekhovskiy Electoral District No. 206.

Yastreb, Valentina Arkadyevna, deputy principal of Soligorsk secondary school No. 5; CPSU member; City of Soligorsk, Minsk Oblast. From Soligorskii—Shakhterskiy Electoral District No. 90.

Information Cited on Belorussian Deputy Elections

90UN1920C Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 8 May 90 p 1

[Information of the Central Commission for the Election of People's Deputies of the Belorussian SSR: "Results of Repeat and Runoff Elections on 28 April and 5 May 1990"]

[Text] The Central Commission analyzed the results of the repeat election for Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies which took place in 63 electoral districts on 5 May.

Of 1,636,172 registered voters 1,008,850 (61.6 percent) took part in the election.

In accordance with the election law, the district electoral commissions registered 229 candidates for Belorussian SSR people's deputies. In 43 electoral districts there were three or more nominees; in 20 districts there were one or two nominees.

The election took place in 54 districts. Twenty two people were elected people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR. In 29 districts none of the candidates received the necessary number of votes and they will have to conduct runoff elections. The election was deemed invalid in 9 districts and in three districts with one or two nominees none of them got elected. In the last two cases repeat elections will be held.

On 5 May runoff elections were conducted in seven districts. Out of the registered 167,692 voters 121,920, or 72.7 percent, took part in them. The elections were valid in all of the 7 districts and six people were elected people's deputies. Repeat elections will be held in one of the districts.

The deputy from Borisovskiy—Western Electoral District No. 51 was elected in the runoff elections on 28 April.

According to Article 53 of the election law, the Central Commission for Election of Belorussian SSR People's Deputies registered 29 people's deputies as elected in the runoff and repeat elections.

The list of the elected deputies is published.

All in all, in the course of all the elections, 317 people were elected people's deputies of the Belorussian SSR.

On 5 May runoff and repeat elections of people's deputies to the local soviets of the republic also took place in some electoral districts.

Belorussian Communist Party Honors War Veterans, Others

90UN1895A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 10 May 90 p 1

[BELTA report: "Thank You, Hero Veterans!"]

[Text] A meeting with a group of war veterans, internationalist soldiers, servicemen of the Belorussian Military District, and youth took place on 8 May in the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee in a cordial atmosphere and in a warm and businesslike manner.

On behalf of the Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and the republic Council of Ministers, those attending the meeting were greeted by Belorussian Communist Party Central Committee First Secretary Ye. Ye. Sokolov. He wished them good health, fine feelings, and happiness.

We have gathered together to remember the incredibly high price at which the Victory was won. Ye. Ye. Sokolov emphasized. Millions of lives paid for the bright years of peace for the peoples of the land of the soviets, whose heroic representatives conducted themselves so well in the fire of the fronts, in the partisan detachments, at the lathes of the defense plants, and on the fields of the kolkhozes [state farms] during the war, just as you did, dear veterans. We have also gathered to remember those who today, taking advantage of glasnost, are trying to cast doubt on the gains of Soviet power and on the decisive role played by the international unity of all the nations and nationalities to achieve the Victory. Enormous gratitude is in order for the fact that even today, in the far from simple situation of perestroika processes, you remain as unbending soldiers of the party who have

aroused your combat comrades at the front and are now making a significant contribution to the acceleration of the gigantic changes in our country, and in this complicated situation are defending the unity and cohesion of all healthy forces in society.

Ye.Ye. Sokolov informed those present at the meeting about the measures being implemented to further strengthen the republic's economic independence, the preparations being made by the Belorussian party organization for the upcoming 28th CPSU Congress, and the qualitatively new approaches in party work which are typified by a turn to the needs and requirements of specific people and to radical improvement in the life of the people, including the veterans, who have done so much for the country. With their enormous experience of life and their Bolshevik tempering, even today the veterans are providing invaluable assistance for the party, both with advice and with concrete deeds, and are delivering a decisive rebuff to the attacks on perestroika and on the glorious past of the Soviet people.

Those speaking at the meeting—the chairman of the Belorussian Republic Council of War and Labor Veterans, Hero of Socialist Labor A.Ye. Andreyev, and his brothers-in-arms in the partisan movement in Belorussia I.B. Kardash, N.Ye. Avkhimovich, I.M. Glaskov, M.M. Dzhagarov, I.F. Klimov, T.N. Strizhak, and Hero of the Soviet Union A.A. Filimonov, and former frontline fighters K.V. Matyushevskiy, M.D. Zhukovskiy, and A.D. Borovkov—offered their warm gratitude for the concern for veterans and made a number of proposals and criticisms aimed at deepening and accelerating the economic and social transformations in the republic and in the country. Thus, in particular, many of those who spoke expressed concern about the lack of any constructive tone in the statements made by some mass media organs, including party publications, which are sometimes clearly aimed against the CPSU and the Soviet Army. The veterans sharply raised this question: Why are the Leninist positions and principles bought at such cost by the older generation now being publicly dishonored at meetings of the various informal associations without being properly rebuffed by the communists?

Questions were also raised pertaining to the unsatisfactory compliance by some ministries and departments with government decisions aimed at improving life and support for pensioners and the disabled. The veterans talked about the need to revive former contacts with the youth organizations, particularly in military-patriotic indoctrination and in preparing young people for service in the army, and instilling in the rising generation internationalism and respect for the traditions and customs of all peoples in the land of the soviets.

The older communists were warmly greeted by the president of the republic association of internationalist soldiers, V. Kurdyukov. Soldiers from the Minsk garrison wished them health, long life, and inexhaustible energy.

The following took part in the meeting: Comrades N. I. Dementey, V. I. Boris, V. I. Goncharuk, A. S. Kamay, A. I. Kostenko, and V. A. Pechennikov, and member of the Belorussia Military District Military Council, Lieutenant General A.N. Novikov.

Sillari Addresses Estonian Party Plenum

90UN19624 Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 17 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Report by E. A. Sillari, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, to Estonian Communist Party Central Committee Fifth Plenum on 14 May 1990]

[Text] Dear Comrades!

Six weeks have elapsed since the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress and the proclamation of the independent Estonian Communist Party. Today's plenum is the first at which the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee has in its new capacity examined basic conceptual issues.

What is this new capacity?

First of all, the Estonian Communist Party has lost or is now losing a large part of its composition—members of the official ruling party. It no longer encompasses the vast majority of the politically assertive population and executive personnel.

Second, what is happening currently in the political life of Estonia no longer depends to a decisive extent on the Estonian Communist Party. Evaluating the political situation today, we do not view it in the old way as a result of the activity of the Estonian Communist Party. Estonia's political life depends on many forces both within Estonia and outside. The Estonian Communist Party is just one of these forces.

And, third, proceeding from what has been said, it should be acknowledged that Estonia is developing by no means as envisaged just a few years ago even by our party program documents. And in this sense also we are not today perceived as the guiding and directing force.

What has happened?

When perestroika began in April 1985, no one was thinking of the disintegration of the empire. However, the easing of political and ideological pressure immediately revealed the main problems which had long been present in the depths of society, including a most serious one—national self-preservation.

As soon as the possibility of freely shaping a viewpoint in respect of many important problems of our life emerged, the previous formal unity and monolithic nature of the Estonian Communist Party numbering 110,000 members were scattered. On the main problem of Estonian society—statehood—three positions were revealed as early as 1988. Under various slogans some members of

the Estonian Communist Party began to put up resistance to the birth of Estonian independence, and for some time this was the prevailing approach in the party. Others, recognizing the weight of the burden of the past and the former limited opportunities for self-expression in the party, began to seek an opportunity for political work outside of the Estonian Communist Party. Yet others embarked on changing the party itself. As of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee 11th Plenum, which was held in September 1988, the Estonian Communist Party tried for the first time in its history to express the will of people. This was a fundamental turning point, but it was not further developed in the changing political situation. This, together with the constant attempts to consolidate too varied forces and also the burden of historical guilt, led to a new crisis of confidence, which is making itself felt even today.

There has as of the present been a thorough change in the situation in Estonia and in the Estonian Communist Party also. A new Supreme Soviet was elected on 18 March. The Congress of Estonia was an event in Estonia's political life. Thus in place of the old political structures, new democratic institutions expressing the will of the people are taking shape. On 30 March the Supreme Soviet proclaimed a transitional period, which will culminate in the restoration of the Republic of Estonia. Article 6 of the Basic Law was revoked, which initiated constitutional transition to a multiparty system. New steps en route to statehood were taken on 8 May.

As of the present the split in the Estonian Communist Party has deepened even more. However, it has transpired since the 20th Congress that there are many also of those who are prepared to continue political activity precisely in an Estonia-centrist Estonian Communist Party. There are many reasons for this. The most essential of them is the ascertainment based on a sober evaluation of the actual situation that the Estonian Communist Party has the prerequisites for balancing the relations of the Estonian and Russian communities and thereby achieving mutual understanding, which has as yet been beyond both the People's Front and the citizens' committees and which will hardly be within the capacity of the liberals or social democrats. But without this, progress will be complicated. In addition, in the struggle against the Union republics' aspiration to independence all-Union conservative forces are gambling to a large extent precisely on the representatives of the other peoples living in these republics. But the main force uniting them is the Communist Party. Whence the position of many of Estonia's Communists with a sense of responsibility: to remain in an independent Estonian Communist Party and thereby support the unification of Estonian Communists adhering to the positions of the people and democratic communist non-Estonians supporting the right of the Estonian people to self-determination and to prevent the use of the Communist Party as a tool against Estonia's acquisition of independence.

In spite of all the political peripeteias, an understanding that Estonia's future will depend to a decisive extent on political and economic contacts with the East is gaining the ascendancy. For Moscow the Communist Party is the political partner with which dealings are had and which thus has an opportunity for resolving the Estonian question. Given the existence of several communist parties, it is by no means a matter of indifference which of them is supported by membership thereof.

Nor is it a matter of indifference that the Estonian Communist Party is changing from an apparat party into a people's party. In the program adopted at the 20th Congress we renounced many dogmatic assertions. The paths of the Estonian Communist Party's further development will be determined not by the party leadership but by its members. It may be said today that the basic positions of the progressive part of the Estonian Communist Party, which were presented at the 19th All-Union Party Conference and which did not meet with understanding there, are now contained in the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress.

1. A central question of Estonia's current policy is undoubtedly the question of statehood. Opinion polls confirm that more than 90 percent of Estonians and half of non-Estonians are supporters of the republic's independence. Thus more than two-thirds of inhabitants of Estonia wish to see it free and independent.

But it would seem that the Estonian Communist Party's position on this question is still not clear to many people, although the 20th Congress clearly defined our party's position on the question of Estonia's statehood. We proceed here from the decision of the Congress of USSR People's Deputies on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact and the secret appendices to it and also the historical and legal evaluation of the 1940 events made by the Estonian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet. Estonia's annexation to the USSR was forcible, and for this reason is it essential that justice be restored. The position of the Estonian Communist Party on this question coincides with the position of the majority of political forces supporting Estonia's independence. This position should be understandable to non-Estonians living in the republic also. After all, the vast majority of them wishes to continue to live in Estonia and has no desire to fight against Estonians.

I should in this connection say a few words about the law enacted by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet on 8 May. I believe that the legal and political significance of this law is in need of considerable disclosure and extensive commentary on the part of the Supreme Soviet Presidium. The population has difficulty understanding its legal essence in its present form, and this has caused a sharp reaction in the Russian community. The Supreme Soviet should subsequently avoid undue haste in the preparation of important decisions in order that they be legally beyond reproach. It should be emphasized also

that on the road to independence we need primarily allies, and we should learn to find them both here, in Estonia, and outside.

The party program adopted at the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress reveals to some extent our view of the restoration of Estonia's independent statehood. But we need to go further. The restoration of Estonia's independence does not, in our view, mean the identical restoration of the power structures which existed prior to the annexation. Much has changed in the world in the past 50 years. An independent Republic of Estonia may be born only as the result of the efforts of the Estonians living in Estonia, Estonians who move here, and the non-Estonians who wish to link their fate with Estonia. In order for these efforts to be as successful as possible it is essential to give thought to the uniform tactics of all supporters of independence. But no one party or movement can of its own accord create uniform tactics independently. They may and should be the fruit of cooperation based on a sense of responsibility and good will.

And, further, for us Estonia's independence represents a value merely in the event of the democratic arrangement of its society. But let us be honest—different development is, after all, possible, and an independent undemocratic republic cannot be ruled out, and certain features already point to this danger today. At the same time, however, hoping for the democratization of society without Estonia's independence would under our conditions be naive. Generally, the Estonian Communist Party is for an independent Estonia, not just any, but a democratic Estonia.

It seems to me that at the present stage of progress toward independent statehood we need once again to talk about legal enactments, which have come to a standstill, as it were. One of them is a law on parties. We welcome the decision of the Supreme Soviet Presidium on the registration of several parties. A law regulating the relations ensuing from this is now a practical necessity. The Estonian Communist Party has already taken the initiative on this matter, and the business should now be completed.

Further, we believe that it is right to once again return to the Citizenship Act, which was formerly postponed, in its so-called zero version. We have already emphasized that considerable numbers of the non-Estonian population are disposed toward recognition of independent statehood as Estonia's future and see themselves as citizens of an independent Estonia. It is essential to afford people a guarantee of civil rights legislatively!

It is justified, in our view, to raise the question of the elaboration of a new basic law of the Republic of Estonia, which could be enacted following nationwide discussion by way of a referendum. It is a question precisely of a referendum on the basic law, not a referendum on the question of official status. The latter should not be decided in this way.

Considering the present position of Estonia and its demographic situation, a basic law adopted by referendum would express the people's wishes so indisputably that, considering the traditions of international law, other states could not fail to recognize it and the jurisdiction of no other state could extend to it. This could be our path to independence. But at the same time it should not be forgotten that the acquisition of independence is a process in which the economic, political, and social foundations should be created together with the legal foundations since the achievement of real state independence does not amount to the adoption of the corresponding political enactment by overwhelming majority. Balancing politically the interests of the different nationalities and national groups and providing security guarantees is extremely important for this also.

The 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress spoke of the need for civic peace, and the corresponding resolution was adopted on the initiative of Tartu social scientists. Now the initiative of the Tartu people is acquiring specific contours, and people from Tallinn, Kokhtla-Yarve, and Narva have subscribed to the appeal. The constituent assembly of the "Civic Peace" society, in which representatives of the said regions participated, was held on 21 April in Tartu. The society's charter and a "Social Contract" on civic peace, with which both public organizations and individual citizens are called upon to affiliate, were drawn up. It is planned to convene a democratic forum of Estonian landmen with the participation of movements and citizens who support the draft contract, which was published recently in the press.

It seems to me, and I am counting also on the support of members of the Central Committee, that the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee is prepared to sign it. The basic idea of the contract on civic peace is close to the positions of the Estonian Communist Party. We wish also to support everything which unites different national groups and makes it possible to calmly and steadily continue the road toward independence and democracy.

Aside from the general principles, this contract contains one point which I would now like to emphasize particularly. All three Baltic republics have embarked on the creation of alternative formations to maintain order, and this is being done with us, for example, both in the form of the "Kaitseliyta" and in the guise of worker squads. The emergence of such forces, which are extremely contradictory in terms of their focus, is extraordinarily dangerous and could in a particular situation become a so-called "self-igniting element." If we add to this the calls and appeals which are being made by the first secretaries of the Latvian and Lithuanian Communist Parties adhering to the CPSU platform, such a confrontation is engendering a presentiment of civil war. Against this background I wish on behalf of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee to say firmly that the Estonian Communist Party will never on any pretext call for the igniting of mutual hostility. Let us on behalf of

the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee appeal to all movements and parties for an abandonment of the creation of such formations and the cancellation of the planned measures connected with their creation and activity.

The Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet has sufficient forces and power at its disposal to maintain order, at the same time exercising supervision of Ministry of Internal Affairs subdivisions. The threat of the use of weapons in politics needs to be reduced to the minimum.

What, however, awaits us in practice? It is becoming clear that the response to the proclamation of the republics of Latvia and Estonia will be different from the Lithuanian version: the retaliatory strike will be based mainly on the use of internal forces, so to speak. It can already be clearly seen in Latvia that the Interfront, the United Council of Labor Collectives, and the Latvian Communist Party have merged.

The main directions of action are the creation of worker squads, the formation of alternative authorities, the calling of a general political strike, and a request to the authorities protecting public order, the Soviet Army, and the border and internal troops that they intervene in the situation directly. The purpose of this whole activity is "the restoration of Soviet power in Latvia." We, however, believe that this sets course toward civil war.

Such activity developed at the end of last week with us also. Joint actions with the strike committee were initiated by the same forces, and common activities are planned. It is our duty to be ready for this, remain calm, not succumb to provocations, and take account of the lessons of last year's wave of strikes.

The Estonian Communist Party appeals also to the workers of Union enterprises, primarily the Communists, to maintain in all political activities a sense of responsibility and avoid steps which would have a paralyzing effect on our economy, which is in a state of crisis.

Estonia's path toward independence has as yet been relatively straight, and this has been a consequence of the well-conceived and relatively tolerant policy of different, frequently opposite forces even. The Estonian Communist Party, whose democratic wing has in critical situations displayed soberness and has not aspired to satisfy its party interests and ambitions at the expense of society's stability, has made its contribution also.

Now also we believe that under the conditions of political and economic crisis it would be correct not to look for contradictions but to support the activity of the organs of power and administration aimed at ensuring the stability of society and the accomplishment of radical reforms and Estonia's real independence. This does not, of course, rule out the formulation and defense of our own development plans and also constructive opposition. The general interests of the people must continue to be higher than party interests.

Two fundamentally different institutions currently exist side by side on Estonia's political landscape: the Supreme Soviet and the Congress and Committee of Estonia. Their existence reflects political and legal realities which have been accumulating for 50 years and the aspiration of Estonian people to the restoration of their independent existence, and at the same time their will to achieve this at the price of as few misfires as possible. Theoretically the Supreme Soviet and the Estonia Committee should complement and support one another, thereby laying a bridge from the past into the future. But the idea and will of the people are at odds with the aspirations of some politicians. Instead of the formation of a common popular front, party-group rivalry in the Estonian Communist Party has been manifested, which, in turn, has engendered friction between the Supreme Soviet and the Estonia Committee. Instead of the proclaimed constructive cooperation, we are witnessing a continuing struggle for leadership in the hierarchy of power. Clearly, only the people themselves can bring together the political disagreements and ambitions of politicians and direct policy into the channel which they deem correct. The party-group struggle should not leave the parliament building. Otherwise it will be difficult for us to avoid a profound new crisis in Estonia.

We are following with interest the formation of social democratic parties, primarily the Estonian Social Democratic Workers Party, which will very shortly hold its constituent congress. The social democratic and communist parties have common historical roots. A comparison of their program documents affords grounds for hope of cooperation—primarily in defense of working people's social gains in the severe times of introduction of a market economy.

II. And now we have come to economic policy. The Estonian Communist Party program notes that the party sees transition to a market economy as the sole way out of the economic crisis. The need for the application of market relations emphasizes increasingly significant pro-Estonian social and political movements [sentence as published]. There are no differences of opinion here. For this reason the center of gravity of political struggle is shifting to the strategy and tactics of transition to the market economy. And this struggle will intensify following promulgation of the government program, in which we would like to see not abstract arguments but a set of specific measures.

A fetish is being made of the market economy to a large extent. Without its essence having been revealed, it is being seen as an all-purpose way out of the current crisis situation. At the same time, however, there is an absence of theoretically substantiated forecasts and calculations connected with the influence of the transition to market relations on economic processes. It cannot be forgotten that the state-run economy of the totalitarian society did, for all that, for a time ensure a certain living standard. The bulk of the population has become accustomed to this as to something which goes without saying. And the politicians who suppose that the people will agree to a

fall in their living standard in the hope of everything changing for the better in the future are super-naïve. And who could guarantee this today? The population needs dependable guarantees at each stage of the transition to the market economy. This means the specific responsibility of the Republic of Estonia Supreme Soviet and Government for the substantiated nature of the decisions they adopt. Otherwise the impoverishment of a multitude of people up to and including the formation of economically outcast groups of the population and, consequently, the appearance of the social base for the stormy manifestation of discontent with the market economy only just coming into being are forecast. A new political crisis would then be inevitable.

It is wrong, in our view, therefore, to reduce transition to market regulation merely to the formulation and introduction of laws controlling management-economic activity. This must be combined with social development programs which record the main goals and also the resources necessary for their achievement. I repeat a proposition of the Estonian Communist Party program: to give preference to social assistance to fellow citizens with income below the subsistence minimum and satisfaction of the most elementary requirements of a sphere of life of decisive significance for the future of society—education and science.

Currently the public at large has no clear idea of the state of the economy. The publication of Central Statistical Administration analyses has been suspended. Regular surveys in the form of analyses of the statistics department or government reports are essential. I would like to hope that it is on questions of the economy that such a form of work as the deputies' questions and the answers to them of members of the government in the Supreme Soviet is infused with content. And answers which are not superficial and formal, what is more.

Greater glasnost is needed at the time of formation of the legal basis of the new economic relations. Laws on property, land, and taxation are essential. We know that they are being drawn up. But on what principles? There is no basic law! The people must have more information about these matters.

The Estonian Communist Party regards economic innovations not only as a way out of the present crisis but also as the laying of the foundation for a renewal of the technological base of society. Proceeding from this, we consider it important that foreign economic relations accelerating the updating of technology take shape. These relations also require precise economic and legal safeguards. Otherwise commercial relations will be dominated by essentially secondary partners exporting our national wealth for various trifles.

We must self-critically acknowledge that the Central Committee has not progressed all that far in the formulation of its own economic program since the 20th Congress. All the more important for us also is the anticipated government economic program.

III. In conclusion, about the situation in the party itself.

As of 1 April of this year there were in our republic over 102,000 registered members of the CPSU. In four months of this year we have lost almost 12,000 CPSU members, the vast majority of them at their own request. At the same time, on the other hand, 67 persons have been admitted as party members; eight people, among whom there are several Estonians also, have become party candidates.

Two lines of development are being observed at the present time:

The first: In four months of 1990 almost three times more people have left the party than in all of the previous year as a whole.

The second: Compared with the same period last year, party membership admittance has declined by a factor of almost 2.5.

These processes need to be seen in close connection with the events in East Europe and the USSR, the Baltic peoples' movement for independence, and the change in the correlation of political forces in Estonia. Obviously, the most difficult moment in the change that is occurring has now come: A party which until now held sway has renounced power, and there has been a retaliatory response of its members. We have not yet found our new place in the structure of political forces, and this is intensifying the confusion even more.

In addition, pressure on the Communists has increased in today's political atmosphere. The press has switched from historical evaluations of the activity of the CPSU and the Estonian Communist Party to criticism of past and present activity of specific Communists and, in certain cases, to compromising them. All this is creating the corresponding mood at city, district, and work force level also.

Aware of the situation, many Communists are preferring to quit the party. The majority of district elders and the chairmen of district commissioner soviets have quit the party or are intending to do so in the immediate future. Conversations with them show that this step is, as a rule, necessary for the creation of a normal work atmosphere. The viewpoint that only nonparty persons should work in government itself and its departments has taken shape in certain districts. What we are talking about here essentially is a professional ban, the democratic nature of which is highly questionable, particularly when it will be applied in respect of one party—the Communist Party.

Frequently among the first to submit their resignations from the party are the leaders of labor collectives. From a fear of falling out of favor, the leader's example is followed by chief specialists, then leaders of the middle tier and, finally, the communist rank and file. The negative attitude toward Communists in general which is taking shape, the instability of the USSR as a whole, and the intrarepublic struggle of parties and groups for power

beneath a screen of struggle for Estonia's independent statehood, an abundance of political demagoguery, and political fatigue and satiety brought on by all this are prompting people to leave the party and quit politics altogether.

It is essential to see also our own mistakes and miscalculations and also the objectiveness and inevitability of the process of a numerical reduction in the Communist Party. After all, each Communist must choose for himself. Some Communists have from the very outset struggled against the idea of Estonia's independent statehood—some in the ranks of the Intermovement, some in the strike committees. Now they have their own party organization also. This is their choice; they have made their decision. There are people who, recognizing their responsibility for the party's past deeds and aware of the Estonian Communist Party's guilt in the elimination of Estonia's independent statehood, have decided to no longer compromise themselves by membership of the Communist Party. We can understand them, and it cannot be ruled out that the future course of development of the Estonian Communist Party will bring many people back to our ranks. It is true, there is among those who have left a particular contingent against whom it has come to be said that there are among Estonia's new politicians two types: Communists and careerists. It is clear, after all, that it is now easier to "mix with people" if one is not a member of the Estonian Communist Party.

A third way has been chosen by those who support the decisions of the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress. This is the most difficult choice inasmuch as it presupposes practical daily work for the good of Estonia and a restoration of its statehood.

Preservation of the party at all costs cannot be an end in itself. The Estonian Communist Party, like other political forces also, is necessary for the building of a prudent future for Estonia. This is our mission. It will be performed by those who are already registered with the Estonian Communist Party and those who intend being such in the very near future. A party which takes shape under such difficult conditions will have a place in the future politics of Estonia also. Of this there is no doubt.

A few words about the split in the party which occurred following the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress. The incorrect idea has taken shape in certain circles to the effect that two equal parties have emerged. This is not the case. A fragment has broken off from the republic organization. The numbers of those that have broken off amount, we estimate, to approximately 15,000. We do not know what their choice will be following the 28th CPSU Congress, whether they will associate themselves with the Russian Communist Party or whether this will be some kind of section of the CPSU in Estonia. But we know that there are among the supporters of this line many Communists who will in time necessarily come to understand that people with any philosophy, with any

native language, cannot, if they wish to live in Estonia, struggle against the Estonian people and their aspirations.

We categorically condemn the political discrimination which has come to be employed extensively by the grouping which has broken off from the Estonian Communist Party. We condemn the campaign of slander it is developing against the Estonian Communist Party, the tactics of deception and intimidation of the Communists in the primary party organizations, and the punitive measures in respect of independently minded officials of the party apparatus. Considering the attitude of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo toward the emergence of the above-mentioned grouping, we may hope that these actions, which smack of Stalinism, will be justly evaluated on the part of CPSU Central Committee.

Indeed, one is astonished by the situation which has come about precisely in the party organizations which consider themselves to be adhering to the positions of the CPSU, where the requirements of the CPSU Rules are being most flagrantly violated and where the most militant defenders of the CPSU line are encouraging breaches of the party rules in every possible way, sponsoring this, and even organizing these violations themselves. In a whole number of party organizations adhering to the positions of the CPSU decisions have been adopted on the payment of party membership dues not in accordance with the CPSU Rules but in the amount of one percent. They are refusing to transfer the membership dues which have been received to accounts of the rayon party committee or the Central Committee, and in some instances the party organizer is putting the money which has been collected in a personal savings account or a safe even. Not to mention the party conference in Tallinn's Morskiy Rayon, which was organized in defiance of the requirements of the CPSU Rules and which was needed only to ensure that the composition of the raykom [rayon party committee] be made suitable to the local leader.

Such a modus operandi is paralyzing normal party work and creating an unhealthy situation in the primary party and rayon organizations. The activity of the Tallinn Gorkom [City Party Committee] Bureau has been paralyzed, and relations between secretaries of the gorkom and the gorkom and certain raykoms are abnormal. All this is forcing us to raise the question of the need for a transformation of the structure of the party organization of the city of Tallinn.

We have also been forced to spend much time and energy on dispelling artificially created tension. This, incidentally, is a reason why in the six weeks since the congress the Estonian Communist Party has been unable to participate fully in the political life of the republic. Yet the coalition Central Committee created at the congress had such an opportunity.

But let us be critical of ourselves also.

What was achieved at the congress, the striking demonstration of the different areas of focus by means of television and radio included, has not since the congress been duly developed. The material of the congress has taken too long to reach people.

Membership of the Estonian Communist Party has still not been infused with serious practical content, and registration of people's free choice, of the most serious decision in their lives, perhaps, has for six weeks now been conducted haphazardly. The first batch of Estonian Communist Party registration cards was issued to the party committees only on 8 May. Besides the technical difficulties, elementary practical impotence is manifested distinctly here. We cannot permit ourselves this.

The apparatus of the city and district committees is being replaced, and in the present complex situation the new people are frequently deficient in ability and knowledge, what is more.

Rarely have we appeared in the press and on radio and television, and rarely has it been possible to glimpse Central Committee, gorkom and raykom/district committee officials in the work force.

Many apparatus officials have indifferently let matters drift. The ordinary Communist is noticing this with particular distress against the background of the active efforts of other parties and movements.

The Estonian Communist Party has not succeeded in forming its own clear-cut representation in the Supreme Soviet. A faction which does not represent the policy course of the 20th Estonian Communist Party Congress has thereby been afforded an opportunity to act on behalf of the Estonian Communist Party.

People who might be prepared to associate with the Estonian Communist Party expect from it not loud, proud, and handsome promises but practicable proposals fit for implementation and initiatives in the Supreme Soviet. There are enough windbags and phrasemongers without the Estonian Communist Party adding to them.

The thought has been expressed in conversations with the Communists that there has as yet been insufficient specificity in the work of the Estonian Communist Party, but on the other hand, enough limpness and timorousness, which is typical today of many Communists and which is preventing implementation of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party and the more solid formation of its membership.

This work is proving more successful in Tallinn, where over 800 Communists have been registered, 335 of these in Kalininskiy and Morskiy rayons. An active start has been made also in Rapla, Kokhtla-Yarveskiy Rayon (Vostochnyy Virumaa), Vyrü, Valga, and Tartumaa. I would like to see more initiative from the party organizations of Tartu and Pylvamaa.

So we have taken only the first steps in respect of formation of the membership of the Estonian Communist Party. To ensure its right to life we must operate efficiently and scrupulously, taking the program propositions of the Estonian Communist Party as a basis.

A Most Important Issue—Preparations for the 28th CPSU Congress

Now, when a Russian Communist Party is taking shape and the organizational composition of the CPSU is changing, the continuation of the Estonian Communist Party as a local organization of a monolithic all-Union party is practically precluded. We have sufficient sorry experience not to repeat old mistakes. The Estonian Communist Party may draw strength only from the trust of the people, but by no means from the strength of central authorities.

The political situation in the CPSU today is complex. As of the present time there are 19 all-party platforms, which it is planned presenting to the 28th CPSU Congress. Of these, three platforms have been published: the CPSU Central Committee Platform "Toward Humane, Democratic Socialism" was published on 15 February in the republic papers and in the April issue of the journal POLITIKA; PRAVDA published on 3 March the "Democratic Platform;" and the same paper for 17 April acquainted us with the "Marxist Platform of the CPSU." The belief has been expressed in the CPSU Central Committee that a further four or five platforms will be published prior to the 28th CPSU Congress. It is likely that the draft approved at a CPSU Central Committee plenum will gain the support of the majority of delegates at the congress.

As you know, an underlying document of the Estonian Communist Party program was the CPSU Central Committee platform—humane and democratic socialism. It is directed against dogmatism, totalitarianism, and alienation. Economic, cultural, and political nihilism is condemned. The emphasis is put essentially on private ownership. A multiparty system and the principle of a separation of powers are recognized. At the same time, however, the model of socialism of the past and the present are subsumed beneath a common denominator, and emphasis is put on reforms within the framework of a planned-market economy. The interpretation of nationality policy entirely fails to satisfy us.

The "Marxist Platform of the CPSU" calls for a return to the ideas of K. Marx. On the basis of strictly public ownership it hopes to democratize society while ignoring here even the USSR's negative experience in respect of the introduction of collective forms of ownership. What we have essentially is an attempt to once again resuscitate the rejected model of state socialism.

From the viewpoint of the Estonian Communist Party the "Democratic Platform" best serves as a basis for discussion. It presents the ideological, political, organizational, and moral reasons for the crisis of Soviet

society and the CPSU. It is explained why the old model of the party is failing to justify itself, which forces the CPSU to change from a vanguard party into a parliamentary party. A two-stage development is envisaged to this end: The CPSU gives back power to the soviets and then becomes a parliamentary-type party within the framework of a multiparty political system. It is essential to abandon dogmatically understood democratic centralism in favor of democratic principles of government.

The "Democratic Platform" ends with the conclusion that unless the CPSU is radically reformed, the party will find itself a political bankrupt, as happened in Poland, or will, in line with China's example, come to establish a dictatorship.

An analysis of the different platforms of the CPSU leads us once again to the conclusion that the delegates to 28th CPSU Congress elected from Estonia should go to the congress with their own platform which reflects the viewpoint of Estonia's Communists. Preliminary work on drawing up the platform has begun. We are also relying in this work on the experience of other democratic forces of the USSR. The contacts and basis for such cooperation have as of the present time been established. Naturally, the Estonian Communist Party will not interfere in the political struggle of the leaders of the different platforms.

Intraparty life with us now is characterized by a certain degree of puzzlement: The old methods of work are not appropriate in the new situation, but others have yet to be worked out. People look to the Central Committee expecting, as before, instructions and decisions acceptable to all.

But we can no longer provide them. We can only point to some areas of activity, of fundamental importance in our view, whose introduction depends, naturally, on local conditions and the will of party members.

Primarily the city and district party committees may do only what the members of the party themselves deem necessary. Now membership of the Estonian Communist Party should mean, if we may permit ourselves a slight exaggeration, that a party member benefits from being in the party.

We encounter in the party today the exponents of quite diverse political views. Our coalition Central Committee represents the coexistence of different factions. The same thing is taking shape in the district and city committees: The different opinions of party members are being manifested, debate is under way and so forth within the framework of certain general program propositions. The party clubs emerging in Tallinn and Tartu are the correct form for intraparty activity ensuing from this. There is nothing terrible about the fact that in some cases members of the Estonian Communist Party are associating in the primary party organizations on the basis of platforms. This is not directly agreed on in our statute of the transitional period or in the draft rules, but if reality so requires, it will be necessary on this and

other points to reconsider the organizational forms of the party. From the viewpoint of party discipline the basis will be the Estonian Communist Party Program, which says that party members should be guided by general political decisions, "retaining the possibility of defending their particular opinion."

This presupposes also a transformation of the work of the city and district committees. Until now the party committees have been mainly the whereabouts of the corresponding apparatus and the place where bureau or committee meetings were held. Now the party committee is becoming a natural place for meetings and contacts, where party work in essence is performed. This is particularly important for the people in party organizations whose activity at the place of work has been suspended—in many cities and districts they have been left out of it, as it were. The same applies to the Communists who are working in outfits where just individual members of the Estonian Communist Party remain.

This is, perhaps, superfluous, but we will emphasize once again that the existence of members of the Estonian Communist Party and organizations on an equal basis and their cooperation is not an end in itself. It is necessary for specific political work. What these actions are, what kind of policy is pursued—this will depend on local conditions. The Central Committee can only advise. It should be in a position to offer local organizations and specialists assistance in performing work in particular areas. Whence the need for its own policy analysis center, which we are starting to form both on the basis of the former Party History Institute and the resources of the "Sakala" Center. In some cases the role of the Central Committee will amount to indicating urgent areas of action in which the party organizations should involve themselves, imparting specific content to the work in each instance. One such is the participation of Estonian Communist Party organizations in the reform of local self-government. This is not only a legal matter. From the very start of the introduction of IME [Self-Managing Estonia] it was emphasized that the key level of the revival of the economy and social life are the city, the district, and the volost. Self-governing communities, without which financial autonomy and self-regulation are inconceivable, should emerge here. It seems that formation of the foundations of local development has come to a halt, as it were. We consider the influence of Estonian Communist Party organizations on the local commissioner soviets inadequate. Such questions as the social focus of economic life in the district or city and fiscal and tax policy require solutions. In a word, their economic independence. To this end the platform of Estonian Communist Party organizations must be precise. The Narva city party organization, which has presented to the administration its substantiated proposals concerning the city's economic independence, has gone furthest in this matter. Implementation of the ideas of financial autonomy together with the social and economic development of the city and district will, in our view, strengthen also the feeling of social assurance of people of different nationalities. For the political unanimity of Estonian landmen and civic peace this is very important.

Dear Comrades! The report has been heard. In former times all would have been simple: Everything has been put in its place, tomorrow the newspapers will publish it, and now let us get down to work. Now, however, we have conclusively determined nothing. We need to discuss how we will proceed. If the report has evoked in members of the plenum certain thoughts, let us listen to one another and try to think things over together and come to some constructive conclusions. For my part, that is all. Thank you for your attention!

Latvian Referendum on Independence Urged

90UN2033C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
25 May 90 p 3

["A Referendum Is Necessary—Resolution of a General Meeting of the Tsesisskiy Rayon Organization of the Communist Party of Latvia"]

[Text] Endorsing the constitutional right of the people of Latvia to organize a sovereign independent state, and affirming our full recognition and respect for the right of any nation to self-determination right up to separation, we cannot agree with the fact that the decision about changing the status and state structure of the republic is being made without taking our opinion into account, as well as that of hundreds of thousands of Latvian workers.

The communists of the rayon believe that the Declaration "On the Restoration of the Independence of the Latvian Republic," which was adopted on 4 May 1990 at the First Session of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the Twelfth Convocation, is an anti-constitutional act, inasmuch as a decision on the status of the Latvian Republic as a state outside the Union SSR can be made only on the basis of a nationwide vote (referendum).

We appeal to our supporters to endorse the appeal of the deputy group "Ravnopraviye" ["Equality of Rights"], and to start a campaign to collect signatures under a demand that the Supreme Soviet of the republic hold a referendum.

General meeting of the Tsesisskiy Rayon organization of the Communist Party of Latvia.

Latvia's Rubiks Meets with Electorate

90UN2025A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
18 May 90 p 1

[V. Polyanskiy report on meeting of A. Rubiks, member of USSR Supreme Soviet and Latvian people's deputy, with electorate on 16 May: "A. Rubiks: 'I Consider This Government Illegal'"]

[Text] "I consider this government illegal." Thus answered the member of the USSR Supreme Soviet and Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputy at a meeting with his electorate when he was asked the question, "Who has authorized you to engage in propaganda against the government of Latvia?"

The deputies' meeting with his constituency took place on 16 May in a crowded hall. When A. Rubiks entered one heard not only applause but also the whistles of those who were trying to break up the meeting or at least drive the deputy into a corner with their questions. One of these questions is cited above. There were others which were presented in an insulting, crude form and, to put it lightly, which did not characterize the questioners as people educated according to the traditions of European civilization.

To a certain extent this minority group which was present in the audience helped make the meeting more heated. And one may only thank the opposition for this. In this instance the opposition only scored points against itself and in this fashion helped A. Rubiks and the voters supporting him to expose the hypocrisy, lies, and cheating which we are being fed so abundantly by the "fathers" and "teachers" of Latvia's perestroika.

To affirm his opinion about the illegality of the government currently existing in Latvia, A. Rubiks said:

"The people's deputies of the Latvian SSR renamed themselves deputies of the Republic of Latvia and declared that they were seceding from the Soviet Union, crudely ignoring the democratic norms established by Soviet law for secession from the Soviet Union. Think about how they would react in the United States of America if even one of the American states acted in a similar fashion."

[Question] What is the attitude of the leadership of our country to such an arbitrary act?

[Rubiks] It is considered to be an act which did not have legal force the moment it was adopted. This evaluation was expressed in the USSR president's Edict "On the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet's Declaration 'On the Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia.'" Each of us must secure implementation of this presidential edict. And we must secure the political struggle by all accessible means. Committees for the defense of citizens are being created now. Each of us must determine his own position and decide once and for all whom he is with—with the power which will be in the hands of the workers, or with those who are determined to decide for the people, who lie, and who appeal for extremism. Incidentally, a great number of members of fighting groups [boyeviki] are being trained in the republic, and they have transportation registered to them. And all this is being done under the auspices of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia].

A. Rubiks went on to read out the full text of a document which was officially distributed from the press center of the Latvian Supreme Soviet on 16 May and is called "In the Governing Board of the NFL." In particular it says there allegedly "were many people in a state of alcoholic excitation" among the Riga demonstrators on 15 May. The demonstrators were characterized as "groups of hooligans." The Duma of the NFL stresses that the 15 May incident arose immediately after the presidential

edict on the invalidity of the Declaration adopted on 4 May. Furthermore, it says: "The People's Front of Latvia warns everyone that in the event of a repetition of the attack on parliament and of attempts to violate order in the republic, it reserves the right to request that its numerous adherents in Riga and in the republic come to the defense of the legally elected Supreme Soviet. The NFL also warns that forcible actions by the opponents of change will prompt the regional departments of the front to begin forming self-defense detachments."

It is too much! If there is anyone inflaming interethnic hostility, it is the authors of these types of appeals.

"We will react accordingly," said A. Rubiks. "I promise that the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee will support the republic's healthy forces. But we are in favor of settling all problems in a civil manner. Nonetheless I cannot guarantee today that we will be able to avoid some sort of serious confrontation: Too many people still believe irresponsible assurances and rely on the pretty words of numerous and impossible promises."

[Question] Mr. Gorbunovs has violated the USSR Constitution. After that can he remain a member of the CPSU?

[Rubiks] Yesterday I had a telephone conversation with A. Gorbunovs. I asked him if he would come to a meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau as a member of the CPSU. He did not come, but he asked me to meet alone with him. Today I had a 90-minute meeting alone with him. But you understand that I cannot speak publicly about the content of such meetings.

[Question] In the event of secession from the USSR, will they pay us our pensions?

[Rubiks] Pensions come from the Union budget, and one out of every four or five residents of the republic receives one. But now we are crossing the rubicon and seceding from the Union. Do you think the Soviet Union is going to give us a sack of rubles for pensions? Of course not. Mr. Godmanis was already asked this question, but he avoided answering it. God grant that they find the money for the pensions of those who have registered for citizenship in the Republic of Latvia. Although I do not know where they are going to find those finances. What kind of concern for the people is that? And who is going to care for the 1.9 million people who have not registered for citizenship in the recently declared Republic of Latvia?

[Question] Can Mr. Bisers occupy a position in the Soviet of Nationalities?

[Rubiks] When he was elected to the Soviet of Nationalities he did not defend the interests of any nationalities there except for issues of Latvia's independence. Before the elections to the Latvian SSR he declared in the newspaper RIGAS BALSS that he was only prepared to dedicate himself to a free Latvia. Otherwise, as he

declared, it simply "was not worth living." But the voters gave him a vote of no confidence and did not elect him their deputy. Nonetheless, Mr. Godmanis presented him a good post in the government by designating him his deputy. As for his party documents which, according to I. Bisers, were lost in Moscow, this is a most patent lie, as I learned not long ago in the Kremlin.

[Question] How do you explain the shortage of milk in the stores? Have the cows begun to give less of it since the Declaration?

[Rubiks] I believe that there will be even less milk on the shelves. In one of his recent speeches D. Ivans called for milk not to be given to the city. Here they are, foundations for inciting interethnic enmity.

[Question] How can Mr. Gorbunovs and the other highly educated gentlemen from the newly elected parliament speak of the Soviet power in Latvia as a reprieve of occupation if they all received diplomas and scholarly titles according to Soviet laws in Soviet institutes of higher education on the basis of the right to free education, guaranteed by Soviet authorities, as well as high positions in the party and in the Soviet administrative apparatus? We request that you submit a deputy's written inquiry on this question.

[Rubiks] I will try to carry out your request.

[Question] What can the policy of returning property, including land, to its former owners bring us?

Answering this question, A. Rubiks reported that the former owners of several houses in the center of Riga had already turned up. They found their buildings in unsatisfactory condition and declared, "Never mind, we will repair them. The Latvians can live there, and let the rest find themselves some other place." No doubt owners will also found for the land underneath five- and six-story buildings...

Unforeseeable circumstances also threaten the redistribution of land in the country, where they are also preparing to return to the former owners their land. Does this mean we can look forward to farm hands in the countryside?

Here the author of this newspaper article must cite a certain true instance from his own life. Recently a Latvian scholar (true, not very well-known!) who did not know who to handle land that he had acquired suggested in a friendly manner that I, a man of 58 with some experience and knowledge in agriculture and the ecology of horticulture and truck farming, become a farm hand on his farm, simultaneously combining this position with that of an agriculturist. The deal did not come off: The good gentleman did not tell me, the agriculturist-farm hand, what kind of pay I would receive, what kind of food I would get, etc., etc.

As you see, the program planned by our parliament already possesses its own realities. Do they suit you comrades?

[Question] Why cannot the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] organize its own defense detachments?

[Rubiks] The OSTK has made such a decision. Indeed, the members of fighting groups of the NFL are allowed. They could make raids at night...

[Question] Why do you believe that the USSR will brutally break off economic relations with the Republic of Latvia? (There is noise in the audience, cries of indignation.)

[Rubiks] I did not say that. I said something else. If we spend many years teaching people to see an enemy in the person of the Russian man and the Soviet soldier, then do you not suppose that they will answer us the same way?

A. Rubiks also reported that part of the deliveries from the USSR to Latvia have already been curtailed. And he explained that relations are on a negotiation basis and that each Soviet supplier decides for himself with whom he will and will not have business relations. As a result, the violation of norms of friendship and internationalism are already having a very real negative effect on the economy and on the standard of living of each family. Indeed, we all see what that standard of living has become.

10 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Viewed

90UN2013A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
11 May 90 p 3

[LETA "Informational Report": "First Session of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet of the 12th Convocation"]

[Text] The fifth day of the first session of the republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation began on 10 May. A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet opened the meeting.

The session continued to examine the issues introduced into the preceding day's agenda.

People's Deputy M. Budovskiy offered proposals from a working group on the makeup of the standing commissions. Fifteen commissions were formed. The question of forming a Commission on Religious Matters was left open. The staffs of the commissions were approved.

At the meetings of the commissions the candidacies of their chairmen were proposed. The session approved these candidacies and elected the chairmen of the standing commissions members of the republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet Presidium.

I. Godmanis, chairman of the republic of Latvia Council of Ministers, spoke on the question of a draft bill on the makeup and the basic directions of the work of the republic of Latvia Council of Ministers.

The deputies began debating the structure of the government, the status and competence of its ministries, and

the most important aspects of their activity. Latvian people's deputies Ya. Lutsans, M. Gavrilov, G. Grube, B. Salitis, J. Blazevics, I. Emsis, A. Aleksejev, L. Kurdyumov, A. Bartashevich, S. Dimans, O. Kehris, L. Alksnis, R. Kruminsh, E. Repse, D. Abikis spoke during the debates on this issue. I. Godmanis gave the concluding speech.

The 11 May Session will continue the work.

11 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Session Viewed

90UN2013B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
12 May 90 p 1

[LETA "Informational Report": "First Session of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet of the 12th Convocation"]

[Text] The work of the first session of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet of the 12th convocation continued on 11 May. A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Latvian Supreme Soviet Presidium, opened the meeting.

The deputies continued to discuss the structure of the government and the status and competence of its ministries. The leaders of the standing committees informed the deputies of the conclusions of the standing committees. A Law on the Makeup of the republic of Latvia Council of Ministers was adopted at the end of the debates (it will be published in the press). The issue of the basic trends of the Council of Ministers activities will be evaluated in a month. Proposals concerning the formation of departments should be examined at that same time.

Then the standing committees of the Latvian Supreme Soviet discussed the personnel of the Council of Ministers.

At the proposal of I. Godmanis, chairman of the republic of Latvia Council of Ministers, staffing of the Council of Ministers was continued at the evening meeting. A. Kalnins was designated to the post of deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers. E. Aboltins was approved as minister of economics.

11, 14 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Report

90UN2017D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 May 90 p 3

[LETA article: "Informational Report"]

[Text] On 11 May the discussion of candidates for the government of the Republic of Latvia continued during the evening meeting. I. Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, proposed for the post of minister of internal affairs USSR People's Deputy V. Skudra, who has worked before now as the republic's minister of justice and whose candidacy has been approved by the standing commission on defense and internal affairs. From the session's tribune there sounded both words of

support and serious doubts about the proposed candidate. S. Dimanis, leader of the "Equality" faction, declared that members of that faction would not participate in the voting. When registration of the deputies in the hall was begun prior to the voting, members of the "Equality" faction left their seats. As a result the two-thirds of the deputies needed to continue was not present in the hall. The sixth day of the session ended with the first demarcation of the body of deputies.

The session continued work on 14 May. A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet, opened the meeting. He reported on his participation in the meeting in Tallinn where the leaders of the three Baltic republics signed a number of documents and created a Council of Baltic states.

On the request of I. Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, the question of confirming the republic's minister of internal affairs was postponed for two days until negotiations in Moscow with Latvian's governmental delegation are ended.

After a prolonged exchange of opinions, the following agenda was approved:

1. On changes to the Republic of Latvia Constitution.
2. On the military obligations of Latvian residents.
3. Formation of the government and other administrative organs.
4. On a standing representative of the Latvian Council of Ministers to the USSR Council of Ministers.

Deputies R. Marjas, E. Repse, S. Dimanis, L. Mutsins, A. Plotnieks, and M. Gavrilov took part in the debate on changes to the Republic of Latvia Constitution.

Discussed were changes to Articles 97 and 100 of the Basic Law, which establish a quorum for adopting legislative acts. Adherents of changes to the Constitution asserted that such a position must be taken in order to remove the opportunity to vote with one's feet and to work out an appropriate method for achieving agreement. The minority demanded that first of all provision be made for their interests and that amendments to the Constitution be postponed.

The proposals introduced in the course of debates were handed over for examination to a commission, which should present its conclusions at the evening meeting.

The Supreme Soviet then moved on to the examination of the second question on the agenda. T. Jundzis gave a report. He acquainted everyone in detail with the terms of a packet of proposed draft bills concerning military service and a draft Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet Declaration on USSR Troops in Latvia.

Protests at Latvian Supreme Soviet Viewed

90UN2023D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
17 May 90 p 1

[Parliamentary correspondent E. Lapidus report, under the rubric: "First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia of the 12th Convocation": "Forced Confrontation"]

[Text] A most powerful outburst of emotions occurred on 15 May—the eighth day of the republic Supreme Soviet session. It had been building up since 4 May, when the declaration on independence, which evoked joy and exultation in one part of the inhabitants of Latvia and anxiety and concern in another, was adopted.

The sitting of parliament this day began at 1000 hours. But an hour before the atmosphere on the nearby streets had noticeably changed. Television reporters and photographers had taken position on the balconies and at the windows of houses opposite the Supreme Soviet Presidium building. Volunteers from the Latvian People's Front, who had been positioned at the approaches, were replaced by compact chains of police. There were more pickets also.

Everyone was waiting to see the reaction of the inhabitants of Riga who, it was forecast, would unfailingly be coming to parliament to express their attitude toward the appeal of the United Council of Labor Collectives of the republic for a political strike on 15 May and toward the edict of USSR President M. Gorbachev, according to which the declaration on independence was legally invalid.

At 1000 hours A. Gorbunovs opened the sitting, and the session began its routine business. The first attempt of a representative of the opposition to call the attention of the leadership of the Supreme Soviet and the deputies of the majority faction to the edict of the USSR president evoked no reaction. And the session continued examination of the draft law on alterations and additions to certain legislative enactments of the republic and also a draft decree on the military service obligation of inhabitants of Latvia.

Closer to the first break noise from the streets began to carry more and more to the meeting hall. Passions had become heated there. The ranks of supporters and opponents of the declaration had grown quickly. But so far the confrontation was being confined to verbal crossfire. Fuel was added to the fire by a group of servicemen, who had arrived in formation, which was met with shouts of "occupiers!" As of this moment small-scale and large clashes in the vicinity of the Supreme Soviet Presidium began.

A break at the session was announced which lasted more than one and a half hours.

And on the street people were chanting "Gor-bu-novs! Gor-bu-novs!" Obviously, had the Supreme Soviet quickly gotten its bearings and had some of the leaders

gone to the people, talked with them and accepted the petitions, which representatives of the servicemen and the strike committee wanted to present, that would most likely have been an end to the incident.

But while the building was deciding on the why's and wherefore's, brawls were continually breaking out on the street. With the help of sturdy boys, now armed with metal shields and nightsticks, the police cordon was having to push the whistling, shouting, and singing demonstrators further back.

Ultimately representatives of the servicemen and the United Council of Labor Collectives met in the Presidium building with A. Gorbunovs. Later several members of the strike committee were admitted to the meeting hall. Both were afforded an opportunity to convey their demands.

According to reports broadcast by foreign radio stations broadcast on the evening of 15 May, approximately 5,000 people had assembled at the parliament building. This figure was, I believe, low by at least 3,000.

Such is the information about what happened on day eight of the session's business.

But republic television and radio reporters had a different viewpoint: It was declared for all to hear, no more, no less, that there were attempts to seize the building where the session was being held. What can be said here? Only perhaps advice that people learn from Supreme Soviet Chairman A. Gorbunovs restraint and prudent consideration....

A press conference was held in the evening. Two aspects would appear to be of interest. Evaluating the incident which had occurred, D. Ivans said that there were on the street "soldiers and soldiers who had changed into civvies." Whereas such assertions are customary for the chairman of the Latvian People's Front Duma and evoke no surprise even, I would still like to have heard from the first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet more cogent and, most importantly, verified facts.

To a question about the strikes Prime Minister I. Godmanis replied that, according to the information available to him at that time, meetings had been held at 40-50 of the republic's enterprises and, according to unconfirmed information, people were on strike in Daugavpils. To what had been said he added that the government would evidently have a minister for interethnic relations.

But in an interview with the Vremya program P. Nefedov [name transliterated from Russian], chairman of the United Council of Labor Collectives, announced the participation in a political strike of more than 90 of the republic's labor collectives.

Who is closer to the truth?

Deputy Vilis Seleckis was right when he maintained in RIGAS BALSS that the present Supreme Soviet of the republic was operating independently and no longer

represented, as he put it, a sham "spokesman for the working people's interests." But why does the same deputy disregard the entirely natural interest in the work of parliament on the part of the electorate, an interest which is growing, as we can see, with incredible speed. On the part also of those who do not support the positions of the Latvian People's Front. Are hints at "conspiracy" and mythical Pinochets appropriate here?

Before the end of the 15 May sitting, the deputies expressed a desire to declare their gratitude to the police officers who had that day guarded the approaches to parliament. And this was one of the rare decisions at the session which was adopted practically without factional disagreement.

Latvian Council of Ministers Restructured

90UN2023C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 17 May 90 p 1

[Law of the Republic of Latvia on the Composition of the Republic of Latvia Council of Ministers published under the rubric: "First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Latvia of the 12 Convocation"]

[Text] 1. To form the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia—the government of the Republic of Latvia—in the following composition:

- chairman of the Council of Ministers
- first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers
- deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers
- minister for government affairs
- minister of architecture and construction
- minister of internal affairs
- minister of health
- minister of foreign affairs
- minister of culture
- minister of material resources
- minister of public education
- minister of industry
- minister of railways
- minister of communications
- minister of social security
- minister of trade
- minister of finance
- minister of economics
- minister of power engineering

—minister of justice

—chairman of the Committee for State Security.

2. For deciding current questions connected with leadership of the national economy and other questions of state administration the Council of Ministers Presidium, composed of the chairman of the Council of Ministers and the first deputy and deputy chairmen, acts as a permanent organ of government.

At a representation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers the Council of Ministers may incorporate in the Presidium two other members of the government.

3. To deem it necessary to make the following changes to the system of state administration of the Republic of Latvia:

1) to form a Ministry of Architecture and Construction of the Republic of Latvia and eliminate the Republic of Latvia State Committee for Construction and Architecture;

2) to form a Ministry of Power Engineering of the Republic of Latvia and eliminate the Republic of Latvia State Fuel and Power Committee;

3) to form a Ministry of Agriculture of the Republic of Latvia and eliminate the Republic of Latvia State Agro-Industrial Committee;

4) to form a Ministry of Material Resources of the Republic of Latvia and eliminate the Republic of Latvia State Committee for Material and Technical Supply;

5) to form a Ministry of Railways of the Republic of Latvia and eliminate the Republic of Latvia Ministry of Transport and Roads;

6) to eliminate the Republic of Latvia Ministry of Municipal Service and the Republic of Latvia State Committee for Physical Culture and Sport.

4. To deem it necessary to reorganize the Republic of Latvia State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and the Republic of Latvia State Committee for Statistics.

To instruct the republic government to prepare the corresponding proposals and submit them for examination by the Supreme Soviet.

5. To deem it necessary to form a commission for drawing up the draft law "Government of the Republic of Latvia."

To instruct the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet Presidium to submit to the Supreme Soviet proposals concerning the composition of the said commission.

6. To instruct the republic government within one month:

1) to draw up a program of its activity and submit it for examination by the Supreme Soviet;

2) to prepare proposals concerning the need for the formation of departments;

3) to study the question of the need to form a Ministry of Timber Industry.

7. To recognize that the law "Council of Ministers of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]" is valid to the extent that it is not contrary to this law.

*A. Gorbunovs, chairman,
Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet.*

*I. Daudiss, secretary,
Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet.*

Riga, 11 May 1990.

Latvian Supreme Soviet Names Ministers

90UN2023B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
17 May 90 p 1

[LETA report on First Session of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet of the 12th Convocation: "Information Report"]

[Text] The 15 May evening sitting was chaired by D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and Deputy Chairman A. Krastins.

The Supreme Soviet continued to form the government.

I. Godmanis, chairman of the Council of Ministers, proposed for the office of minister of trade A. Plaudis, who had been recommended by a commission of deputies also. The candidate answered a number of questions. Following a discussion, A. Plaudis was appointed minister of trade of the Republic of Latvia.

I. Godmanis proposed the appointment as minister of material resources of E. Zausajevs, who was confirmed in this office by the Supreme Soviet.

The chairman of the Council of Ministers nominated A. Lazdins as minister of power engineering. The candidate obtained this appointment.

The following appointments were also made following the same procedure: J. Janovskis, minister of railways [soobscheniye]; and D. Gegers, minister of agriculture.

This concluded the 15 May evening sitting of the Supreme Soviet.

On 16 May the Latvian Supreme Soviet session began at 1000 hours. It was opened by A. Gorbunovs, chairman of the republic Supreme Soviet.

Some 182 deputies were registered.

The session continued to examine items which had been placed on the agenda earlier.

A. Gorbunovs nominated G. Zemribo for the office of chairman of the Republic of Latvia Supreme Court. The candidate answered deputies' questions. Following a discussion, G. Zemribo was appointed chairman of the

Republic of Latvia Supreme Court. Following the same procedure, G. Narkevics was elected to the office of chief state arbiter of Latvia.

The Supreme Soviet then continued formation of the republic government. Following a discussion, A. Prusis was appointed minister of architecture and construction.

K. Lics was elected minister for government affairs at the evening sitting.

18 May Latvian Supreme Soviet Session

90UN2025B Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 19 May 90 p 1

[LETA article "At the Session of the Republic's Supreme Soviet": "Informational Report"]

[Text] The 18 May session of the Latvian Supreme Soviet began work at 1000. D. Ivans, first deputy chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, opened the meeting.

The session continued to examine questions which had already been included in the agenda.

I. Godmanis proposed U. Gundars for the post of minister of social security. The candidate answered questions from the deputies, and after a discussion he was appointed to that post.

Discharging the duties of Latvian minister of internal affairs B. Steinbriks spoke before the deputies about the situation in the republic and about the events of 15 May. He read an appeal to all citizens of Latvia:

"In these difficult times I appeal to you and request that you demonstrate prudence, calm, and patience and do not yield to any provocations leading to interethnic enmity, disorder, or strikes. Force and illegal actions are not arguments with which to resolve disputes. Let us work together in a friendly fashion for the good of all the residents of our republic."

Answering the deputies' questions, B. Steinbriks stated that the organs of internal affairs will guard the Supreme Soviet and the Council of Ministers in order to prevent possible provocations and ensure the normal operation of these institutions. B. Steinbriks said that he would implement the laws of the Republic of Latvia and that he intended to depoliticize the work of the organs of internal affairs.

At the evening meeting A. Piebalgs was appointed Republic of Latvia minister of public education.

The session will continue on 22 May at 1000.

Latvian Party Bureau Views Current Crisis

90UN2023A Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian 17 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report on proceedings in Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro]

[Text] A meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro has examined urgent aspects of the current political moment in the social and intra-party life of the republic. It was observed that the hasty adoption by the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet of the declaration "Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia" has exacerbated and intensified the political atmosphere among the population. The very course of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet session, the procedure of discussing the questions which are being submitted and the adoption of decisions on them are giving rise to various forms of protest, including civil disobedience.

It was emphasized that particular concern and anxiety were evoked in the workforce by the refusal of a majority of people's deputies of the republic Supreme Soviet to hear the appeal to them from representatives of the United Council of Labor Collectives and also from leaders of the strike committee. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro sees this as direct disregard for citizens' constitutional rights and disdain for the legitimate demands of the working people, who, under such conditions, are forced to seek other means of protecting their interests.

The Central Committee Buro instructed the gorkoms and raykoms [city and rayon party committees] and the primary party organizations to step up explanatory work among the working people in respect of the cohesion of their ranks and to develop dialogue in formulating mutually acceptable decisions to ensure political stability.

Priority measures were studied in connection with the USSR president's edict of 14 May 1990 "Declaration of the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet 'Restoration of the Independence of the Republic of Latvia'". The Central Committee Buro expressed total agreement with the evaluations and measures contained in the edict and deemed it expedient to send a letter to Comrade M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR, in this connection.

It is recommended that the gorkoms and raykoms, party organizations and party publications provide for an explanation to the population of the USSR president's edict and reveal the unconstitutional thrust of the declaration and its separatist character and the true actions and aims of the sponsors of a severance of state ties to the USSR and a change in the republic's political status.

The Central Committee Buro supported the actions of the party organizations and Communists of the personnel of the Internal Affairs Administration of Riga, the Internal Affairs Department of Daugavpils and others.

which have expressed loyalty to their oath of office in defense of the citizens' constitutional rights.

A decision was adopted on questions of the safekeeping of party documents. On the initiative of leaders of the Independent Latvian Communist Party pressure on Communists is being employed in some party organizations, departure from the ranks of the CPSU is being speeded up and party cards are being surrendered to Independent Latvian Communist Party authorities. The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro regards such actions as invalid and counsels against haste in decisions on questions of party affiliation and determination of the fate of each party member surrendering his party card personally. Party cards of members of the CPSU should be surrendered to the Latvian Communist Party gorkoms and raykoms.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro recognized the authority of the Valmiyerskiy, Valkskiy, Yekabpilskiy, Limbzhskiy, Madonskiy, Orgskiy and Tukumskiy raykoms, which were elected by party conferences and communist meetings, and approved the decisions of party conferences on the election of party committee first secretaries.

The results of the meeting of Latvian Communist Party Central Committee secretaries with a delegation of the Rostock District Committee of the GDR Party of Democratic Socialism headed by Comrade Ulrich Peck, chairman of the district committee, were studied and approved.

It was observed that there was a constructive and mutually useful exchange of opinions on the state of affairs in the parties, on points in common in the evaluations of the political situation in them and the joint defense and protection of the socialist development choice. It is planned to continue and extend relations in the social and political, propaganda and other spheres of joint cooperation.

It was decided to reprofile the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Party History Institute as the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Sociopolitical Research Institute. The main efforts of the institute's staff will be geared to study of the problems connected with restoration of the historical truth and an objective evaluation both of events of the past and the entire spectrum of the interests and aspirations of different political forces and public movements of our time.

Proposals pertaining to the reorganization and reduction of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee apparatus and the procedure of examination of the citizens' written and verbal appeals to the 28th CPSU Congress and also questions connected with the work of the upcoming Latvian Communist Party Central Committee plenum were discussed.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro expressed its support for the state and economic authorities and public organizations and all citizens who

actively advocate a consolidation of public forces, political stability and solution of the question of Latvia's official status on a strictly constitutional basis.

Latvian Communist Party to Appeal Curtailed Activities

90UN20331 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
24 May 90 p 1

["In the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party"]

[Text] The question concerning the activity of CPSU members who work in state administration organs was examined at a meeting of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro. It was noted that recently, on the initiative of the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers, work has been initiated to depoliticize in state organs. Managers of many ministries, state committees, institutions, and organizations are taking steps to curtail the activity of party organizations. On their own orders and instructions, they are withdrawing premises that are being used by party committees and buros, and they are prohibiting the conduct of meetings of communists and, in general, any kind of activity at their place of work.

The Central Committee Buro assessed the depoliticization as imposing latent self-dissolution on the party. It was observed that this kind of action is contrary to the norms of the Latvian SSR Constitution, which is in effect and which permits the establishment of social organizations at places of work, and that they infringe upon the rights of personal association of citizens by prohibiting participation in the work of party organizations at places of work.

The raykoms [rayon party committees] and gorkoms [city party committees] of the Latvian Communist Party should take under special protection CPSU members who work in state organs who do not intend to break their ties with the Communist Party. Attention was turned to the intolerance of haste in resolving the question of party membership of those CPSU members who are perplexed and are suspending their membership or who are leaving the ranks of the CPSU.

The legal service of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee is instructed to prepare an appeal, directed to the office of the public prosecutor of the republic, which contains a demand for the protection of constitutional norms, rights, and the personal freedoms of citizens. In the event that this is not taken into consideration, the Central Committee Buro reserves the right to appeal to the USSR prosecutor general for assistance in restoring social justice.

It was also decided to address a demand to the Supreme Soviet of the republic to ensure adherence to the Basic Law of the republic, and to stop discriminatory actions of the government with respect to some groups of citizens.

The Latvian Communist Party Central Committee Buro recognized the authority of the Gulbenskiy, Saldusskiy, and Tsesisskiy Raykoms of the Latvian Communist Party that were elected at meetings of communists of these rayons, and it approved the decisions of the cited meetings regarding the election of first secretaries of party committees.

The results of the meetings of the secretaries of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Lithuania (CPSU), Latvia, and Estonia were reviewed and approved. It was emphasized that the meeting confirmed the unanimity of the assessments of the socio-political, social, and economic processes that are developing in the Baltic republics, despite the peculiarities of the situations that have arisen in each of the republics that are dictated by differences in the national structure of the population, the degree of integration of the national economy, its readiness to work under conditions of sovereignty, and the tactics of political and social forces that preserve the potential of the communist party. The conference participants came to a conclusion about the feasibility of continuing consultative meetings of this kind for an exchange of reliable information and the elaboration of joint practical actions. In particular, agreement was reached to establish a joint group of scientists and practical workers to develop the draft of a new union treaty that envisions a maximum degree of political and economic freedom of the Baltic republics, while remaining within the USSR system. The meeting especially indicated the need to set forth the socialist choice for building a new society in the document being developed. The Central Committee Buro acknowledged as proper other joint actions that were worked out at the meeting.

The Central Committee Buro examined and approved the results of the negotiations of A.P. Rubiks, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Latvian Communist Party, with the secretaries of the Central Committee of the republic's Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League], and also the concluding documents adopted at the congress of representatives of work collectives and social organizations that defend the constitution and the rights of citizens of the USSR.

Jurmala Gorkom Elects New Officials

90UN2017C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
15 May 90 p 2

[Article by E. Damberg under the rubric "28th Precongress Tribune: The Party and Perestroyka": "At Party Conferences and Assemblies: Hot Spring in Jurmala"]

[Text] The delegates of the 5 May Jurmala city party conference already know that the Declaration of Independence of Latvia had already been adopted by the republic's Supreme Soviet. This event probably had an effect on each of the 247 communists representing the party organizations of the resort city. As it seemed to me,

none of them was against raising the question of independence, sovereignty, and freedom. But they argued about it from their own ideological, social, and moral conditions.

The lecturer, O. Leshehuk, secretary of the gorkom [city party committee], said in part, "Any nation wishes to maintain itself, and as a result we see such national enthusiasm, such high political activity and solidarity on the part of the Latvian people. Our nation has seen secession as the restoration of statehood, the secession of immigration, the creation of normal conditions for development of the republic, and improvement of the quality of life... We must understand all these processes well and help the Latvian people preserve its culture, its language, and its national character. But there are several routes for achieving these goals. We could unilaterally demand the restoration of an independent state today, or we could examine and sign a new mutually profitable treaty and achieve a new level of federative relations."

The lecturer and many of the delegates to the conference who spoke emphasized that they stand for a sovereign socialist Latvia within a federation of Union republics. They believe that only together, only within a fraternal family of all the peoples of the country, can we manage to achieve the development of the economy and an improvement in people's lives. S. Aristov, N. Kravchuk, and others noted that the republic's Supreme Soviet has charted a course toward the restoration of bourgeois Latvia. In their view this is political adventurism which will bring the people many misfortunes—unemployment and a lack of social guarantees for the poor classes. Without their own sources of raw materials, the republics may find themselves in a difficult situation: Factories and plants will come to a halt and there will be problems with fuel and electrical energy.

They talked about how people have already felt interruptions in gasoline, shelves are becoming empty in stores, and it is difficult to buy salt, matches, flour, and cereals. And it may get still worse. "Communists must not accept such an abnormal situation. We are obligated to take up the defense of people who are suffering from rash political decisions," emphasized the speakers.

In particular V. Titova noted that members of the party must have discussions not only with their opponents from the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] and other organizations but among themselves as well. A split has taken place within the party: V. Dzebalis, the former first secretary of the gorkom, currently expelled from the CPSU, worked to create an independent Latvian Communist Party from the first days after he was elected gorkom first secretary. Of the city's 3,700 communists, approximately one-third transferred over to that party. But it is not a question of quantity. The thing that alarms people is the fact that the "independents" are abandoning the positions of Marxism-Leninism.

The lecturer and the delegates who spoke gave much attention to the problems of rallying the communists and

spoke about the necessity of conducting propaganda in the residential areas and at the labor collectives. In Jurmala and throughout the entire republic the mass media are under the influence of the NFL and they have carried out wide anticommunist propaganda. This same campaign was also conducted during the election contest and it had an effect on the elections. Adherents of the People's Front dictate their will in the city soviet. Not only are they trying to administer and rule monopolistically and with complete dominion, but they wish to take command of all the organs of control. It is known that a state based on rule of law is built upon the division of power into legislative, executive, and judicial branches. But in Jurmala it is not a division that is taking place but, on the contrary, an amalgamation of power. They are attempting to gain control of the procuracy, the militia, the KGB, and the judicial organs. In addition, attacks on the Latvian Communist Party as a viable opposition are being carried out.

The conference's participants noted that the communist deputies have important work to do in the city soviet. They have made a decision to create a deputies faction made up of members of the party. Emphasis was put on the need to use deputy's inquiries, protests, and other parliamentary procedures and to master the means of parliamentary struggle.

The mass media—the city's newspaper and radio—can help in such a struggle. The delegates noted that Jurmala radio gives air time to all political forces in a genuinely pluralistic manner. The same cannot be said of the newspaper JURMALA. It is increasingly difficult to get space on its pages. The conference supported the idea of creating its own print organ and adopted the appropriate resolution.

Much attention was devoted to the problems of the ecology. And that is understandable because all are interested in seeing that the resort city is clean, that the air is not fouled, and that the dumping of wastes into the Gulf of Riga and the Lielupe River is stopped. The delegates spoke with concern about the intention of the Jurmala City Soviet to eliminate the Young Pioneer Camps as of next year. To deprive the children in this way means that they are not thinking of the future. Another instance of a heartless attitude toward people in the opinion of the communists was cited: The city soviet has decided to repeal the right of war invalids to receive certain goods once a week. In this manner the blows are falling on the most vulnerable parts of the population—the elderly and the children.

A. Klauzens, secretary of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee and first secretary of the Riga Party Gorkom, spoke at the conference. He noted that the process of curtailing Soviet power is going on more actively in Jurmala than in the other cities of the republic. And the party gorkom bears much of the blame in this. The communists must work more actively among the population and explain to people what is hiding

behind the Declaration on the Restoration of Independence. In essence a full return to private property and the stratification of society into rich and poor are contemplated. Some can look forward to a life of luxury and others to poverty and unemployment. In his speech A. Klauzens focussed attention on issues of working with the youth and of party discipline. He stressed that the depoliticization of the organs of power which the adherents of the NFL are calling for applies only to the Latvian Communist Party. In this fashion they wish to exclude the communists from political life. "We must give a decisive rebuff to these efforts," stressed A. Klauzens, "and strengthen the influence of party members in all spheres of the national economy."

The conference's delegates adopted a number of resolutions directed at strengthening the unity of the Latvian Communist Party and consolidating ideological work among the masses. They condemned the actions of communists who are conducting actions to split the party.

The conference elected a new party gorkom. G. Shchukin, who had worked previously as the executive organizer of the Latvian Communist Party Central Committee, was elected first secretary. V. Bogdanova and O. Leshchuk became secretaries.

Prunskiene Assesses Meeting with Gorbachev

90UN20341 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
22 May 90 pp 1, 3

[Report on speech by Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, to 19 May Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council meeting: "A Step Toward the Beginning of Negotiations?"]

[Text] A meeting was held on 19 May in the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council at which Kazimiera Prunskiene, prime minister of the Lithuanian Republic, provided information on her meeting with USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev. Her report is presented here in abridged form.

The conversation with M. Gorbachev, in which USSR Council of Ministers Chairman N. Ryzhkov also participated, lasted one hour and forty minutes. Our counterparts were interested not so much in the specific points of the 16 May 1990 announcement of the Supreme Council and the government as in that part of the preamble in which our position was formulated with regard to the suspension of certain decisions. This relates to the decrees adopted by the third USSR Congress of People's Deputies, the USSR Constitution, and other documents that in one way or another restrain their current effect. Of course, they restrain to an extent that they themselves determine. In a word, part of the preamble seemed inadequate to them, which is also reflected in the TASS report.

I would not like to specifically formulate now either what they would like to hear or what it appears to be to me.

Everyone should think about this jointly, and not speak in favor of a unilateral program that would prevent everything being weighed freely. The fact is that we put up two barriers, a definite reserve, in the part where we talk about the suspension of our decisions. When it becomes necessary to take a decisive step, to move from intentions to actions, our statement about readiness is really not yet an accomplished fact.

Now, when Moscow has assessed our step rather favorably, the action itself should be taken. Where does this rather favorable assessment lie? President M. Gorbachev, observing that I clearly expressed dissatisfaction with their conclusions (they were later formulated in the TASS report), turned to three points. First of all the meeting, nonetheless, was held, so we are considering this question of the possibility of negotiations and a rapprochement of positions. Second, they assert that we took certain steps. Third, the leaders of the USSR do not demand a categorical repeal of our documents, but they propose, true, as a minimum, that we at least suspend them. This means they are also waiting...

Thus, speaking about how to bring our positions closer together, and what document to adopt leading to the beginning of negotiations, we see standing before us one remaining additional barrier, which we have to think about seriously: Can we abandon the force of the act itself as a legal document? Will we suspend actions that have a timely practical value as an obstacle which impedes the Soviet Union in the realization of its own interests in those spheres in which we recognize these interests in the transition period?

Consultations were conducted during the trip to North America and to West Europe on the question of what denotes suspension, what is being suspended, and what consequences this could have. After discussions with M. Gorbachev I met with ambassadors of other states and also with J. Baker, and I checked once more whether those states will recognize the fairness of our position, whether this compromise is sufficient in their opinion, and whether the step was enough to invite the other party to negotiations. I and those participating in the meeting with J. Baker, B. Kuzmickas and C. Stankevicius, deputy chairmen of the Lithuanian Republic Supreme Council, became convinced that they consider such a position to be acceptable and that, more than anything, it should be adhered to. A formulation is also possible which in essence would satisfy our position, but which would make it possible to interpret it more flexibly with those formulations that are expected and with the possible coupling to that position which is still rather firmly associated with the laws of the Soviet Union.

Why can we not suspend action on the documents that are most important to us? It is understandable that in such a case our status would become quite ambiguous, that we would sit at the negotiating table as representatives of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and that in our relationship the Law on Secession from

the USSR and the USSR Constitution would be operative once more. We can hardly allow ourselves to take such a risky step. Although in another case, if there were equal partners, suspension of the force of the document itself or action to implement its suspension would not be different in principle, at least that is the way it seems to representatives of foreign states. J. Baker, for example, said that this was semantics. But that is the way it would be, if the discussion did not have the intentions of subordinating the will of the weak to the interests of the strong. Therefore, we have not only a legal but also a definite moral basis for a more cautious, and along with this, a stricter position, knowing that at the end of negotiations it will not be possible to revert to the status of a Lithuanian SSR, to the situation of 10 March.

Incidentally, in answer to the question of whether there would be an attempt during the negotiations to return us to the position of 10 March, M. Gorbachev answered that there would not be. But what does the situation of 10 March mean? It can be said that the situation is different, with a broadening of some of our rights, but with the retention of vital features, as it was. It should be obvious to us and to other states what our real status is, with which we are going to the negotiations. There must be clear international guarantees, which foreign countries are forming with their active participation in the resolution of the Lithuanian problem.

Western states, as I have already noted, do not like clearly defined roles, including an intermediary one. They are doing this without loud words, but firmly. We cannot expect more than this from them. And this also already supports us. And if today our counterpart is interested in negotiations then, undoubtedly, it is not only because he was compelled by the actions of Lithuania and, in a certain sense, by his own involvement in the blockade. Apparently, there are other interests, and other motives.

Thus, the coming week should be very important. If we find a genuine formulation that is acceptable for the preservation of our legal status and the removal of one of those barriers about which I spoke, which at least in form would be acceptable to the other party, then most likely a rapprochement of positions could occur. I do not think that negotiations should be started right now at any price. If we do, nothing good will come of it. The beginning of negotiations will determine a lot of things—both their progress and their ending. If we begin the negotiations by humbling ourselves, we will really not win them even with the support of powerful helpers. It is no accident that Mr. J. Baker repeated several times: Those decisions and those formulations you accept are your own business, and, in any case, we support your decisions and your path to independence.

I think that in the preparation and consideration of documents it is necessary to be tactful and behave wisely. Statements that can be heard from time to time of the type "he will go for it—he will not go for it," and that give the appearance that we want to use some kind of

bait, do not help the other party take a similar step. We cannot change our actions, when we are planning to take such a responsible political step. We must not risk this on the path to negotiations. We understand very well that negotiations are necessary and that they essentially will make it possible for us, even though at a fixed time, to assure real de facto independence. We must formulate ideas with dignity, and we must not ruin the atmosphere right before the negotiations or at their beginning out of a feeling of outrage or other behavior.

And more. I think that the government could assume more responsibility or undertake compromise actions to neutralize tense relations with other political forces. Although they are operating very unfavorably for us, they should be legalized nonetheless. These instances were mentioned twice in conversations in the Kremlin. This was done not as a demand but simply as an expression of regret or as a comment. If you did not have an objection, we would be able to take the initiative upon ourselves to seek out contacts with the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform). We must consider the possibility of printing their newspapers in Lithuania, but not in Belorussia. For it is not the place of issue of the newspaper but its popularity that can have influence. We should also discuss the desire and proposal expressed in Moscow to grant them an opportunity to appear also in other mass media, first of all on television. This kind of a decision has to be adopted without political emotions, but as a fact of the transition period. If we let these forces into legal mass media, we thereby lower the tension and their aggressiveness. Two months after the declaration of independence we can feel quite adequate and confident in ourselves. But one or another divergence—we will put it this way—does not hinder the realization of our true aspirations.

Lithuanian Appeal Against Blockade Viewed

90UN02424 Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian
25 May 90 p 2

[“Statement of the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council to peoples of the world on the economic blockade of the Republic of Lithuania”]

[Text] With the restoration of the statehood of the republic of Lithuania, the USSR, pursuing political ends, has since 16 April 1990 practiced an economic blockade in the form of isolation from the world, a ban on supplies and trade links, rupture of the energy system, blocking of the activity of the railroads, ports, and banks, withholding of resources, and strict limitation of traffic across the state border and of international communications. Such measures, effected with the enlistment of the armed forces, are leading to an undermining of social guarantees of the exercise of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens, the wrecking of the economy of the republic of Lithuania, and mass unemployment.

A real danger to the existence of inhabitants of the republic of Lithuania is being created. The threat of epidemics, epizootic disease, and ecological catastrophe

looms over Lithuania. Lithuania will shortly be a region in the grip of general calamity.

The economic blockade being practiced by the USSR should be seen as economic aggression entailing particular legal consequences, just like any other form of aggression. The actions of the USSR are contrary to Article 32 of the Charter of States' Economic Rights and Duties adopted on 12 December 1974 by the United Nations General Assembly, which proclaims that “no state may employ or encourage the employment in respect of another state of economic, political, or any other measures of a forcible nature for the purpose of subordinating to itself the exercise of the former's sovereign rights,” and also to other enactments of international law.

Communicating to the peoples of the world the economic aggression being practiced by the USSR, the Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council requests international pressure on the USSR—a member of the United Nations—by all possible measures for the purpose of curtailing on its part the inhuman actions, contrary to the rules of international law, against the population of the Republic of Lithuania.

*E. Landsbergis, chairman,
Republic of Lithuania Supreme Council
Vilnius, 23 May 1990*

Moldavian Ideology Secretary on Reforms

90UN19174 Kishinev SOVIETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 13 May 90 p 2

[Interview with I.T. Gutsu, secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, by E. Shalimov; date and place not specified: “There Is No Other Force”]

[Text] [Shalimov] Ivan Timofeyevich, we are just a matter of days away from the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress. Previously at such moments it was de rigueur to speak about the atmosphere of the even higher-than-usual labor and political enthusiasm. Today one hears more often about crisis, impending catastrophe.... What, in your view, is the atmosphere in which our congress is about to meet?

[Gutsu] I may say with all certainty merely that the atmosphere on the eve of the congress is very complex. It contains, finally, truly great political enthusiasm, if what is meant is the hitherto unprecedented politicization of the masses here. There are crisis phenomena also. We all—both Communists and nonparty people—are aware of this. There has been an increase in the tension in society, primarily social, caused by the many shortcomings in the socioeconomic sphere.

We have to consider also that the congress will be held under multiparty conditions, practically. Numerous public formations—with their own programs and aims—are operating.... And, let us call things by their name, with their own claims to power. In the democratic society based on the rule of law that we wish to create, each public force, except of course those that profess misanthropy and adhere to other such ideas, should have the right to aspire to power. Availing itself of the right of legislative initiative, our party itself put on the agenda of the Third Congress of USSR People's Deputies the question of a change in the status of Article 6 of the country's constitution, which had legislatively enshrined for the CPSU the role of ruling party. So in this sense all is legitimate—the emergence of new public formations in the political arena of the country and the republic and their increasingly great activity. This should in principle contribute only to the further democratization of society and create the conditions for a competitive struggle of ideas and social projects. But there have also been very disturbing aspects in Moldavia's political life of late (we will confine the interview to a republic framework).

The point being that among the public formations which have recently come on the political scene and which aspire to power there are also manifestly destructive forces. They are not announcing themselves openly but are increasingly making their presence felt. They wish to hamper the entire process of perestroika, destabilize the political and economic situation, and complicate inter-ethnic relations. And whereas the forms of their "participation" in the republic's political life are at times very much disguised, their ultimate aims are perfectly clear: to discredit perestroika and its program goals.

What is particularly disturbing is the ever increasing manifestation of elements of uncontrollability and unpredictability in social and political life. On the one hand many of the former structures, party structures included, cannot operate under the new conditions, on the other the new structures are for the most part being slow to master the new methods and cannot control many processes. The transition period (this is, most likely, natural) is characterized by such situations.

People today are worried. They are evaluating the progress of perestroika by the way in which their vital requirements are being satisfied.

You could convince nobody currently that all is well, when in fact it is not so. People are tired of promises and every conceivable inconvenience. Unfortunately, social discontent is accumulating. The four years of perestroika, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere, are characterized by a contradictory result. The clearly expressed social focus of the economy has to have been noticed in the recent period. There has been a tangible increase in the introduction of housing, preschools, schools, and health care facilities. Given a 19-percent increase in the total amount of capital investments in four years of the 12th Five-Year Plan compared with the average annual growth in the 11th Five-Year Plan,

nonproduction capital investments grew 57 percent. The quotas in respect of a number of most important indicators—the amount of retail commodity turnover, chargeable services to the public, consumer goods production—were exceeded....

[Shalimov] But, to speak plainly, this has not of late been seen on the store shelves....

[Gutsu] You are right, unfortunately, the situation on the consumer market continues to grow more difficult. This points to appreciable disproportions. We exceeded the plan indicators of four years of the five-year plan for the production of consumer goods. But the disproportion between effective demand and the consumer market increased in this same time. Put simply, earlier also wages were not covered by commodities with us, but now the scissors have become even wider. There are today many enterprises and sectors even in which the amount of production is declining and productivity falling, but where at the same time wages are growing. As you know, all the attempts which have been made to control the growth of wages have as yet produced no results. Here are fresh figures. The average monthly wage of industrial production personnel according to the results of the first quarter of the current year amounted to 262 rubles and had increased 10 percent compared with the analogous period of last year, and productivity in this period increased 3.6 percent. Many outfits have essentially begun to work less well, but are wanting to live better. To this it should be added that inflationary processes are on the increase in the republic and that people are expressing many complaints in connection with the quality of medical and municipal services and the deterioration in the environmental situation. This situation is greatly disturbing the Central Committee and, naturally, me, as the secretary in charge of socioeconomic issues.

[Shalimov] Ivan Timofeyevich, let us look into what is meant by the word "disturbing." It is not, after all, a question of some purely personal feelings of Central Committee Bureau members, say, in connection with the unsatisfactory solution of socioeconomic problems in the republic. It is a question, so to speak, of effective disturbance—of how to rectify the situation. But it is here that the question arises. If you listen closely, you can hear even from your office how some things are being declaimed about Article 6 at the republic Supreme Soviet building. Discussion began in parliament this very morning as to what the nature of Article 6 should be and whether it should be in the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Constitution at all. In any event, however, it is clear that neither you nor even the Central Committee as a whole will have an opportunity to directly influence the economy and the solution of social questions. It will no longer be possible just to pick up the receiver and demand.... Or adopt a decision.... Or appoint a minister.... Perhaps those who believe that the party should concentrate on ideological work with the change in its legal position in society are right. Why

should it assume responsibility for the spheres in which it cannot have a direct impact?

[Gutsu] I cannot agree with this conclusion. The party cannot suddenly become a detached observer of how socioeconomic problems are being tackled or not tackled. First, because it remains, whatever anyone says, the spokesman for and defender of the interests of the vast majority of the population—the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. Second, because there is today simply no other social force which could seriously advance perestroika and be a consolidating basis.

It is with good reason that our opponents are "insinuating" the idea that the party should altogether not interfere in economic life and the elaboration and solution of social problems. I believe that the core of any party's practical activity should be socioeconomic policy, particularly in our society, where there are so many unsolved problems. Of course, the delineation of functions among the party, soviet, and economic authorities is now putting the party authorities in a different position. We have wholly abandoned the methods well known in the recent past—colloquiums, seminars, and "booster" sessions on economic issues.

All categories of ministry, department, enterprise, and organization leaders have been excluded from the Central Committee schedule. Our relations with other bodies have undergone fundamental change. We will make the basis of our activity an emphasis on political methods of work and influence of the state of affairs through the Communists working in the soviet and economic bodies and directly at enterprises and in organizations.

We will concentrate our efforts on an in-depth analysis of the socioeconomic processes occurring in the republic and participate in the elaboration of concepts and programs concerning the development of the economy and its prospects.

The division of functions means also division of responsibility for all that is being done in society. This does not mean that human problems will recede into the background. On the contrary, the party will have far more opportunities for directing its forces toward the realization of values common to all mankind, which earlier we recalled rarely. I am convinced that the party should not quit the socioeconomic sphere....

[Shalimov] But, I repeat, how to influence it if it lacks its former direct, commander's levers?

[Gutsu] I am convinced that the times of commander's levers have gone forever. And not only for the party. The time of economic levers has come. The draft program of renewal of the Moldavian Communist Party outlines the political reference points and priorities which the Moldavian Communist Party will advocate. We support and will strive for the creation of a highly efficient economy and the assurance on this basis of the people's high level of prosperity.

Among the most important strategic tasks is the republic's transition to principles of economic sovereignty and independence. This is not simply a problem. Much has become clearer following the enactment of laws on questions of property, economic relations between the center and the republics, the division of functions between the Union and the subjects of the federation and others, although there is much that is unclear also. There is much debate on the question of sovereignty.

Another most important task, which will largely determine the economic and ideological situation in the country and in the republic, is the transition to market relations.

[Shalimov] Ivan Timofeyevich, in the talk and discussions about economic sovereignty emphasis is very often put precisely on sovereignty, with a connotation, what is more, of a certain exclusiveness—if we want something, we will do it ourselves, and had we ourselves made the decision, we would never, for example, have begun to build the computer plant in Kishinev....

[Gutsu] Well, to be specific as concerns the oft-recalled computer plant, I personally believe that an enterprise manufacturing so modern and science-intensive products is being built by no means to the detriment of the republic (granted that there is much that has not been thoroughly thought through and that there are for the giant a great multitude of problems). Much could be said today about how to understand economic sovereignty, but it seems to be that many questions will simply be removed with the establishment in our economic life of a controlled market. Moldavia cannot retire into itself and be totally self-sufficient. Even the most developed countries cannot permit themselves this—this is not to their advantage, in any event. Moldavia needs a customer for the products in which it specializes. This is one aspect. But the other is that Moldavia needs resources—fuel and others. Put another way, it needs an all-Union market, it has an economic interest in it. And this market, not our own desires, will regulate the kind of enterprises to build and the kind of product to manufacture. Yes, we could sell our product to other countries, we have things to sell. And there is as yet, unfortunately, no real right of outlet onto the foreign market without all kinds of obstacles. But there will be—in the renewed federation of Union republics. However, even then the outlet onto this actual hard currency market will not be as simple as some people seem to think. The point being that in terms of their standard our products are, in the main, very far from those which people are prepared to buy for hard currency.

[Shalimov] So the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress will examine and, we hope, approve a program of renewal. And as you have already emphasized the Central Committee does not intend to hold aloof from the socioeconomic sphere. On whom, however, does the Central Committee intend to rely in the accomplishment of the impending difficult tasks?

[Gutsu] The Moldavian Communist Party has the forces for this, and considerable ones at that. It can enlist them in work on various terms—scientists, specialists, and Communists, who work everywhere. But what is most important, it seems to me, is that the party has a well-oiled system of organizations in the work force. Whether some people like this or not, they exist as yet and, I am sure, will remain a mobilizing and organizing force. Yes, there are among them those that have lost authority. There are even more frequent instances of our competitors, let us call them such, in the political arena impressing upon and dinning into people the idea that the party organizations have forfeited their authority. But if we approach matters impartially, it is not difficult to ascertain one regularity: that the new formations and new social structures (with the odd exception) are mainly engaged in a struggle for political power. Much in their activity is subordinated to exposing some people or other, primarily, of course, the CPSU and its leaders, pulling down some of that which was created earlier and, as a last resort, demanding something or other from someone. But it is, meanwhile, our party and its committees and the primary party organizations that are mobilizing people to creativity. And will continue to do so.

I would like to emphasize that the potential of the primary party organizations is enormous and has simply not yet been properly realized. Because the party masses have not as yet in all seriousness come to power in the party. This has still to be achieved. At the congress included, such decisions as emancipate the initiative and energy of the primaries having been adopted. But there is one principal condition here—making the party masses the legislators in the party. And, finally, it is more important than ever that each Communist have a clear-cut party position.

[Shalimov] Ivan Timofeyevich, the call and even, if you like, instruction that people have a position was for years addressed from the most varied rostrums to the party's rank and file. But here the time of a real test of position has approached, and it has been ascertained that far from all party leaders have such.

[Gutsu] This is, unfortunately, the case. It is particularly irritating when one sees people to whom the party has, simply put, given everything slandering it or selling it out on the sly. But many Communists today simply lack boldness in upholding the party's position and party ideals. As far as the first is concerned, here, I believe, the time has come to ascertain who's who and to draw the line. Boldness is acquired in battle. Let us learn under multiparty conditions to directly, openly, and publicly defend our party line and enter into a serious polemic with our political competitors. Flexibility is needed in politics, of course, but no less essential is firmness on matters of principle. Otherwise, one could become spininess.

[Shalimov] Concerning boldness. Does it not seem to you that it is as yet very much deficient in many people's deputies in the course of the debate in the republic's

parliament? Nor are they as yet seen to be acting on the most serious issues as a common force.

[Gutsu] I believe that the main debate is still to come and that each deputy, the communist included, will have a chance to show his mettle. Inexperience and confusion in the ambivalent and unusual situation are still taking their toll. Let us hope that this is a temporary phenomenon.

[Shalimov] You, obviously, will speak at the 17th Moldavian Communist Party Congress. But were you to be granted just one sentence, what would it be?

[Gutsu] We must under no circumstances allow a split and demarcation along national lines, as this would mean impasse for the Moldavian Communist Party.

Background Note On Moldavia's Luchinsky

90UN2041A Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 19 May 90 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Petr Kirillovich Luchinsky, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee"]

[Text] Petr Kirillovich Luchinsky was born in 1940 in the village of Reduleni Vek in Floreshtskiy Rayon. A Moldavian, he has been active in the Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] and the CPSU. He has the Doctor of Philosophy degree. He has been a CPSU member since 1964.

P.K. Luchinsky graduated from the Kishinev state university imeni V.I. Lenin and also completed the course in the Higher Party School under the CPSU Central Committee. For 10 years he worked in the Komsomol: He was an instructor of the Moldavia Komsomol Central Committee, the first secretary of the Beltsy Komsomol city committee; after that he was the second and later the first secretary of the Moldavia Komsomol Central Committee.

From 1971 to 1976 he worked as a secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee; from 1976 until 1978 he was the first secretary of the Kishinev Gorkom [city party committee]. From 1971 to 1978 he was a member of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee Bureau. Since June of 1978 he has worked as deputy chief of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee. Since 1986 he has served as second secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee. The plenum of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee elected him first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee in November of 1989.

At the 12th Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party P.K. Luchinsky was elected a candidate member of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee and at the 13th and 14th congresses he was elected a full member of the Central Committee. From 1967 to 1971 he served as a member of the Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium. He was a delegate at the 24th, 25th, and 27th CPSU Congresses

and at the 19th All-Union Party Conference; he was a deputy of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet of the Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Convocations. He is a people's deputy of the Moldavian SSR of the 12th Convocation.

He is also a member of the CPSU Central Committee, a member of the CPSU Central Committee's International Policy Commission, and a USSR people's deputy.

P.K. Luchinsky has been awarded two orders of the Red Banner of Labor and an order of the Friendship of the People.

On 18 May 1990 the 17th Congress of the Moldavian Communist Party again elected P.K. Luchinsky first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee.

Moldavian Womens League Formed, Aims Stated

90UN21424 Kishinev SOVETSKAYA MOLDAVIYA
in Russian 30 May 90 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report: "A Womens' Party?"]

[Text] The Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers has adopted an ordinance which reads: "In accordance with an edict of the Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet... the Moldavian SSR Council of Ministers resolves to register the statutes of the Christian Democratic League of Women of Moldavia."

The draft program of the new organization says, in part:

The Christian Democratic League of Women of Moldavia [KhDLZhM] is a mass voluntary independent democratic organization exercising its activity in accordance with current legislation and its own statutes and program.

The mission of the league is to enlist women, regardless of nationality and religion, in effective activity geared to the spiritual regeneration and democratization of society for the purpose of ensuring for them conditions for the exercise of their natural functions and guaranteed rights in all walks of life.

The KhDLZhM actively participates in political, economic, social, and cultural life for the purpose of the creation of a propitious social and public climate.

The league does not support organizations and groups whose activity is contrary to the principles of the sovereignty of Moldavia and which propagandize racist, chauvinist, anti-Semitic, militarist or other ideas leading to division and confrontation in society....

The league advocates realization of the right of the Moldavian SSR to self-determination and political, economic, and social sovereignty.

Operating within the Moldavian political system, the league supports the democratization of all its structures and political, economic, and social mechanisms, considering that

only this way will ensure the progress, freedom, and humanization of society. The league advocates observance of human rights and is a supporter of actions pertaining to the de-ideologization of all aspects of the life of society.

While fully supporting the process of denationalization of property, the KhDLZhM advocates the creation of more efficient mechanisms of social safeguards. The league participates in the elaboration of draft laws and other legislative enactments of the Moldavian SSR.

Evaluating unemployment in the republic as a phenomenon exerting a negative influence on the stability of society, the league will participate in the necessary surveys and specific actions for resolving this problem.

The league believes that for the creation of a favorable psychological climate in the republic, actions geared to the humanization of interethnic relations based on mutual respect are essential. To this end it supports a dependable, truthful assessment of the history of the Moldavian SSR and Romanians and other ethnic groups of Moldavia.

The league insists particularly on the enactment of laws connected with the interests and aspirations of mother and child and the right of freedom of worship. It supports the struggle for peace throughout the world and intends promoting all movements for demilitarization and the democratization of the Soviet Army.

The KhDLZhM proceeds from the fact that it is essential for the burgeoning of society to renounce dubious forms of the emancipation of women. A primitive understanding of equality with men has led to a concealed form of the exploitation of women and is harming all of society and the interests of the people's normal development. The league is called upon to defend the natural calling of women and to fight for the legalization of socioeconomic guarantees of the right to motherhood in accordance with international enactments in defense of the rights of mother and child and the Declaration of Human Rights.

The league will contribute in every way to a restructuring of social policy and a reform of the mechanisms and institutions designed to ensure women's basic function—being the source and joy of life.... The league advocates the elaboration and approval of a long-term national program of the people's recovery.

Inasmuch as the current system of institutions of children's preschool education is failing to contribute to children's normal and healthy development, the league will promote their fundamental reorganization, at the same time advocating an expansion of and improvement in children's education in the home. Activity pertaining to children's education should be put on a par with other types of socially useful labor.

The league will contribute to an improvement in the system of measures of government assistance to women with large families and those who adopt children, single mothers, and families with invalid children.

The league will initiate a broad movement for charity aimed at protection of the rights of the weak (children, old people, invalids, and others) and moral and material assistance to them.

The league will participate in the fight against various social ailments and deviations from behavioral standards, particularly among women and juveniles. The league will give preference in its activity to such methods and means as persuasion, propaganda, and the appeal to morals and dignity.

The league believes that the family is the basis for molding the human qualities necessary for free, dignified, and effective activity. The league advocates a return to universal standards of the functioning of the family and the mutual responsibility of parents and children, the right of the family to independent economic activity and to association with other families, and inculcation in the children of an interest in useful labor and honest earnings, an ability to make their outlays commensurate with their income, and so forth.

The league will promote a policy of the stimulation of production and services aimed at alleviating and reducing the amount of women's domestic work, particularly in the countryside. It will propagandize rational forms of work for women and cultural types of leisure activity.

The KhDLZhM proceeds from the fact that profoundly national culture is authentic culture. The league will pay particularly great attention to a revival of national culture and an orientation of the public consciousness toward principles common to all mankind and authentic values. The league will promote the development of culture common to all mankind...

In the process of spiritual revival the league will pay particular attention to the church, religion, and traditions connected with religion. The league will maintain relations with women's organizations of the USSR and other countries and become an active part of the world women's movement.

The league will have its own press organ.

Official Draft Law For Tajik People's Deputies

90US0916A Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Report signed by K. Makhkamov, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet: "The Law of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic: On the Introduction of Amendments and Additions to the Tajik SSR Constitution (Fundamental Law)"; Dushanbe, 23 April 1990]

[Text] For the purposes of ensuring the further development of the political transformations being implemented in the republic, strengthening the constitutional structure and bringing the Tajik SSR

Constitution into correspondence with the USSR Constitution, the Tajik Supreme Soviet **resolves:**

1. To introduce into the Tajik SSR Constitution the following amendments and additions:

1. To expound articles 6, 7, and 49 in the following redaction:

"Article 6. The Tajik Communist Party, trade unions, Komsomol, sociopolitical, and other public organizations and mass movements, through their representatives elected to the soviets of people's deputies, and in other forms, participate in the development of state policy, and in the administration of state and public affairs of the Tajik SSR.

Article 7. In fulfilling the functions specified by their programs and charters, the Tajik Communist Party, sociopolitical and other public organizations and mass movements act within the framework of the Constitution and laws of the Tajik SSR.

The creation and activity of sociopolitical and other public organizations and movements having the goal of the violent alteration of the constitutional structure and integrity of the USSR and the Tajik SSR, the undermining of their security, or inflaming social, national, and religious strife is not allowed."

"Article 49. Tajik SSR citizens have the right to unite into the Tajik Communist Party, sociopolitical and other public organizations, to participate in mass demonstrations which promote the development of public activism and amateur activity, and the fulfillment of their diverse interests.

"Public organizations are guaranteed the conditions for the successful implementation of their chartered tasks."

K. Makhkamov, chairman, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet.

Legislation Amends Tajik Constitution

90US0916B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST
TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 28 Apr 90 p 1

[Report by Ye.I. Turgunov, Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet deputy chairman: "On the Tajik SSR Draft Law 'On the Status of People's Deputies in the Tajik SSR'"]

[Text] Esteemed comrade deputies! Submitted for your consideration is the draft law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the Tajik SSR," developed at the direction of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and discussed in preliminary procedure by the group of newly-elected Tajik SSR people's deputies who have concerned themselves with its preparation in this session.

First of all, it should be noted that the legal status of the deputies of the soviets of all echelons in our country is

defined by the USSR Law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the USSR," adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet in December 1989. This stems directly from the unity of the system of the soviets, the communality of the principles of the organization of their activity and the need to ensure equality of the powers of the deputies of the appropriate level.

At the same time, we cannot fail to consider the process of the growth of the diversity in the determination of the forms and methods of the organizations of power in the provinces, the specific particulars of our republic and its suffusion with ever greater real content. That is why it is advisable to have the Law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the Tajik SSR" which would reflect the processes indicated.

While in complete correspondence with union legislation, the proposed draft contains at the same time norms of deputy activity that have been proven under local conditions and have justified themselves in practice; it develops them and includes new statutes responding to the demands of the regeneration of the authority of the soviets and the development of the initiatives of the deputies.

Comrades, you have the text of this document. Nonetheless, allow me to pause upon several principal statutes.

The draft Law preamble determines that the deputies are the leading force of the self-management of the people. All possible concern with the needs of the voters, the people's well-being, and the strengthening of soviet democracy are the immutable principal of their activity. The deputies are called upon to express and defend public interests in the soviets, to lead socioeconomic development, and to direct and control the work of the state apparatus.

The first section of the draft comprising the "Common statutes" has important significance. Here it is established that the deputy constructs his work in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the Tajik SSR, on the basis of the decisions of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies, and strives to fulfill his preelection program.

The draft law precisely determines the order of the deputy's interrelations with the soviet and its organs. It is specified that the deputy, as a member of the collegial representative organ of state power, has all the plenitude of rights ensuring his active participation in the activity of the soviet. It should be emphasized at the same time that a deputy who has not justified the voters' trust may be recalled, and in the event that a deputy does not perform his duties in the soviet, or his violation of the established procedure of the work of the representative organ, the demands of deputies' ethics, the issue of a deputy's conduct may be considered by the soviet or appropriate commission of the soviet.

Article 7 of the draft Law regulated the defense of the deputy's rights, honor, and dignity, and guarantees every deputy conditions for the effective implementation of his powers. The presidiums, executive, and administrative organs of the corresponding soviets of people's deputies are called upon to render the necessary assistance in this.

The norms contained in the second section of the draft are aimed at the development of the deputies' initiative and activity, and ensuring the opportunity for free expression of opinion in the course of the discussion and decision in the soviet, and manifestations of independence in the deputy activity. In accordance with the draft law, the deputy has the right to raise in the soviet the issue of trust of a body of the organs formed or officials elected by the soviet, elected, appointed, or confirmed by it.

In effect, this section gives for the first time a description of the deputy demand, and defines the procedure of consideration of deputies' proposals and comments introduced at sessions of the soviet.

And we should also distinguish the statute of the draft that establishes that a deputy in the body of the soviet presidium, permanent commission, or other organs of the soviet has the right to introduce any issues and proposals for the consideration of the indicated organs, to participate in their preparation for review, in their discussion, and the adoption of decisions on them, as well as in the organization of implementing the decisions of the soviet and its organs, and in the control over their implementation.

The work of the deputy in the election okrug occupies a leading place in the implementation of deputy powers. The broad circle of issues associated with this is regulated in the third section of the draft law. Under discussion here are the deputy's rights and responsibilities in connection with work in the election okrug, the procedure of the deputy's consideration of citizens' proposals, statements, and complaints, and the deputy's reports to the voters. The draft law statutes on the responsibilities of the presidium or the executive committee of the corresponding soviet, local organs of a public organization, the administration and public organizations, enterprises, and institutions to assist the deputy in exercising his powers in the election okrug have great significance.

The fourth section of the draft law includes statutes concerning the organization of the work of people's deputies with the voters' mandates. As determined by Article 27, mandates are instructions taken during encounters, meetings, or conferences with candidates for people's deputies representing the election okrug. Subsequent articles of this section define the procedure of for the formation, confirmation, and implementation of the mandates.

A principally important aspect is the provision of glasnost in the work with mandates. In particular, the draft

establishes that the decisions of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet, and local soviets of people's deputies adopted by mandates are subject to mandatory publication, and the mass information media must cover the course of the execution of the voters' mandates.

Under the conditions of alternative elections, there has arisen the issue of the realization of proposals contained in the mandates to the candidates not elected during the course of the elections of deputies. The draft permits the issue indicated, and establishes that the soviets direct these proposals to the appropriate organs and officials for consideration and adoption of measures for their execution.

The last section of the draft law fortifies the statutes characterizing the legal, organizational, and material guarantees of the deputy activity.

In particular, the draft law regulates the procedure of releasing the deputy from his production or official responsibilities and of compensating him for expenses associated with deputy activities, and the deputy's rights to receive information, consultations, and legal assistance rendered him; the deputy's labor rights are preserved.

Such are the basic principles of deputy activity specified by the draft law in all echelons of the republic soviets of people's deputies.

At the same time, the working commission for the preparation of the draft law considered it advisable to set aside in it a number of statutes regulating the activity of the Tajik SSR people's deputies. As you understand, the basis for this is in the force of the special status of the Supreme Soviet in the system of organs of state power. Therefore, in those cases when the power and procedure of the deputies' activity in the body of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet differ from those relating to the soviets in general, the necessary refinements are made in the corresponding sections of the draft law. In particular, Article 12 specially reserves the right to legislative initiative for the Tajik SSR people's deputy in the republic Supreme Soviet. Such an approach obviates the need to develop a separate law on the status of Tajik SSR people's deputies and once again emphasizes the unity of the system of organs of popular representation.

Comrade deputies! In completing the description of the draft law, it should be emphasized that as the deputies accrue practical experience under the new conditions of development of common union legislation regulating the activity of the soviets of people's deputies, the future law must inevitably be improved. It is therefore proposed that with consideration for the comments and suggestions expressed by the permanent commissions and deputies, that the law "On the Status of People's Deputies in the Tajik SSR" be adopted at this session in its entirety and thus the entire job of regenerating the power of the soviets be placed on a new legal basis.

Turkmen CP Official Interviewed on Party Budget

90U'S0921A Ashkhabad TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA
in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 2

[Interview with A.N. Zhadanyy, Turkmen CP Central Committee administrator of affairs by TURKMENSKAYA ISKRA special correspondent G. Shehepotkina: "The Party Budget: What Does it Consist of and How is it Spent?"]

[Text] Recently, my colleague, a journalist, jokingly complained:

"I went on a trip for the party Central Committee, and then they started torturing me to account for myself. Oh, those hair-splitting accountants: they question every kopek you spend."

I have done party work myself, and I have the opportunity to compare. What is permitted in any other organization is absolutely excluded in the party committee—an advance for business travel expenses; travel fare in the absence of tickets, and bills for phone conversations. They know how to count money here, and that is understandable. The party coffers are really special resources.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union does not have state donations and meets all its expenses through its own resources. Strictly speaking, the party budget was never top secret. It was simply that the issue had never yet been raised. Now, letters come to the editors expressing in some form or another a desire to know what makes up the party budget and how it is spent.

This is subject of our conversation with A.N. Zhadanyy, Turkmen CP Central Committee administrator of affairs.

[Zhadanyy] The Turkmen Communist Party is an inalienable part of the CPSU, but we have our own budget.

The reality today is such that the Turkmen republic party organization, among a number of other republic party organizations of the country, is in no condition to cover their own expenses and are in need of the financial support of the CPSU. I want to emphasize that subsidies are made exclusively at CPSU expense. Not a single kopek is spent on party needs from the state budget, that is, from the taxpayer's pocket.

The subsidy to the republic party organization is large, approximately 50 percent of the total amount of expenses. There are several reasons for this situation. The main one is that the republic organization is relatively low in membership; there are somewhat over 115,000 party members and candidate members. Accordingly, the amount of dues, the fundamental portion of income, is relatively small. The second reason is the fact that our organization has practically no income from another point central in the CPSU—from publishing and printing activity.

As you know, the Turkmen CP Central Committee has its own publishing house, which includes your newspaper as well, but it exists on the foundation of another production base. In a few years, we hope to acquire our own printing base when we construct our own newspaper-magazine complex. Then we will have additional income. But this is something for the future.

[Correspondent] Meaning that the main income is party dues! Publishing activity is falling off. And what else? Please cite some figures.

[Zhadanyy] Well, first of all, publishing activity, taking away the printing expenses, brings us income all the same. Last year, this sum was R676,000. Plus party dues, to cite the figures, R8,337.3 million. The sale of property holdings, and of former property of the party committees brings in income annually—motor vehicles, furniture, miscellaneous inventory. Last year, this brought R285,100 to the party coffers.

Great income was received in this category in 1988, when two oblasts and seven rayons were eliminated in the republic. Accordingly, two party obkoms and seven raykoms were vacated. The sale of their property brought a tangible profit. Some 38 cars alone were sold. Moreover, 225 party organ officials came under reduction. A total of 25 units of militia protection were taken off the personnel roster.

The cost of the buildings belonging to the party committees was over R8 million; we transferred them to the local soviets gratis.

[Correspondent] Yet several rayons were reinstated last year.

[Zhadanyy] Yes, and accordingly, the previous status was returned to the party raykom in all the newly-created rayons. They are getting their buildings back now, and of course, there have been expenditures for the property acquired.

Now, when everybody has learned to count money, the party committees will only sell or lease out the buildings, property, and transportation, etc. belonging to them.

We will be more zealous landlords in all matters. Now, construction is excluded in the plans of the Tashauz Oblast committee, the Ashkhabad city committee, the Proletarskiy Rayon committee, the Turkmen Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism under the CPSU Central Committee. A sharp reduction of plans for capital construction, for example, that specified by the party budget of last year, made possible a transfer of the limits of the contract jobs by Gosstroy alone for a total of R3.5 million. The human resources and construction materials freed up were directed toward construction of facilities with social designations.

[Correspondent] It is understandable when facilities whose construction has not yet begun is excluded from

plans. But what, for example, will happen to the unfinished building of the Tashauz Oblast party committee, which has already made its mark on the city panorama?

[Zhadanyy] Yes, it is a large structure, and the 7-story building has almost been raised to the roof. A total of R5.6 million has already been invested in its construction. Now the building has been sold for utilization in the economy. So the party Central Committee has come out with its almost-finished 4-story garage building, that was later refitted for an electronic equipment plant.

The House of Political Education in Ashkhabad and the hotel of the permanently functioning courses under the Turkmen CP Central Committee have some sort of income. But they are on self-financing; they spend on themselves everything they earn. The hotel purchases furniture, equipment, gives itself amenities. But the House of Political Education, which has only recently begun to earn money by leasing its halls, is spending for the acquisition of expensive television and video apparatus, and for the same furniture.

That, perhaps, is all that can be said about our income.

[Correspondent] Now we move on to expenditures!

[Zhadanyy] Last year, the expense portion of the republic party organization party budget was R14.9 million. Only 56 percent of it was covered by party dues. A total of R11.6 million, or 78 percent of all the resources spent, was directed toward financing the activity of local party organs, and the organizational and ideological-political work conducted by them. Of this, R2.2 million was spent on the needs of the primary party organizations, including the maintenance of the released party staffers in them.

According to the party Central Committee estimate, expenses were somewhat over R2 million. This total is divided in such a way. A total of R800,000 was spent on the maintenance of the Central Committee apparatus, that is, less than 10 percent of the total of membership dues. Construction and reconstruction of party organ facilities, housing construction for party committee associates, and repair of the balance of the rooms in them took up R700,000. Some R330,200 was spent on management needs. Maintenance of the Turkmen Branch of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism cost R152,700.

[Correspondent] Several tens of thousands of rubles are left over. Where where these funds spent?

[Zhadanyy] There are relatively small expenses associated with correspondence training of party cadres in the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, and with the country's higher party schools, when students are in session, and their workplace salary is retained. The party Central Committee also pays for the travel of students of their continuing courses for higher qualification of party and soviet organs.

[Correspondent] And for the maintenance of dachas in Firyuza?

[Zhadanyy] The republic party organization does not have its own dachas, nor pension inns. But in Firyuza, we did indeed lease several dachas from the management department of the republic Council of Ministers, but staffers paid for their use with personal resources.

[Correspondent] In my opinion, we have exhausted the subject of income and expenses of the republic party organization, but I would like to return to the beginning of our conversation, when you spoke of the subsidy from the CPSU budget. What mutual relations, including financial relations, exist between the CPSU and the Turkmen Communist Party?

[Zhadanyy] As I already emphasized, the republic Communist Party is a component of the CPSU, functioning under the same Charter and general laws of party ethics. Our expenses are within the framework accepted by the CPSU, so we are requesting nothing in excess. Moreover, we always aspire to spend the resources we have very economically. For example, according to the report on the execution of the budget for last year, the savings were R2.8 million. This included R159,300 remaining from the funds allocated for maintaining the apparatus of the party Central Committee.

[Correspondent] And will subsidies be coming in the future?

[Zhadanyy] Apparently, there will be.

[Correspondent] That is clear. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, you would agree that this is now a very uncertain time for the Communist Party: The draft of the new CPSU Charter is under discussion. There are the most disparate proposals concerning the items of the formation and the expenditures of the party budget. What changes are coming in light of this?

[Zhadanyy] I will not take it upon myself to predict the party's financial situation even in the near future. I can say one thing with complete certainty: The party will not exceed its budget. Expenses will never exceed income.

I can only reflect aloud. Now, on the average, the republic party organization receives R6 per month in dues from every communist. If income grows, then it would seem that incoming membership dues must increase. But it is not so. The draft of the new CPSU Charter specifies a certain reduction of their amount as regards handicapped communists (2 kopeks from their disability pension), and pensioners, whose dues amounts will be taken not from their total income, but from various forms of earnings separately, low-paying, and up to R150 from a category of workers, as well as the statute written into the charter on the right to retain up to 50 percent of the dues within the primary party organizations. So it is entirely possible that even in the near future there will be a significant reduction of the amount of membership dues coming in, and consequently, of the quantity of workers maintained on the party budget.

[Correspondent] Is there any way to compensate for it?

[Zhadanyy] In a direct sense, no. I can only say that apparently, we will make firmer demands of the communists for failure to fulfill charter obligations and to seek non-traditional sources of income, that is, we will learn how to earn resources. In the former case, I have in mind incidents of indebtedness and communists covering a portion of their incomes. For example, at the start of the year, there were 479 debtors in the republic party organization. This figure hardly fluctuates during the course of the year. And up to 100 people always have debts in the course of 3 months.

There are cases of failure to pay full membership dues. This is usually found to be a total of R33,000-36,000 annually. I do not wish to say that all these violators are intentionally hiding the total volume of their earnings, but there are those as well. The majority do this through ignorance or forgetfulness. But this is disorder all the same. Money loves to be counted, and financial relations among like-minded people must not be clouded by such incidents.

The majority of party members are now for leaving up to half the total of membership dues in the primary party organizations.

Our conversation drew to a close. It seemed that all the issues of interest to our readers had been exhausted. He turned to the topic of his attitude toward his cause, his professional honor, and in general, well-known truths came to light. For example, from the very same ingredients it is possible to prepare in a dining hall very good food, with a wide assortment of dishes, and not-so-good food, with no choice. And cleanliness in offices can be maintained by putting one's heart into it, or just haphazardly. And the opportunities to save money in management expenses are the same in all institutions. Electricity, telephones, business travel expenses are items the same everywhere, but the savings are different.

It would seem that if everyone were occupied with his own cause, giving his all, honorably and professionally, there would be less mutual suspicion and offense.

Tajik People's Deputies Announcement on State of Republic

90US0921B Dushanbe KOMMUNIST

TADZHIKISTANA in Russian 26 Apr 90 p 1

[Report of Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet: "The Appeal of the Tajik SSR Supreme Soviet to All the Residents of the Republic"]

[Text] Dear compatriots, esteemed parents, sisters and brothers, daughters and sons!

We, the Tajik SSR people's deputies, having gathered at the first session of the Supreme Soviet, have for over 10 days discussed the problems that have concerned you for years, and have decided to appeal to you, workers and peasants, teachers, representatives of the technological, scientific, and creative intelligentsia, student youth,

Tajiks and Russians, Uzbeks and Ukrainians, Kirghiz and Turkmens, Tatars and Germans, to people of all nationalities, our countrymen and compatriots.

As you know, our republic is experiencing a complex and crucial stage of perestroika. The processes of democratization of public life, political and economic reform are taking place impetuously and dynamically, touching upon all spheres of life in our society. It must be said that the lack of political experience and political culture frequently lead to the domination of emotions over reason, and negative manifestations in public life. The chronic backwardness of the social sphere, which is not responsive to people's growing demands, also has its effect.

It is well known that starting next year, we face a transition to self-financing and self-management, the introduction of the principles of a planned market economy. Enormous work will be required, and it has begun. Under the new conditions, the republic's population will become a more empowered master of all its natural resources and the created economic potential; the welfare of every one of us to a great extent depends upon persistent labor and the efforts of each and every one of us.

Now as never before we are in particular need of unity, friendship, and the mutual understanding of all residents of the republic, regardless of national or religious affiliation. We are all residents of one same common home; we have the same joys and concerns; we are united by a common homeland—the land of Tajikistan, hospitable to all.

In condemning the extremist forces that attempted to destabilize the situation in the city of Dushanbe in February of this year, we decisively state that the Tajik people are not involved in these shameful events and condemn them. We appeal to those of our sisters and brothers who suffered and gave in to the panicked moods, and to those who left the republic or plan to do so to weigh everything out carefully and to think, rather than make such a decision in haste.

We appeal to war and labor veterans whose contribution to the republic's development has earned general recognitions and respect. Today, your words of wisdom straight from the heart are capable of inspiring confidence in people, of assisting in a correct evaluation of the situation.

We appeal to our youth, who are faced with building the future common home together with those their own age of diverse nationalities. Always remember: It is impossible to build one's own happiness and success upon the misfortune and suffering of others. This is a dangerous, dead-end road; it will always be alien to the Tajik people. Your strength is in the unity and the sons of all our peoples.

We appeal to our Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Armenian, Georgian, and Azerbaijani brothers, to all

those for whom Tajikistan has become a second homeland. For us, there is not nor can there be a division of people along national, religious, or linguistic lines. All people are equal, and only the active contribution of each to the common cause may and can determine the measure of its public recognition.

Dear compatriots! Ahead of all of us is the difficult job of creating a flourishing, effectively functioning republic economy, regenerating the culture and traditions of the peoples inhabiting it. Let us take up this large-scale and noble cause shoulder to shoulder!

We are convinced that the difficulties caused by the events of February are of a temporary nature, and that the good neighborly relations, friendship and fraternity, and mutual respect on which Tajikistan has long prided itself will triumph and bear fruit.

On the eve of the 45th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet people over fascist Germany, we are especially acutely aware that only our unity and solidarity saved us from enslavement by Hitler's hordes. The heroic feats of those sent by the republic, Tajiks and Russians, Uzbeks and Turkmens, Ukrainians and Armenians, Belorussians and Kirghiz, sons and daughters of all the peoples populating the republic, at the fronts near Moscow, Leningrad, on the banks of the Volga and Dnepr, in the liberation of Belorussia and the Baltics, and the assault on Berlin will never be erased from our memory. Nor can we forget that during those terrible years, Tajikistan took in and harbored thousands of elderly, women, and children forcibly removed from their native lands.

Nor can we forget that together, hand in hand, we mastered the Vakhsh and Gissar valleys, and revealed to the world the ancient treasures of the Tajiks' spiritual life.

We would like to emphasize once again that for today and for all times, our strength is in unity and solidarity. And this must be appreciated.

Let peace and benevolence always abound in our life! Let the friendship of peoples grow stronger and triumph!

Official Discusses Ukrainian Congress Delegates

90UN1850.1 Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 12 May 90 p 2

[Report on interview with P. Todorov, chairman of the Ukrainian Central Election Commission for Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent N. Belov; date and place not specified: "We Will Do Without Quotas"]

[Text] Kharkov—The nomination of candidates for delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress in the Ukraine has been concluded. The first round of voting will take place 15-17 May. In the meantime, meetings of candidates

with Communists are taking place. First to begin the election campaign in Kharkov were communists of the "Elektrotiyazhmash" Plant. Named as candidates here were engineers A. Zavatskiy and V. Maksimenko, designer V. Logvinov, and plant director Yu. Patoka. V. Zhuzhoma, director of the Lozovaya Metal Construction Plant, is the only candidate for deputy to both congresses and the oblast conference. In this regard, many workers want to know if this will leave the working class "washed out" of representation at the union and republic congresses, as happened in the elections to the soviets. This is the question I posed to P. Todorov, chairman of the Central Republic Election Commission for Elections of Delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and party committee secretary of the Kharkov Tractor Plant imeni Sergo Ordzhonikidze.

[Todorov] If we analyze the qualitative make-up of registered candidates, the results at first seem distressing—only one tenth of the candidates are workers and just one fifth are party or soviet workers. But not every party worker nominated is popular. Thus, the elections which will take place 15-17 May may alter a great deal.

We would like there to be equal representation of communists in the elections of delegates, of course—of workers, employees, and the creative intelligentsia. The previous method of using a strict quota system provided for this. Rejecting not only the quota system but disavowing as well any kind of pressure on party committees changes a lot.

[Correspondent] Petr Prokofyevich, independent decision-making turns right around against the workers—they lose out to the "technocrats" and the plant upper echelons. Delegates to the Donetsk Oblast Party Conference recently elected a new oblast committee without any external pressure whatsoever. And when the election was over, the new organ had just seven workers and not a single kolkhoz [collective farm] member. There were fewer in the Control and Auditing Commission—just two workers. Are we going to see the same thing happen in elections of delegates to the congress?

[Todorov] I do not think we will. Strong individual personalities have arisen in the working milieu and acquired some experience. They are prepared to fight for the delegate seat on an equal basis with leaders of any rank. Consider our plant—of 10 candidates nominated for delegate to the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, five are workers. I am certain they will prove to be worthy competitors against both party workers and economic leaders. And the party committee will provide them support. With respect to the situation in Donetsk, your newspaper has reported on this and come to precisely the proper conclusion—the elections there were allowed to run their course.

[Correspondent] N. Ostapshuk, party committee secretary of the Kharkov plant "Elektrotiyazhmash," believes

large enterprises will have an advantage in the elections—the majority will vote for "their own" and ensure their victory.

[Todorov] The experience of elections to the soviets has shown that people do not always vote for "their own." If a candidate has an outstanding personality, if his supporters engage in canvassing, he will be victorious over a rival from a large organization. I believe the CPSU took shape as expressing the interests of the working class. And so its representatives should comprise a significant portion of the election organs and congresses. In order for perestroika to escape the bounds of "the top echelons," it is not the party and economic leadership which should be represented at the congress with a thin layer of workers, but just the reverse—it should be the working class with a layer of apparatchiks.

[Correspondent] But really, you yourself are an apparatchik to a significant degree—an experienced party worker, head of a four-thousand member party organization. Communists of the plant form an independent district. Plant personnel called out your name among the first candidates for delegate to the CPSU Congress. And although your two rivals—technologist L. Boguslavskaya and metal worker Ye. Shikin—are respected people at the plant, you clearly have the advantage. So here we have a huge plant where half the communists are workers, and they are to be represented at the congress by a party functionary. How does this stack up against your comments about increasing the number of worker delegates?

[Todorov] I don't see any particular contradiction. First of all, from our party organization, which forms one district, one delegate will be elected to the CPSU Congress, two to the Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, and 13 delegates to the oblast conference. I am sure many of the delegates will be workers. Secondly, the time has come to stop measuring affiliation with the working class by the presence of greasy overalls and unskilled labor. In civilized countries the working man has long lost these attributes. And we see an ever increasing number of workers at our plant who have higher education. Many of our shop and service leaders have files in which only the most recent entry is in an engineering capacity. Who are these people—engineers or workers?

Pay attention to the fact that most of the nominated candidates are not workers and not party workers, but rather skilled craftsmen, engineers, and technologists—people whose job description in the reports comes under "engineers and technicians." This segment of people has long been in the shadows. The quota system usually resulted in nominating either regular workers or major leadership personnel. Plant engineering personnel now have the opportunity to manifest themselves, and this gives no cause for fear. "Engineers and technicians" comprise an educated segment of workers on whom the CPSU can rely.

[Correspondent] How will communists relate to opposition within the party during the elections of delegates?

[Todorov] This is expressed in the open letter of the CPSU Central Committee "To Achieve Consolidation on a Principled Basis," a document which has been carefully discussed in our plant and all across the republic as well. Most people are of the opinion that the party is not against different beliefs, but against splitters who are striving to create an independent party. This striving, incidentally, was no concealed matter in several addresses at the Ukrainian party club conference which convened recently in Kharkov. We must dissociate ourselves from these people prior to the congress so as to arrive there united. I do not think the workers will support adherents of social-democratic ideas in electing their delegates. The rising social-democracy has a different base—people engaged in cooperatives, small entrepreneurs, a portion of the intelligentsia.

I am glad that, in spite of the complicated situation in our party, people take their problems and troubles to the Kharkov Tractor Plant Party Committee as an institution of last resort. And they believe they will find understanding, analysis, and assistance here.

[Correspondent] Well, what do you think the body of delegates to the congress will look like?

[Todorov] It is difficult to make predictions now—the situation is changing so rapidly. But I believe the delegate composition will turn out to be well educated with a pronounced workers' orientation, consisting of plant workers and engineers who will not be an "obedient majority," but rather true leaders who express the interests and hopes of the communists who elected them.

Ukrainian Party Activity Principles

90UN1692A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
5 Apr 90 p 1

[Decision of Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Plenum: "Program Principles of the Activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party"]

[Text] 1. To approve with regard for the discussion and the observations expressed by the participants in the plenum the draft program principles of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party. To publish the draft in the press for discussion in the party organizations and among Communists and all working people of the republic.

2. To propose that the oblast, city, and rayon party committees organize extensive discussion of the draft program principles of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party in close connection with discussion of the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th Party Congress. Discuss the place and role of the Ukrainian Communist Party in the restructuring processes and paths of its renewal. Ensure coverage of the course of the discussion in the mass media.

3. Instruct the Politburo and commissions of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee to collate all proposals and observations pertaining to the draft program principles of the activity of the Ukrainian Communist Party, complete work on it and submit it for examination by a Central Committee plenum.

Ivashko's Closing Speech at Ukraine Plenum

90UN1697A Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 Apr 90 p 3

[From the report "Speeches at the Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee," closing remarks by V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and Politburo member]

[Text] Plenum participants made a great many observations and proposals regarding draft program documents for the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party. This is understandable, insofar as questions of principle are involved here. But in the end we all reached the conclusion that these documents could be brought out for discussion by Communists and the workers of the republic.

With respect to the timing of the reporting and election campaign—I would like to remind you that it was we, representatives of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, who proposed at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum that the right of determining when reports and elections would be conducted—prior to or following the 28th CPSU Congress—should be given to the local party organs themselves. And as you know, we were supported in this. I would just like to point out that I for one am among those who prefer to conduct this campaign prior to the Congress. Many people do not share this point of view. Well, let us consider it again and make the decision that is most intelligent and most well thought out, especially since the situation changes now with almost every day.

One observation of principle regarding the rejoinder of Comrade I.N. Saliy. I categorically deny that we are prejudiced in any way with respect to any segment of our society, including, as has been alleged, the "intellectual elite." And it is no accident that I stated many times today that we must fight for each Communist. But let us speak frankly concerning those who used to be in our party, and who have now left of their own accord or been expelled. Who forced them to appeal for the establishment of a new political party? No one. We got together to consult on where to go from here. There is a kind of absurdity here—for a single individual to be in two parties simultaneously. You do not see this anywhere. Well, we decided to talk some more with these people. All kinds of things happen in life—someone doesn't understand something right, or a person does something in the heat of the moment... But, as was shown by the further development of events, these people placed themselves outside the party.

Again I emphasize that there must not be any formalism in this exceptionally important matter. All those so-called norms "reinforced in concrete" have now been discarded, all those different percentages on party admission. Last year more than 53,000 individuals were approved as CPSU candidate members. And admittance to party membership is presently taking place in all oblast party organizations—even where the situation is somewhat complicated, in Lvov Oblast for example.

And when a person becomes a party member today, there is no need to find fault with what age he is or what social group he belongs to. The important thing is his degree of conviction and desire to work for the benefit of the people.

If someone does not want to be in our party, then we have to talk with him and find out what the problem is—is it some kind of misunderstanding or a divergence of principle? And if someone wishes to belong to some other party, what should we do then? My opinion is that it is not worth holding on to such people by force.

We must not yield our position on questions of principle. Many of you now present in this hall attended the December plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, where the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party were discussed. The leaders of this party assured us they were headed towards separation from the CPSU with just one thing in mind—to "save" the Communist movement in Lithuania, the Lithuanian Communist Party. I gave an address at that time and stated that I disagreed with this step, because it was evident they had something entirely different in mind. So what has happened? Now even some of the leaders of this party have left it entirely. And in the final analysis we are talking about the party's disintegration. Everyone understands this. Can it be that we desire such a fate for our party, the Ukrainian Communist Party? I am convinced that no one present desires this. And the Communists of the republic do not want this. And so, let us fight to consolidate the unity of our party ranks.

Ukrainian Communist Party Resolution on Party Unity

90UN1704B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
6 Apr 90 p 1

[Resolution of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum: "To Consolidate Unity in Party Ranks"]

[Text] The Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum notes that during the course of discussion prior to the 28th Party Congress various opinions and positions are being expressed as well as numerous observations and constructive proposals, which illustrate the aspirations of Communists and nonparty members to improve and enrich the pre-Congress CPSU documents, to accelerate the processes of party renewal, and to consolidate the party ideologically and organizationally.

At the same time we are seeing ever more noticeable manifestations recently of forces which would like to knock the party off its charted course. On the one hand we see conservatism, dogmatism, an inability to carry on dialogue with people, and an inability to operate in the new fashion actuality requires. On the other hand we see intensified activity on the part of certain party members and groups in attacking the party and its ideological-organizational foundations from a pseudo-revolutionary—but essentially destructive—position. They renounce the Communist ideal and, in essence, reject Marxist-Leninist doctrine. They oppose party discipline and come out in support of freedom for factions and other groupings. They are working to transform the CPSU into a parliamentary party of the social-democratic variety. This can be seen in concentrated form in the so-called "Democratic Platform," whose leaders are now resorting to a fractional struggle and organizing the establishment of their own structures.

We are also seeing evidence of separatist trends and attempts to split Communists along ethnic lines, efforts to foist the principle of a federative system upon the party and destroy a unified CPSU.

The Ukrainian CP Central Committee Plenum notes that these actions present a serious danger to our party. At a time when a multiparty system is becoming a reality, when irreconcilable political opponents are emerging to confront the CPSU and drag it into a bitter political struggle, fractionalization would entail a split in the CPSU and, in the final analysis, its elimination from the political arena.

The plenum staunchly advocates the consolidation of party unity on the basis of Marxism-Leninism. During the course of the broad democratic process of preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and 28th Ukrainian Communist Party Congress, we must rally to unite party ranks ideologically and organizationally. We must dissociate from those who have set out on the path of struggle against party policy. We are convinced that the sooner the party frees itself from people who are consciously attempting to split it from within, the better it will be for the party itself. At the same time, we must devote maximum attention to every Communist so as to retain in the party all those who hold its future dear. The plenum supports the position of the Secretariat of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee with respect to those CPSU members who made an antiparty, separatist statement in the 8 March 1990 edition of the newspaper *LITERATURNIA UKRAINA*.

The plenum declares its support for the concept of a vanguard mass party true to Communist ideals, built on the principles of internationalism and democratic centralism in their Leninist sense. Expanding its independence within the framework of the CPSU Program and Statutes, the Ukrainian Communist Party will fight for CPSU unity, for only a unified and renewed party can be a guarantor of the irreversibility and socialist nature of today's revolutionary transformations.

The plenum calls upon party organizations and all Communists of the republic to fix precisely their position on questions of principle, to closely unite their ranks, and to consolidate all vital forces in resolving the critical problems of the socioeconomic and spiritual development of our republic.

Ivashko Leads Talks on Ukraine CP Congress

90UN1799B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
25 Apr 90 p 1

[RATAU report: "On the Agenda—Preparation for the Congress"]

[Text] The session of the Commission on Preparation for the 28th Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party, formed by the March (1990) Central Committee Plenum, has convened. The session was chaired by V.A. Ivashko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Commission discussed draft regulations for the Congress, draft procedures for electing leading organs of the republic Communist Party, and the plan-summary of the Congress report "On the Political Situation and Basic Trends in the Activity of the Communist Party of the Ukraine in Our Modern Stage of Development. Report of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party."

Commission members expressed a number of principled observations directed towards ensuring that all aspects of the socio-political situation in the republic are comprehensively discussed at the Congress, as well as socioeconomic policy, interethnic relations, organizational-party and ideological work. Emphasis was placed on the need to make the most effective use of every hour of Congress activity, and to extend the opportunity of expressing their views to the greatest possible number of delegates. To this end, it is envisaged that not just plenary, but sectional sessions as well, will be organized for the most pressing problems of party activity.

It was noted that, in forming the leading organs of the Ukrainian Communist Party, it is necessary to rely on the proposals of primary party organizations and ensure that these represent all regions and diverse party-member categories, especially of workers and peasants.

The importance was stressed of deeply analyzing the arrangement of political forces in the republic and the situation in the party. The Congress report must give priority to measures being taken to provide people with suitable living conditions and reliable social security. There was also discussion of the thorough elaboration of issues concerning the ideology of renewal, and concerning renewal of the ideology itself, of overcoming dogmatism.

Observations and proposals were submitted to a working group for preparation of Congress documents.

Ukrainian Republican Party Rally Deplored

90UN2198B Kiev *PRAVDA UKRAINY* in Russian
31 May 90 p 4

[Unattributed report: "What Deputy Levko Lukyanenko Remained Silent About"]

[Text] In his program speech one of the contenders for the post of chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, Deputy L.G. Lukyanenko, made only a brief mention of the "national liberation struggle." That is how he referred to the Banderite military during the first years after the war. Significant additions were made to this statement in the commentary "Heroes Day" published in the newspaper *GALICHINA* (this is the newspaper of the people's deputies, which started publication this month in Ivano-Frankovsk).

On 23 May, *GALICHINA* reports, a meeting dedicated to "Heroes Day" took place in the park of culture and leisure at the oblast center under the blue-and-yellow and black-and-red flags. It was organized by that same Ukrainian Republican Party (URP) whose leader is Levko Lukyanenko. "Former members of the OUN [Association of Ukrainian Nationalists] and leaders of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurrection Army] addressed those present," the newspaper reported. "They called for 'respect for the memory of those who gave their lives in the struggle.' What are we talking about here? Who were these 'heroes.' Yes, they were all gangsters from the OUN-UPA who left their bloody tracks on the land of the Western Ukraine: Documents testify to the fact that more than 30,000 peaceful Soviet citizens died at their hands."

URP member M. Kovalenko, who spoke at the meeting, claimed that the OUN and UPA "followed in a worthy manner the traditions of the liberation struggle." Another member of the same party, M. Keyvan, emphasized that the URP regards Simon Pelyura and Stepan Bander as its predecessors. And former UPA leader I. Burshtinskiy stated this: "I would follow along the same road."

And of course, at the meeting there were all kinds of variations on the myth that the OUN-UPA "fought on two fronts"—against both the Soviet troops and the German occupation forces. But no one said a word about the fact that the commander-in-chief of Bander's cut-throats, Roman Shukhevich, was a Hauptmann in Hitler's army, and that the UPA was supplied with weapons and ammunition by the fascist Abwehr Command-202...

The former members of the OUN who have merged with the URP not only show no repentance with respect to the people whom they damned, but are even insolently talking about "following along the same road." How does this square with the claims made by Deputy L.G. Lukyanenko that his party will fight within the framework of the Constitution using peaceful parliamentary methods?

Crimea, Donetsk Soviet Chairmen Elected

90UN17041 Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
6 Apr 90 p 3

[RATAU report: "Sessions of Oblast Soviets"]

[Text] Organizational matters were examined at the first session of the new convocation of the Crimean Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies. Elected chairman of the oblast soviet on a competitive basis was N.V. Bagrov, first secretary of the Crimean Obkom [party oblast committee] and candidate member of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Politburo. Elected deputy chairman, also on a competitive basis, was G.I. Kapshuk, acting secretary of the party obkom. Elected chairman of the oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] was V.V. Kurashik, already working in this position.

At the first session of the new convocation of the Donetsk Oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, Yu.K. Smirnov was elected chairman of the soviet on a competitive basis. Smirnov formerly served as chairman of the Donetsk Oblispolkom.

Donetsk, Kiev, Lutsk Soviets Elect Leaders

90UN1717D Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
13 Apr 90 p 2

[RATAU report: "Sessions of Oblast Soviets"]

[Text] Organizational matters were examined at the first sessions of soviets of people's deputies, new convocation, of a number of oblasts.

Donetsk. On a competitive basis, V.I. Sheludchenko, formerly serving as director of the oblast Municipal Services Administration, was elected oblispolkom [oblast executive committee] chairman.

Kiev Oblast. On a competitive basis, I.S. Plyushch, serving as oblispolkom chairman, was elected chairman of the oblast soviet. V.D. Sinko, former first deputy oblispolkom chairman, became chairman of the oblispolkom.

Lutsk. On a competitive basis, V.I. Blazhenchuk, second secretary of the party obkom, was elected chairman of the Volyn Oblast Soviet. M.V. Parasunko was elected ispolkom chairman of the oblast soviet, a position he formerly occupied.

Aid to Ukrainian Helsinki Union Questioned

90UN1702B Kiev PRAVDA UKRAINY in Russian
15 Apr 90 p 3

[Letter to the editors of PRAVDA UKRAINY from A. Fesenko, CPSU member, adviser to the board of the Ukrainian Cinematographers Union: "A White Flag Before the Ukrainian Helsinki Union?"]

[Text] Dear Editors!

The Sixth Congress of Ukrainian Cinematographers begins its work on 17 April. I believe that its participants

cannot be indifferent to the following fact. The secretariat of the board of the Ukrainian Cinematographers Union has decided to offer the Cinematographers House for the constituent congress of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

As we know, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union is an organization characterized by extreme political adventurism and blunt anti-Sovietism. And it is waging a furious nationalistic campaign for secession of the Ukraine from the USSR. And here the cinematographers are handing over their creative house to the Ukrainian Helsinki Union people, waiving the interests of their union members, and of their families and children (a 29 April pre-holiday evening function and an event for 600 children have been canceled).

This decision was made at the initiative of CPSU member V. Kuznetsov, secretary of the union board. Other union secretaries voted for it as well, also party members. Several individuals present at the session opposed the decision, but the secretariat did not consider this.

Perhaps the leaders of the creative union are not adequately informed as to the separatist activity of Ukrainian Helsinki Union? Don't they read the newspapers?

Reading a very recent issue of PRAVDA, I got to where the paper's Lvov correspondent reported ("A Bitter Lesson for...Teachers," 13 April 90) that one Ukrainian Helsinki Union leader, V. Chernovil, published an "appeal" at the first session of the oblast soviet, stating that the executive organs of the soviets should be pulled entirely out from under the influence of party organs and organizations. Having obtained a majority in the soviets, representatives of the Ukrainian Democratic Bloc started a program of "shuffling" school directors from a "political reliability" point of view, the primary people booted out being Communists—Russians or those from eastern regions of the Ukraine. And a session of the Zaliznychnyy Rayon Soviet began with a decision to remove the bust of V.I. Lenin from the assembly hall.

Such are the facts.

I would also like to ask the secretaries of the Cinematographers Union who are obliging the Ukrainian Helsinki Union people—can you have forgotten the artistic Ukrainian films "The High Pass," "The White Bird with the Black Mark," "The Uneasy Month of September," "The Collapse of Operation 'Big Dipper,'" "The Crimson Coasts," "Three Spent Cartridges from a British Carbine," and a multitude of documentary films debunking nationalism?

With respect to V. Kuznetsov (script writer for the films "The Mentality, Honor, and Conscience of an Epoch," "The Road of Our Fathers," and "The Party Approach")—one is struck by his evolution to active support of the nationalist wing of Rukh and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union.

The party buro of the primary party organization of the Union of Cinematographers board adopted a decision at its session condemning the actions of the Union of Cinematographers secretariat in offering the Cinematographers House to the Ukrainian Helsinki Union people for their congress—thereby showing disdain for the interests of union members, precluding their earlier scheduled (and approved) events, and ignoring the views of the Cinematographers House board and the council of the labor collective.

And what will the delegates to the Sixth Congress of Ukrainian Cinematographers say?

A. Fesenko, CPSU member, adviser to the board of the Ukrainian Cinematographers Union

Helsinki Union Congress Proceedings Viewed

90UN1850B Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 May 90 p 2

[Article by staff correspondent G. Dolzhenko: "How Are We Worse Than the Hetman?"]

[Text] Kiev—In the pre-celebration bustle, a certain event in Kiev somehow went unnoticed. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union conducted its congress over the two-day period prior to the First of May holiday at the House of Cinematography. The Ukrainian Helsinki Union has been transformed into a political organization competing with the Ukrainian Communist Party—the Ukrainian Republic Party.

It may be too soon to be talking about this as a party—there are 2,300 people in its ranks. But if we are to judge by the results of elections to soviets at all levels, we see that 12 Ukrainian Helsinki Union members have become Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] people's deputies, and V. Chornovol, one of the founders of the organization, was elected chairman of the Lvov Oblast Soviet. In short, we should not close our eyes to the fact that, in the Western Ukraine at least, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union enjoys support. And the fact that of almost 500 of its congress delegates, every other one had been a political prisoner in the past imparted to them a kind of aura of martyrdom, of being "victims for truth." In any case, almost every speech began with this, and the words were invariably met with applause. Rousing the delegates to particularly great heights were the words of L. Lukyanenko, elected party chairman at the congress, who had been sentenced to death for his political convictions, was then pardoned and sent to serve almost three decades in exile. "The entire leading nucleus of the movement is prepared to return once again to the camps, if necessary. Freedom or death."

Cossack marches rang out in the foyer, semi-legal newspapers and pins were sold, cartoons displayed, and charts of figures showing development of the Ukraine which could hardly be comforting. Of special interest was *VPERED*, the newspaper of the Tysmenitskiy

Raykom [rayon party committee] of the Ukrainian Communist Party and the rayon soviet, in which a Ukrainian insurgent army was discussed and the words and music of old Sech fighter songs were printed. Yellow and blue, crimson, and black and red banners waved in the hall. The television cameras of foreign correspondents panned the participants; movie cameras whirled. A priest opened the first session with an invocation. Then they read welcoming remarks from N. Playuk, president of "separatist" Ukraine now living in Philadelphia, and comments from the people's fronts of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Sajudis. The speeches were alike in many respects and there is no sense in repeating the abuse which leaves such a bitter taste, directed towards the "evil empire." All the same, it is worth recalling some of them.

Major Badzitskiy from Kharkov, for example, spoke of the military committee of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union operating in the city, comprised of active-duty and retired officers and military cadets. Army doctrine of the future "separatist" Ukraine is being developed there. Doctor R. Koval proposed that instead of a party to replace the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, a Ukrainian Christian Union should be created, insofar as the proposed program is, as he expressed it, a collection of happily worded phrases which give no indication as to what kind of party is to be formed, what kind of state established. The alternative program he presented bans parties whose centers are located outside the Ukraine, parties which propagate ethnic or class enmity, violence, or dictatorship. All foreign troops would be taken out of the republic and weapons, including nuclear weapons, would be nationalized. One of the leaders of the Ukrainian Language Society, A. Sergiyenko, proposed that the elitist nature of the party be preserved, that a special kind of sword-bearers' order be created which would serve as an example of the ideological purity of the "national-liberation struggle" and direct mass democratic movements.

The speech given by V. Novodvorskaya, the representative of the Moscow Democratic Union, as always, abounded in scandalous comparisons and imprecations. In addition, she generously disavowed "Russia's unjust conquests" and allowed the Ukrainian SSR to go where it wishes.

In short, the congress committed the familiar sins—the mass rally atmosphere, lack of restraint on the part of its speakers. Some Pedchenko from Poltava takes the platform and declares that he has created his own security service, and is necessarily organizing his own party. "I am as good as the hetman—it is just that the organs have somehow not seized me..." The poor devil just needs a crown of thorns. Then during a break they showed the film "Ivan Sirko," on the struggle between Zaporozhye Cossacks and the Turkish conquerors. Every phrase about freedom for the Ukraine, every episode with the blue and yellow flag elicited a burst of applause...

But this is all emotion. One can understand people's euphoria and their intoxication with freedom suddenly presented. We could only dream about this in the camps, delegates stated, dignifying one another using the forgotten words "pan," "pani," "dobrodiy." And if we move away from the emotions, what remains is a new party with its program and statutes. What does it desire to attain that others do not? It turns out the Ukrainian Republic Party is a voluntary political organization which operates on the principles of the United Nations General Declaration of Human Rights and other international legal acts, within the framework of the Ukrainian SSR Constitution. Sound familiar? Very much so. One need only read our state and party documents. Except that these do not include such methods as pickets, boycotts, strikes, acts of civil disobedience, etc.

And the program contains much which is familiar—we can point to the struggle for markets and equal rights for various forms of ownership, a multiparty system, wholly peaceful and constitutional methods of influencing the masses, separation of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial, introduction of a jury system, decentralization and demonopolization of production, freedom of speech, assembly, and mass meeting, improved social security benefits... I could go on to list a great many other similar things. But who is against this? Who are we fighting with? All of this is already being implemented in our lives. It is for the sake of all this that perestroika was initiated. One need only look at the work of the new parliament, look at the processes which are taking place in the country.

And their own, the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, a third of which is comprised of Democratic Platform supporters, will also soon begin to function. Here is the way to achieve adoption of the necessary decisions and fight for the voters. The most important thing is that the expectations of the peoples of our multiethnic country not diverge from reality. And this depends on all of us.

23 March Uzbek CP Plenum on Party Platform, Political Sovereignty

Information Report

90US0893A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
24 Mar 90 p 1

[Information Report on Plenum of Uzbek CP Central Committee]

[Text] On 23 March 1990, the 19th Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee was held. The First Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee I.A. Karimov gave a report entitled "On the Results of the February and March (1990) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the Tasks of the Republic Party Organizations in Preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22d Uzbek CP Congress."

The Plenum examined the questions of changes in the date of convening, the agenda and the procedure for

electing the delegates of the 22d Uzbek CP Congress as well as submitting proposals on amendments in the Uzbek Constitution (Basic Law) at the First Session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, 12th Sitting.

Speaking in the debates on the report and other questions of the agenda were: Comrade M.I. Ibragimov, chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet, S.M. Marmarsulov, first secretary of the Tashkent Party Obkom, Ye.M. Mordvinova, crane operator at the Termez Structural Elements Combine of the Trust Uzelstroyindustriya [Uzbek Rural Construction Industry], D.D. Berkov, first deputy chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers, S.Kh. Khaitmatov, electrician at the Copper Smelting Plant of the Almalyk Mining-Metallurgical Combine imeni V.I. Lenin, S.D. Niyetullayev, first secretary of the Karakalpak Party Obkom, L.P. Kayumov, head of the chair at Tashkent State University, D.S. Yadgarov, first secretary of the Bukhara Party Obkom, Kh. Yakubzhanova, pensioner, A.G. Mukhtarov, editor of the newspaper KISHLOK KHA-KIKATI (Rural Truth), B.F. Satin, chairman of the Uzbek People's Control Committee, and P.M. Abdurakhmanov, first secretary of the Samarkand Party Obkom.

The Second Secretary of the Uzbek CP Central Committee A.S. Yefimov gave a statement on the questions of the First Session of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet.

The Plenum adopted the appropriate decrees on all the discussed questions.

The Plenum examined the statement by the former First Secretary of the Samarkand Party Obkom, Comrade N.R. Radzhabov. Considering that the Buro of the Uzbek CP Central Committee nullified its decisions of 19 October and 6 December 1988 as unjustified, the Plenum abrogated the decree of the 12th Central Committee Plenum of 7 December 1988 concerning Comrade N.R. Radzhabov and restored him to the ranks of the CPSU as well as to the Uzbek CP Central Committee.

With this, the Plenum of the Uzbek CP Central Committee concluded its work.

First Secretary Karimov Address

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24 Mar 90 pp 1-3

[Report by A.I. Karimov on the Results of the February and March (1990) Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee and the Tasks of the Republic Party Organizations in Preparing for the 28th CPSU Congress and the 22d Uzbek CP Congress]

[Text] Comrades! Exceptionally important changes are occurring in the life of our party and nation. The

plenums of the CPSU Central Committee held in February and March reviewed the urgent problems in the further development of the reform of the political system and the transforming of the party itself. The most radical step was the creation in our nation of such a world recognized form of state power as presidential rule. The leader of our party M.S. Gorbachev was elected the first USSR President.

The decisions of the CPSU Central Committee Plenums and the extensive discussion held at them on fundamental political questions show the desire of the party for a radical renewal of society, its life and activities on the basis of Leninist democratic principles and the overcoming of the recently formed lag in the party elements behind the perestroika processes. They were marked by exactingness in the approach to an analysis of the situation in the party and by high demands on each communist, regardless of the position held. The February and March Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee marked a beginning to carrying out radical political steps. These have been set out in a concentrated form in the draft adopted at the plenums for the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and the new CPSU Bylaws.

As a whole, these documents mark a desire for the party to emerge on a qualitatively new level of political theory and political practice and they define the most important principles of its further life and activity. Simultaneously they serve as a good basis for a pre-congress debate and for a broad and frank discussion with the communists of the ways for renewing the CPSU.

A key aspect in the Platform is a creative reanalysis of socialist principles as expressed in the program formula of the party—toward a humane, democratic socialism. That is, our ideal is not socialism "generally," but rather socialism directed primarily toward man, his rights and personal dignity and toward the diversity of his interests. Such a socialism in principle differs from that oversimplified and distorted image which was identified with the authoritarian bureaucratic system and the deformations from the periods of the cult of personality and stagnation.

Our political positions on this question should be maximally clear. All the more as in the heat of street passions, certain political forces are constantly forcing the thesis of denying the very socialist idea and declare it to be "not corresponding" to human nature and the fruit of speculative constructs by theorists divorced from life.

We cannot agree with this. Socialist values as formulated by the founders of Marxism-Leninism are the natural result of sociohistorical development in society and they have profound roots in the experience and common sense of the people and in the eternal dream of a better life and social justice. For this reason, each of us should be ready to defend socialist ideals and principles in disputes with any opponents. But these should be ideals

and principles purged of the deformations and filled with new content and returned to their Leninist form.

This is a fundamental aspect. All the more as many of our opponents, for example, one of the leaders of the so-called Democratic Platform, Yu. Afanasyev, have made the overthrow of Marxism-Leninism their banner in a fierce struggle for power.

There must be profound and thorough analysis of the sections of the Platform defining the content and direction of CPSU economic and social policy. From the example of socialist construction in Uzbekistan, one can understand the pernicious effect on the economy of a command system and a primitive view of ownership and market relations.

While in the first stage of industrialization strict centralization, a command, an order and nationalization contributed to the establishing of new national economic sectors, subsequently these became a brake on the path of scientific-technical progress and they gave birth to disproportions which assumed an exaggerated nature. The raw material focus of the economy, the cotton monopoly and the alienation of people from the means of production and the results of their labor are the chief obstacles on the path of the republic's development and on raising the people's prosperity.

The republic Communist Party Central Committee is taking measures to change such a situation and we have stated this in the election platform. Much is being done on this level to change investment policy, the structure and efficiency of production, for defining reasonable priorities in the development of the economy, for turning the economy toward the needs of the public and strengthening independence in the management of production and in the spiritual sphere.

But positive shifts are occurring extremely slowly and as yet have not provided any practical results. Moreover, because of the general imbalance in the financial and economic mechanism in individual sectors there has been a slowdown in the development rate, tension has survived in providing jobs for the population, social labor productivity has declined, the emission of money is continuing to go on as well as negative trends in a more rapid rise in wages and numerous questions are not being settled primarily in the social area and increasing income both on the level of the production sectors and for the public. Increased prices and inflationary phenomena have not been stopped. Substantial changes have not been achieved in the development of the agrarian sector.

Here we are not in any exceptional situation. To one degree or another these phenomena are also inherent to the economy of the entire nation.

The Platform of the CPSU Central Committee proposes an escape from this critical situation and defines the ways and methods for creating a planned market

economy in the nation. Fundamentally new and important is a recognition of diverse management forms and a profound restructuring of production relations and property relations.

Laws have already been adopted on leasing, on ownership, legislative principles on land tenure and these have rightly been given the importance of the legal foundation for a radical reform in the economy. It is a different question how they, these laws, will operate under different conditions, in different regions and with the differing starting development of the republics. Here you and I should investigate carefully and determine our attitude toward these laws and think through the scale and forms of their application considering the specific features of the republic.

Actually, is it possible rashly, without any stipulations, to adopt laws on land and ownership in our republic, if under conditions of the limited nature of irrigated areas and oases and most importantly the shortage of water resources, since time immemorial collective, communal forms of the ownership of land and water have existed? This has served as a guarantee against social upheaval, against fratricidal reprisal and against bloodshed.

Under the conditions of the republic, is it possible to introduce mechanically new laws without a risk of provoking an explosion of private property passions? Even now we have scores of conflicts over land and water, including in Fergana, Samarkand and Bukhara Oblasts. Hundreds of people inflamed by demagogues from the various informal movements and with the amazing inertia and impotence of the local authorities, come to the Central Committee and demand a solution to their questions often at the expense of the neighbors' interests. And what would happen if we, without considering the specific features, were to transfer the enforceable enactments of the new laws to our reality?

At the same time, we must give some thought to how in our republic we can carry out the program economic these laws. The platform of the CPSU Central Committee. Certain oblasts have already found some solution having adopted a decision to provide new plots and broadening the existing ones for all rural families requiring this. Up to the present, over 1.5 million families have received a land supplement and over 150,000 hectares of irrigated lands have been provided for this.

Unfortunately, our leaders of the oblast, rayons and farms have not everywhere recognized all those positive consequences ensuing from the above-stated decision for emerging from the difficult situation in which the republic's population finds itself and particularly the rural population. We have repeatedly emphasized that the question of providing the rural inhabitants with farmstead plots should be carried to its completion. Along with this, we must find other ways for resolving the problem of improving the means of life of the people. Many of these have been set out in the election platform of the Uzbek Communist Party. But this work cannot be

stopped for a single moment and additional proposals must be worked out by the 22d CP Congress.

The republic workers have approved those provisions of the draft which set out the party's social policy and along with the generally accepted guarantees for the human rights establish others such as increasing employment and improving the material situation of those who are forced to change their profession or remain unemployed.

The latter provision is particularly pertinent for us. The annual increase in the republic's labor resources is 240,000 persons. Of the 10 million working-age population, one out of ten does not participate in socially useful labor due to the absence of jobs.

For this reason, it is essential to create a nationwide mechanism for maintaining the employment of the population as well as material support for those who are actually without a job. At the same time, of course, we must solve these problems in the most active manner. And such solutions already are found on the spot. Let us give some thought, let us consult in the party organizations and labor collectives as to what we could additionally offer on this level for our social programs.

In the course of the current plenum and at the coming Uzbek CP Congress, we should define our stance on those positions of the Platform where mention is made of socialist self-government of the people, the fate of the federation and for ensuring the complete power of the soviets.

For us it is fundamentally important that party policy derive from a recognition of the sovereign power of the people as the sole source of power. This is stated in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee. The introduction of the presidency does not run contrary to this main principle of Soviet power. On the contrary, in line with the dividing of functions between the party and the state, Soviet power should assume a qualitatively new level, a qualitatively new significance.

Linked to this are the tasks of carrying out the second stage of the political reform. The renewal of the political system is developing under conditions favorable for the Communist Party, when its representatives comprise over 90 percent of the corps of Uzbek people's deputies constituted according to the results of democratic elections. This creates good prerequisites for our policy and the programs outlined by the communists for the renewal of economic, social and spiritual life to be embodied in the appropriate legal provisions and governmental decisions.

But it will be possible to achieve this only if each communist represented in the republic and local bodies of Soviet power shows the highest responsibility for those powers which have been granted to him by the people and which he has voluntarily assumed on his shoulders, having given agreement to run for office, to express, defend and protect the will of the people in the bodies of power. The First Session of the newly elected

republic Supreme Soviet will open tomorrow. We should do everything so that its work from the very outset has a professional, constructive nature. Our direct duty is to unite and accumulate the hopes and thoughts of the people which they have taken to the elections and for which they gave their votes and embody these in the carrying out of concrete tasks.

The carrying out of the program's political provisions set out in the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee assumes profound perestroika and the renewal of the party itself as an indispensable condition. The chief component of this is the principle formulated at the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference of separating the functions of the party and state bodies and the consistent withdrawal of the party from the state system as the nucleus which directly manages all processes. The amendments adopted by the Congress of People's Deputies, upon the initiative of the CPSU in Articles 6, 7 and 51 of the USSR Constitution fundamentally alter the situation under which the party must now act.

Under these conditions, some have shown confusion and misunderstanding as to the new role and new purpose of the party. Certain party committees and their secretaries have thrown up their hands and ceased being closely concerned with the solving of economic and social problems. At present, such a thing is particularly inadmissible.

The abandoning of state powers by the party and the annulling of the corresponding constitutional provisions upon its initiative in no way have meant a loss of its vanguard role. On the contrary, it is a question of returning the party to its initial purpose of being the vanguard political force of society, working out and offering to the people lines of prospective development and achieving their implementation through the communists represented in the state and social structures.

In speaking in terms of the republic, considering the results of the elections, the Uzbek Communist Party is and will be the ruling party bearing full responsibility to the people for the state of social development, inter-ethnic relations, for the state of affairs in the economy, for the security of the people and for ensuring their rights and liberties. Each party committee, each secretary of a party obkom, gorkom and raykom should bear this in mind.

The amending of the articles in the USSR Constitution which set out the position of the CPSU in society of course does not mean an automatic amending of the appropriate articles in the republic Basic Law. But we cannot maintain the old status. In line with this, we must clearly come forward at the session opening tomorrow with a legislative initiative to revise the articles of the Uzbek Constitution concerning the party. It is a question of Articles 6, 7 and 49 which would set out provisions ensuring for the Communist Party as well as the other political and social organizations equal opportunities to

participate in sociopolitical life and to struggle for implementing their program goals.

Simultaneously we should be ready for when after these amendments more intense politicizing will begin in the social organizations and movements. A number of them probably will try to form their own political parties. This process should develop not spontaneously but, as is customary in any state under the law, within the appropriate legal framework. For this reason, clearly in the near future we must work out and adopt a law and other normative documents on political parties, movements and social organizations. We feel that it would be correct that the republic Communist Party assumed the legislative initiative on this questions.

The principled approaches found in the draft Program to the question of the party's role and place demand a fundamental renewal of its organizational structure and functions and a democratizing of all aspects of internal party life. Proceeding from this, a draft of the new CPSU Bylaws has been prepared and under the decision of the March Central Committee Plenum will be published for universal discussion. The main purpose of the proposed amendments in the bylaw standards is to put the communist at the center of party life, and provide real, direct involvement of the party masses in working out policy and implementing it, in forming the party's leading bodies and supervising their activities.

At the same time, individual provisions in the draft possibly require concretization and greater clarity in the formulating.

For example, the question of the principle of democratic centralism. It is no secret that recently the critics of the party, including certain members of the CPSU holding positions of a democratic platform, have actively advanced the thesis of eliminating this principle from the bylaws and replacing it with a provision on "democratic unity," "consensus" and so forth. There have been particularly active attacks against provisions concerning the subordination of the minority to the majority even to the point of demanding a right for the minority not to carry out decisions assumed by the majority and to form independent factions. Under such conditions would it suit us to erode the formulating of this principle and the standards comprising it in the proposed draft Bylaws?

Many members of commissions of the Communist Party Central Committee and whose opinion on this question we have studied in their reasoning rightly assume that the democratic potential of this principle is still far from exhausted and its removal from the standards of party life would lead to a diluting of the organizational unity of the party. We feel all the same that it would be correct to keep in the Bylaws a clear definition of what we invest in the concept of "democratic centralism" and not be limited to hazy declarations over this question.

A definite viewpoint on this question has already come into being in the republic party organizations. In particular, the communists have approved the proposals of the

CPSU Central Committee to grant each party member the right to participate in the electing of delegates to the party forums and the members of the leading party bodies as well as the right of the party organizations down to the primary ones to demand the recall of any of the members of these bodies. Proposals have also been supported on the question of ensuring the right of the majority to a well-argued defense of their position under the condition of the obligatory fulfillment of a decision adopted by the majority.

At the same time, many Central Committee members consider it necessary to define more clearly in the Bylaws the principles for the interacting of the various levels of the party structure and the procedure of reporting by the superior party bodies to the inferior ones. The principle of glasnost should be not merely declared but also reinforced by specific standards which ensure each communist with the possibility of knowing about all party affairs.

Recently great importance has been assumed by the questions of the independence of the communist parties in the Union republics and the local party organizations. The standards which are set down in the draft reinforce the new status of the communist parties in the Union republics and provide them with real independence within the framework of the CPSU Program and Bylaws, granting the right to work out their own program and normative documents and in accord with them to resolve organizational, cadre, publishing and financial questions as well as carry out a political line in all spheres of development of their republics.

The draft Bylaws also provide that the fundamental decisions of the Presidium and commissions of the CPSU Central Committee concerning the Union republic communist parties should be examined with the participation of their full representatives and in the event of disagreement with an adopted decision the Central Committee of the Union republic Communist Party has the right to demand the convening of a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee for resolving the disputed questions.

Clearly, there is a need to work out for our congress specific proposals on these views. For example, what would be the representation of the Uzbek Communist Party in the leading CPSU bodies so that it could act on equal rights with the communist parties of the other Union republics? Does it suit us that the Communist Party, in accord with the draft, will be given the right to propose its own representatives to the central CPSU bodies and not delegate them directly by decisions of its own leading bodies? Finally, will we submit our own program and normative documents for review at our congress? Let us define our position on these and other questions and let us discuss them with the republic communists.

Thus, the main range of questions for pre-congress discussion has already been defined. Clearly it would be

correct if, having reviewed these questions at present at the plenum, the Central Committee members were to become the organizers of a discussion of these and many other problems of renewing the party and its policy directly on the spot. The party obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms also should show maximum initiative and creativity on this question and make each primary party organization the center of a party-wide discussion. Here wide use should be made of creating debating party clubs, and the opening up of discussion pages in the oblast, city and rayon newspapers as well as conducting sociological research and polls on public opinion. Here the main task is to impel each communist to engage in a frank and involved discussion concerning the fate of the parties and the ways of its renewal. All opinions and judgments should be given maximum consideration, including those of the nonparty comrades, and on their basis we should work out a clear political position. The results of the discussion would be summed up at the rayon, city and oblast conferences and finally at the 12th Uzbek CP Congress.

The elaboration of the draft Party Platform and Bylaws by the CPSU Central Committee and the submitting of these for universal discussion have been the result of an awareness of the processes occurring in the party and society and a real consideration of the sociopolitical situation and the crisis phenomena in the party itself. Precisely this has also caused the decision of the March Central Committee Plenum to move up the dates for convening the regular 28th Congress.

If we assess the situation in the republic from these ideas, then for us it is characterized by increased social and interethnic tension, by a polarization of social forces, by confusion and, let us be frank, by reduced authority of many party committees and organizations. In a number of regions all of this is apparent with maximum acuteness. In this context, clearly there is a need to move up the date for holding the 22d Uzbek CP Congress. The Central Committee Buro has proposed that it be convened on 7 June of the current year.

At present, there is a need to assess again what tasks confront our congress and considering this to clarify its agenda. Many members of the Central Committee commissions have voiced the view that we give up the accountability report of the Central Committee which has become customary in previous years and have proposed introducing for discussion by the congress a report on the main results and directions of perestroika, the tasks of ensuring the sovereignty and economic independence of Uzbekistan as well as the place and role of the Uzbek Communist Party in the new political system in the nation and republic.

At the same time, it has been proposed that at the congress we hear co-reports by the Central Committee commissions concerning the areas of their work, giving these an accounting nature. All these proposals undoubtedly merit attention. We must examine them at present and decide on the optimum version.

In the event that these proposals are adopted, the congress agenda considering them would look as follows:

1. On the course and basic directions of perestroika, the tasks of ensuring the sovereignty and economic independence of Uzbekistan, the place and role of the Uzbek Communist Party in the new political system of the nation and the republic.

2. The report of the Uzbek CP Auditing Commission.

3. On the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress "Toward a Humane, Democratic Socialism."

4. On the Draft CPSU Bylaws.

5. Elections:

—The Uzbek CP Central Committee;

—The Uzbek CP Control and Auditing Commission.

6. On the candidates from the Uzbek Communist Party for the CPSU central bodies.

Other versions are also possible. Let us discuss them. Clearly it would be correct on the spot to incorporate the essential amendments in the agenda of the corresponding party conferences.

We must implement a large group of tasks in line with the preparing of the political documents which in accord with the agenda will be put up for review by the 22d Uzbek CP Congress. First of all, we must define the very concepts of these documents. The Central Committee Buro has worked out definite approaches to the fundamental questions which were first discussed and basically approved in a number of the party committees. In a general outline, these consist of the following.

We have reached the conclusion that the Central Committee's political report at the congress could consist of the following main sections:

—An analysis and assessment of the main stages in the activities of the Uzbek Communist Party over the previous period of perestroika and renewal in the most important areas of socialist construction;

—On the course of perestroika in the Uzbek Communist Party, its main directions and contradictions and errors and deformations committed in the previous period;

—On the political sovereignty of Uzbekistan, the place and role of the Uzbek Communist Party in the renewed system of state power as well as the social organizations and movements;

—The economic independence of Uzbekistan and the positions of the Uzbek Communist Party on the main problems of the republic's economic and social development;

—The overall plan of the Uzbek Communist Party on the main questions of the spiritual development of society and ideological work in the masses;

—The renewal of the Uzbek Communist Party, the raising of its independence and the development of internal party democracy.

Undoubtedly, the first and second sections of the report cannot claim to be a complete and exhaustive analysis of the entire distance come by the republic. This should be first of all a matter of profound and complete research by social scientists. But we cannot pass these questions by in silence. All the more as is shown by recent practice, the party's departure from clear views of various phenomena in the past has been used by opponents and enemies in order, in emphasizing just the negative, to undermine its authority and the trust of the people in it.

For this reason, clearly it would be correct if in the report we merely define the key problems, the basic tasks and directions of their scientific study, having voiced our position on this. This position can consist precisely in the fact that the Uzbek Communist Party considers it essential to investigate all stages of the republic's development in a principled, complete and maximally frank manner and provide an assessment of the distance traveled over the previous period. In our history, there should be no disagreements and innuendos. It is essential to present clearly what in the past was inevitable, natural and progressive and which we will unswervingly defend. But we must also show what was erroneous, antipopular and what we must decisively reject.

It seems to us that the political conclusions and ideas contained in the decisions of the 16th and subsequent Central Committee Plenums, the 21st Uzbek CP Congress and particularly the practical measures to implement them from the standpoint of today cannot be assessed uniformly.

We feel that it would be wrong both from the political and from the practical viewpoint to cross off this intense and contradictory period as completely erroneous. The course set at the outset of the period of a decisive struggle for eradicating negative phenomena in internal party life and in the economic, social and spiritual spheres of the republic seemed objectively determined, although also painful, but vitally necessary. The Communist Party would have been unable to develop further and would have been completely unprepared for perestroika if in 1984 a struggle had not developed against corruption among officials, protectionism, nepotism and patronage and for improving and purging the cadre corps.

At the same time, in the wave of abrupt changes and harsh struggle, initially major errors and mistakes were made and this caused harm as a whole to the republic party organization and to the entire cadre corps and this at present is being actively used by the antisocial forces for the purposes of discrediting the Communist Party.

The compulsory and essential struggle for purification at times was turned into the indiscriminate, unjustified and illegal public dishonoring of many leading workers and a stereotype was artificially created of the mass nature of the unscrupulousness of the party, soviet and economic cadres. Great harm was caused by the illegal, uncontrolled actions of the Special Group from the USSR Procurator's Office for the so-called "cotton affairs," and by the unjustified repressions to which a mass of middle- and lower-level workers and rank-and-file executives were subjected. Irretrievable harm was caused by assertions carried out by degrees in individual mass information media that national character had negative traits and these were almost traditionally inherent to broad strata of the republic population.

All of this could not help but cause a belittling of national feelings and gave rise among many leaders to a sensation of lack of confidence and exposure, it undermined the bases of party and human comradeship and naturally led to a protest by broad strata of the republic population.

This was supplemented by voluntarism in ideological work and by attempts not only to ignore but also to oppose and undermine folk traditions, national culture, history and religion as being uniformly reactionary.

It is a question, for example, of such serious mistakes or more precisely of a complete ignorance of the situation on the spot and as a whole in the republic, when the well-known general plan for the management of the national economy was worked out and implemented with tenacity worthy of the finest endeavor but the consequences of which we must now rectify with great effort.

This directly preceded the present. And, in emphasizing the objective necessity of the course set in this period of purification, we should decisively distance ourselves and at the congress condemn those deformations and distortions which accompanied its carrying out and provide a principled assessment for this.

With a feeling of great responsibility, we must approach an analysis of the problems and the elaboration of general concepts on the questions of the political sovereignty of Uzbekistan. The starting point, we feel, should be the thesis that the Uzbek Communist Party favors the achieving of republic sovereignty within the renewed Union federation. In this context by the congress we must clearly formulate our stance and decide which rights should be voluntarily delegated to the Union bodies and which are the complete and inalienable prerogative of the republic. What should be the nature of the relations of the republic management level with the corresponding Union bodies? How can we ensure the real power of the soviet and their executive bodies while the party bodies must abandon the issuing of commands, taking over and petty interference? How is it possible to achieve a real consolidation of all the political and social

forces holding constructive positions and sincerely interested in the renewal of society? It is through such political structures and mechanisms that we can realize the principles of democracy, glasnost, free expression of will of the masses of people and each specific person.

Closely linked to this are the questions concerning the role and place of the republic Communist Party in the renewed political system and the principles of its relations with the state bodies and social organizations. Here the key position is the final and irreversible abandoning of the command-administrative system, the carrying out of one's political line on a democratic basis through the communists elected to the soviets and to the elective bodies of the public organizations.

But for this it is essential to review our attitude toward organizing the activities of the party groups in the soviets, pay more attention to them and work for their unity on the fundamental political questions. We must consult more with them and provide help in working out a clear stance on specific problems. In a word, we must do everything so that they can work creatively and with initiative and become dependable proponents of our policy in the corresponding soviets.

At the same time, this poses for us a number of serious questions which we should solve virtually now, without putting them off until later.

Above all, these are the questions concerning the political system in the republic. We must overcome all the difficulties of the transitional period, when real power will move from the Uzbek Communist Party and its committees of all levels to the soviets. Even now, and this must be honestly admitted, the soviets are not yet ready to assume full power being turned over by the party. And not merely because the soviets still do not have structural formations which could exercise all powers of authority. The soviets not in words but in deeds should assume full responsibility for solving the difficult questions of our life, our social and economic construction. We no longer have virtually any time for hesitation or for gaining experience on these matters.

Establishing the post of Uzbek President is assuming important significance in the existing situation.

I would like immediately to stipulate that the question of the president and the ensuing perestroika in certain state structures is not merely an imitating of the USSR decisions. As on the Union scale, the introduction of the position of a solely responsible head of the republic undoubtedly will help to strengthen the mechanism of executing the laws and other state decisions and hence accelerate the perestroika processes in the political, socioeconomic, interethnic and other spheres.

But certainly the most important thing is that introducing the institution of a presidency means for our republic a switch to a fundamentally new degree of sovereignty and statehood, for only real and not seeming

statehood has the possibility of acquiring such a structure of power. The republic President undoubtedly will play an important role in working out new principles for a treaty of union and for the federative structure of the nation and worthily represent Uzbekistan in the union Soviet of Federation. In this regard, of course, there are no grounds for the suspicions instigated by some on the desire for the national separation of Uzbekistan.

Of important significance at present is the question of strengthening order and discipline and primarily executive discipline on all levels and areas of management and ensuring a prompt execution of the tasks of accelerating socioeconomic construction and restructuring the economic mechanism as well as supervising all state institutions in defending the rights of the citizens.

Let us discuss this question in order to come forward with a legislative initiative in the First Session of the new Supreme Soviet.

The questions of renewing the political system cannot be viewed in isolation from the problem of the economic independence of Uzbekistan. It must only be kept in view that economic independence cannot be settled unilaterally as self-isolation, as separation or as setting ourselves in opposition. This is one of the presently most widespread perfidious errors. A natural economy, and internal isolation, as world practice shows, cannot be effective.

On the contrary, economic independence presupposes a further deepening and broadening of integration on equal, mutually advantageous bases. Within the common limits of a united national economic complex of our nation and by direct equal treaties with the other regions of the nation and foreign partners. Certainly with a firm and consistent defending of our own interests and making use of regional advantages.

We have such prerequisites for independence, but this is still far from meeting real conditions and opportunities for embodying this in life. The specific situation is such that Uzbekistan at present is in one of the last places in the nation in terms of the level of production efficiency as well as in terms of the indicators of social amenities for the population. The deep-rooted reasons for this are to be found, as was already said, in the one-sided development of the national economic complex, its raw material focus and the "residual" approach carried out over the decades toward the development of the social sphere and amenities for the rapidly growing republic population. For this reason, we feel that a transition to economic independence requires the elaboration and implementation of general Union programs to actually level out the starting conditions. And this is not a parasitical stance but rather an objective economic necessity.

After a discussion of these questions with a broad range of scientists, specialists and national economic leaders, the basic blocks of the problems were defined and the solving of these will determine the republic's transition

to economic independence. In the first place, this is an optimizing of the system of state orders for the main types of product produced in the republic and a price reform for these products. Secondly, a profound restructuring of the economy, a move away from a raw material economy to producing highly-finished end products needed by the people. Thirdly, a fundamental reform in the entire question of the training and preparation of highly skilled workers and specialists for modern scientific- and labor-intensive sectors, scientists and production organizers primarily from among the indigenous nationality youth. And all these blocks are united by one thing, and that is the primacy of man, the satisfying of his needs and requirements and creating conditions for his spiritual and physical development.

For each of these blocks, we must clearly work out the ways and means of realizing them and the economic mechanisms corresponding to them. Without going at present into detail, at the same time we would like to draw attention to one of the most acute and fundamental problems.

This is the question of the fate of the republic's cotton-raising complex. We cannot agree with the judgments popular among a certain portion of the intelligentsia that we must move to sharply cut back on the volume of cotton production, having virtually completely eliminated it with fruit, vegetable and feed crops. It must not be forgotten that at present cotton provides around 90 percent of the income in the agroindustrial complex. The abandoning of our cotton specialization would simply put in question the very possibility of achieving our economic independence.

At the same time, we cannot tolerate a trend which runs counter to world practice where the prices for agricultural raw materials, and in particular for cotton, are artificially frozen, having long since ceased to reflect the real labor expenditures. The republic leadership has sharply posed the question of changing cotton prices before the Union bodies. The additional payment introduced last year for its harvesting provided an opportunity to raise the earnings of a picker over the season by 1.5-2-fold and this made it possible in a short time to bring in a not bad crop virtually for the first time in recent years without the mass involvement of urban dwellers, students and schoolchildren. But these are just the first steps. We must work steadily to bring the prices for cotton and for other agricultural products closer to the world level and this, incidentally, will make it possible for our entire economy to have more objective and just criteria and incentives. The most important thing is to solve the acute social problems and ensure a constant rise in the standard of living of the population. This is an indispensable condition for stabilizing the political situation.

The 22d Congress is to thoroughly and critically analyze the state of ideological work in the Uzbek Communist

Party and set out new approaches and a clear overall concept for carrying this out in the altered sociopolitical situation.

Here a key question is the fact that the Communist Party intends firmly and consistently to defend and carry out the fundamental provisions of Marxism-Leninism. New political thinking with its orientation on common human values cannot mean the abandoning of socialist ideals or the primacy of worker interests. In supporting a pluralism of opinions, we intend to work for a healthy socialist content for this, in decisively repudiating a pluralism of actions imposed by certain forces and often antisocial and aimed at disrupting socialism. The republic communists are in favor of collaboration and consolidation of all the social forces and movements but those operating within legality and defending positions of the Soviet system.

At the same time, this does not mean the conserving of dogmatic views and ideals, obsolete approaches and forms and methods of ideological political work. Particular importance should be given—and this must not be forgotten—to the restoring and all-round development of the national, the unique and traditionally popular in the spiritual life of our society, in basing ourselves on positions of internationalism and respect for the rights and traditions of all fraternal peoples.

There must be a serious restructuring in the sphere of social sciences, public education and culture, radical changes in the content, means and methods of ideological influence on the masses. The relations of the Communist Party, its bodies with the creative unions and the mass information media, should be founded along new lines.

Finally, in the course of preparing for the congress, we should clearly determine the concrete positions on the questions of renewing the Uzbek Communist Party and democratizing internal party life.

In the first place, it is essential to work through a group of questions related to raising the role and authority of the primary party organizations. We must not allow the expulsion, as some now propose, of the main party units from the labor collectives. In our view, the territorial-production principle of their organization should be maintained. We can scarcely agree with the abolishing of party structures in the state or law enforcement bodies. At the same time, the necessary measures must be taken to strengthen the influence of party organizations at the place of residence. Possibly we should even move to create there irregular party organizations, and assign communists to party registration at the place of residence along with the party organizations at the place of work. These are those conditions whereby the primary organizations will be able to play the connecting link and the support of the party in the masses. It is precisely through them that we should receive dependable and objective information on the attitudes, needs and

requests of the people and their opinion of the policy being carried out by the party and actively influence the shaping of public opinion.

On the other hand, namely the primary party organizations should become the main centers for the propagandizing and explaining of political concepts and the collective organizers of their implementation. The people should see that the primary organizations do not stand aside from the problems concerning them, but rather boldly set to solving socially important questions and tenaciously carry them out to the end.

Secondly, it is essential to thoroughly restructure the organization of party committee work.

The activities of the collegial bodies, commissions and party committee members should be given a new content. It is essential to completely free them from the review and resolution of minor questions which are not inherent to the party bodies. All efforts should be concentrated on fundamental political problems, on working out political concepts and measures for their practical implementation. It is essential to strengthen their link with the party masses, the party groups in the soviets and elective bodies of the social organizations and see to it that they work in close contact.

In the course of preparing for the congress, we should thoroughly work through the questions of the party apparatus and clearly determine what functions should be entrusted to it and in accord with this work out specific proposals on its structure, personnel and expenditures for their support.

Thirdly, we should clearly set out our position on the questions of cadre policy. With any variations the party committees and organizations should have the right to influence a solution to cadre questions, propose their own candidates for key positions in the soviet, state and economic bodies and public organizations.

It is not a matter of preserving the cadre monopoly of the party, administrative approaches or the imposing of terms in the selecting and promoting of leaders. But if we lose the opportunity of carrying out cadre policy through democratic mechanisms, then we will deprive ourselves of one of the most important levers in organizational work and party influence in all spheres of society's life. We cannot agree with this. Moreover, to our great regret, we continue to preserve local, tribal and relational priorities in the recruiting and placing of cadres. In certain regions this has at times assumed dangerous scales and tendencies.

Thus, even a brief review of the main provisions of the proposed overall concept of the basic documents for the forthcoming Communist Party Congress indicates what a difficult task we have to carry out in the period remaining until it. We should involve in this work all the intellectual potential of the republic party organization and with its aid work out political concepts which in fact would help in a fundamental renewal of the Uzbek

Communist Party and in the strengthening of its authority and influence in the masses.

Clearly, it would be correct if the corresponding Central Committee commissions would assume the preparation for each of the areas of the political documents which will be brought up at the congress. Here it is fundamentally important that the party activists from the spot and the delegates elected to the 22d CP Congress and the 28th CPSU Congress be involved in working out the political ideas and the mechanisms of their implementation. All this work should be based on a profound analysis of the existing situation, a thorough study and consideration of the opinions held on these questions by the communists, the public, the local party and soviet bodies and all strata of the workers and the population.

On this level of exceptionally important and fundamental significance is the pregress report-election campaign which has already gotten underway in the primary party organizations. It actually should become the turning point in the renewal of the party based upon Leninist democratic principles in its life and activity. It is essential to make maximum use of the opportunities opening up for the collective elaboration of a political action program and for an influx of fresh forces of the most highly regarded communists who are capable of thinking and acting in the new manner into the elective bodies of all levels in the Uzbek Communist Party.

In all stages of the report-election campaign, beginning with the meetings in the party groups and shop party organizations up to the Uzbek CP Congress, there should be exacting and self-critical analysis of the state of affairs, the forms and methods of activity of each party element. It is essential to analyze all the factors of inhibition, to bring out the reasons for the low authority of many party organizations and most importantly work out the ways for renewing them corresponding to the realities of the current stage.

For these purposes, it is essential to make a general rule that still small but useful experience gained in a number of party organizations of preparing and conducting report-election assemblies and conferences. It is a matter of involving in this undertaking the collective reason of all the republic communists. The drafts of the accountability reports, the decrees and other documents of the assemblies and conferences should be made widely available for discussion including among nonparty persons in the mass information media. The reports by members of elective bodies already practiced in a number of organizations should be further developed. For instance, the Central Committee members could report on their activities in those oblast, city and rayon party conferences and assemblies of the primary organizations where they are participating in their work. We feel this would be very good for the authority of the Central Committee.

One of the most fundamental questions is the forming of a new corps of members of elective bodies in all elements of the republic Communist Party. At present, it can be

said with complete certainty that a majority of the party committees, the communists and Central Committee members whose opinion we have studied firmly support the abandoning of any orders, regulations or official approaches in the electing of the party committees. There should only be one criterion and that is the political and moral qualities of the communists, their position in life, authority in the masses and the ability to carry out the policy of perestroika. We cannot help but agree with the proposals that an indispensable condition in the elections of all elective bodies right up to the CPSU Central Committee should be the realization of the right of every primary party organization to recommend to these bodies those whom it considers essential.

The republic party organizations are actively discussing the procedure proposed by the CPSU Central Committee for electing delegates to the 28th Congress and the questions of electing delegates to the 22d Uzbek CP Congress. The Central Committee Commission on the Questions of Party Organizational and Cadre Work, having generalized the first results of the discussion, has prepared proposals on this.

We feel that the electing of the congress delegates in the oblast party conferences in the version proposed by the commission virtually does not limit the democratic nature of the elections. In the first place, there is the obligatory condition of reviewing only those candidates who have been put up in one or several primary party organizations. Secondly, the party organizations gain the real right with the participation of all the communists to reject those candidates who evoke any doubt. The party organizations can also propose different approaches. Let us define our views and select the optimum one.

In this context there is the need to emphasize one fundamental thing. Whatever procedure for electing the delegates there is, the results of the election will be determined by those processes which occur within the republic primary party organizations. It is precisely they who should disclose and name the potential leaders and the political fighters who subsequently can make up the delegate corps as well as the elective party bodies of all levels. If the communists of the primary organizations do not show great responsibility on all these questions, then none of the approaches for electing the delegates to the party forums will really work no matter how democratic it might seem externally.

The entire pregress period should become a period of active ideological work and struggle for the Communist Party and all its units for influence in the masses and for shaping public opinion in favor of our political concepts and ideas.

It must be frankly admitted that the activities of individual party organizations in the republic and its ideological activity in this area presently do not meet the demands of the complex and tense sociopolitical situation.

Many shortcomings were clearly apparent in the course of the election campaign.

Let us take a look at how the propagandizing of our political platform was organized. To call things by their real names, it was really bad. Did many of those seated in this auditorium take advantage of the tribune of the press and the other mass information media to get its provisions to the workers? To point out to them that the real results in increasing the land plots, in organizing social aid to the poorly-off strata of the population and establishing additional payments for cotton were achieved precisely due to the effective efforts of the Communist Party and its bodies. That precisely the firm and principled position of the Central Committee on all these questions became a reliable guarantee for eliminating many bureaucratic hitches. We do have something to tell the people, to convince them of and to lead them.

Unfortunately, the communist leaders, as before, have refused broad contact with the people over problems concerning them, and they fear dialogue and an open debate of acute questions. Certainly now, as never before, it is essential to take up the experience acquired in the party in fighting for the trust of the people and for strengthening our influence in the masses.

Many secretaries and members of the republic party committee buros still remain on the sidelines in the debate developing on the pages of the press concerning the role of the party in society and the ways for strengthening this. They have made no effort to voice their position and prefer to merely sitings out. Let us say directly that the Central Committee secretaries and the leaders of the republic government have not actually set an example of this. And certainly under conditions, when the open attacks on the party are not ceasing or the attempts to compromise it in the eyes of public opinion and destabilize the situation, such passivity is not only out of place but simply dangerous.

The tragic Fergana events were played out before the very eyes of many of us. Their causes have been carefully analyzed, political conclusions have been drawn and the appropriate assessments given. Clearly, there is no need now to repeat them again. They are well known to you.

It is a matter of something else. Of complacency, indifference on the part of many party committees, soviet and law enforcement bodies. There is the impression that someone decided that the most difficult was now behind and everything would be normalized by itself. These are dangerous illusions. The events in Buka and Parkent have reaffirmed this.

It is a secret to no one that actions leading to the tragedy were played out according to the same scenario: pamphlets, rumors, then meetings which begin with the questions of a socioeconomic nature and end with political demands, then the expulsion of the Meskhetian Turks and the cancelling of elections to the republic

Supreme Soviet and the local soviets. We might ask: What is the main thing for the organizers of the demonstrations?

At present, it is already clear to everyone that the good of the people is not the concern of the person summoning the people to demonstrations. And the Turks are not the issue here. That is merely a screen used to cover up the true goal of a struggle for power. At present, when it is becoming evermore difficult for the provocateurs and extremists to put their demagogic appeals concerning the good of the people in opposition to the concrete actions of the party organizations and the Soviet bodies, they move more and more toward outright nit-picking, relying on emotions and not on reason.

We can no longer tolerate such a development of events. We must realize that the absence of any well-reasoned rebuff to the extremist demagogues is direct connivance with the destructive forces. Either we, having rallied our ranks, will conduct an offensive struggle against those who are impeding the creative level of the people and are defaming our social and spiritual values or we will lose initiative and leadership in political life.

Undoubtedly, people will believe us and follow us only when each person from the example of his own family feels an improvement in life. It is essential bit by bit to seek out and find how to ease the working conditions and life of each man: the peasant and worker, engineer and white collar personnel, mothers with large families and the child, the old-age pensioner and the student.

Precisely such a principle underlies our election platform. And we should view it as a word given to the people, an obligation and the violating of this would mean a loss of honor and trust. For the political worker, this is like death.

The first steps have already been taken. This includes the additional payment for cotton and true work on raising the price for this and other types of agricultural products. This is providing the rural workers with increased farmstead plots for engaging in private subsidiary farming and individual construction. This means aid to poorly-off large families, the disabled and pensioners. This means free food for young schoolchildren and ailing pregnant women. This is compensation for students forced because of a lack of dormitories to rent private apartments. This is the return to the people of their beloved holiday Navruz.

Recently, a decision was taken to reorganize the Fourth Main Directorate of the Republic Ministry of Health. We have again self-critically reviewed the question of the privileges and benefits for leading workers. It has been decided to give up the dachas and turn them over to the needs of protecting maternity and childhood. For us this question is fundamental: to live together with the people, to share with them all the hardships and together build a better life for all.

All of this is the main, most important factor in stabilizing the situation in the republic. But a person is wrong in feeling that having done a good deed once, it is possible to rest on your laurels. It is essential to be concerned about people every day and every hour.

One last thing. At present, we still cannot say who of the republic communists will become a delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress as they will be chosen in the course of the report-election campaign. But even now it is clear that each party congress delegate will go there not as an

individual but rather as a full representative of the Uzbek Communist Party. And this means that we should carry out extensive work and generalize the opinions and views of the more than 660,000-strong detachment of communists in order to elaborate a unified political stance on those fundamental questions which have been included in the congress agenda. The shaping of this stance and the embodiment in it of concrete deeds should become the basic content of the pregress work by each party organization and by each communist in the republic.

Latvian Front Warns Parliament Attackers

90UN2025C Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
19 May 90 p 3

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Officials Testify": "In the Administration of the People's Front of Latvia Duma"]

[Text] While the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet was working in Riga on 14 and 15 May 1990, forcible attempts were made by groups of servicemen and civilians to break into the building of the Supreme Soviet and seize it.

On 14 May one of these groups, having overrun the first blocking force of the militia, was only stopped at the very entrance to the parliament.

On 15 May the action was repeated with a new force: The Republic Council of Interfront had made an appeal for the new action the night before in its leaflets. As it turned out, students and officers of the Higher Service School imeni Biryuzov located in Riga, officers of the Baltic Military District, both in uniform and dressed in civilian clothing, as well as groups of the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives] and the strike committee took part in the action. Among the attackers there were many people in a state of alcoholic excitement.

By the middle of the day the pressure of the rowdy groups led to a temporary break in the session, to confrontation with the militia cordon and a Special Militia Unit detachment and, what is especially alarming, to blows. People were hurt.

To the honor of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Special Militia Unit, the attack on the building of the Supreme Soviet was repulsed.

The very same aggressive actions were undertaken at the very same time in Tallinn at the Government House of Estonia, where the attackers managed to penetrate into the building of the Estonian parliament. Only the approach of masses of people to whom Edgar Savisaar, chairman of the Council of Ministers, had appealed for help scattered the crowd of hooligans.

It should be noted that both incidents, in Riga and Tallinn, took place immediately after the edict of the president of the USSR on the invalidity of the acts of the parliaments of the two republics reestablishing their independence de jure. It is as if the edict freed the hands of the instigators of ultimatums, strikes, and provocations.

The administration of the Duma of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] declares the following in connection with the 14-15 May incidents at the Republic of Latvia Supreme Soviet building:

1. The People's Front of Latvia is determined to secure normal working conditions for parliament and order in the republic's capital.

2. The NFL insists that the republic's procuracy immediately carry out an investigation into the attack on the Supreme Soviet and reveal its instigators. The NFL is prepared to put its own witnesses and videotapes at the disposal of the investigation.

3. The NFL hopes that the command of the Baltic Military District will make the appropriate evaluation of the participation of a contingent from the Higher Service School and of officers of the Baltic Military District in the attempts to break off the session and in the clashes.

4. The NFL warns everyone that in the event of a repetition of the attacks on parliament or of attempts to violate order in republic it reserves the right to request that its many thousands of adherents in Riga and the republic come to the defense of the legally elected Supreme Soviet.

5. The NFL also warns that the forcible actions of the opponents of changes will prompt the front's regional departments to begin forming self-defense detachments.

15 May 1990.

Riga Internal Affairs Body on Attack

90UN2025D Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA in Russian
19 May 90 p 3

[Declaration of the Administration of Internal Affairs of the Riga City Soviet Executive Committee under the rubric "Officials Testify": "To the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet and the Latvian SSR Mass Media"]

[Text] On 16 May 1990 the Duma of the NFL [People's Front of Latvia] published its latest irresponsible, threatening declaration introducing destructivism and further destabilization to an already extremely heated and dangerously explosive internal political situation in the republic.

There has been a clear threat to set a significant part of the population which is not loyal to the NFL off against an unorganized force which is able, as the result of provocation or under some forced pretext or, on the contrary, for the implementation of previously planned and far-reaching ambitious political goals, to undertake actions which may lead to the most dire consequences. The result of this political adventurism is unpredictable inasmuch as it will undoubtedly evoke a response. Only one thing is clear—there will be no victors in the conflict that is being provoked.

The leadership and personnel of the Administration of Internal Affairs of Riga views with great concern and alarm the ultimatum of the NFL Duma concerning its intention to create self-defense detachments and to take upon itself the functions of defending the Supreme Soviet and the people's deputies.

All who were involved, including the republic's people's deputies, were able to see with their own eyes that on 15 May 1990— the day cited by the NFL Duma in its

declaration—the situation near the building of the Supreme Soviet was continually under the control of the subunits of the organs of internal affairs; the brief incident which aggravated the situation was immediately cut short by the forces of the militia.

The attempts of the NFL Duma to blame only one party for the conflict which took place do not have any factual basis. Representatives of many different sociopolitical organizations, including some belonging to the NFL, took part in the clashes to varying degrees. Deputies of the NFL faction often excited passions in the crowd by coming out to the people and giving the victory symbol with raised hands.

The NFL Duma's assertion concerning the presence of drunken people in the crowd also does not conform to reality.

At the same time workers of the militia who were keeping order near the building of the republic's Supreme Soviet noted that many of the people who counted themselves members of the so-called "people's patrol" had metal plates under their clothing and in their sleeves to protect the body and deliver blows. This circumstance as well as the statement of one of those arrested—32-year-old Arnold Rozentals, a sanitary engineering metalworker at the "Siltums" production association and a correspondence student with the Latvia State University department of history, arrayed in metal plates—are clear evidence that the so-called "people's patrols" made plans in advance and thoroughly prepared themselves for violent clashes with their ideological opponents.

The accusations that an insignificant group of unarmed servicemen in civilian clothing tried to seize the Supreme Soviet are absurd. The unreality and senselessness of such a step is absolutely apparent to any sensible person who objectively evaluates today's political situation independent of political sympathies.

The conflict with broke out at the Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet building on 15 May 1990 was quickly and efficiently resolved by the militia with minimal force. Public order was restored on the abovementioned grounds in the shortest possible time.

The leadership and personnel of the Administration of Internal Affairs of Riga declare:

1. The subunits of the Riga militia were and continue to be the sole professionally trained, organized, and disciplined force maintaining public order and putting the security of the citizens, independent of their political views, before anything else, including higher political ambitions.

2. The organs of internal affairs of Riga demand that the Supreme Soviet immediately clear all persons with white

arm bands— the so-called "people's patrols"—from the grounds adjoining the Supreme Soviet building and from the building itself. By their presence and conduct they often aggravate the situation around the building, and in critical moments they abandon the place of the conflict in cowardly fashion, thus giving the workers of the militia no practical aid in the matter of restoring public order.

3. The personnel of the Riga militia call upon the inhabitants of the Latvian SSR not to yield to the provocation threats and appeals of the NFL Duma "to come to the defense" of the Supreme Soviet and "to begin forming self-defense detachments," because only the organs of the militia, loyal to their professional duty, are capable of maintaining a stable position with regard to the preservation of public order.

Administration of Internal Affairs of the Riga City Soviet Executive Committee.

17 May 1990.

Gromov Appeals to Republic Leaders on Desertion

90UM0659.1 Kiev LENINSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Article by Maj S. Nagoryanskiy: "Deserters—Face Your Responsibility"]

[Text] "If I violate this solemn oath of mine, let me be subjected to the severe punishment of Soviet law and the universal hatred and disdain of the laborers." (From the Military Oath).

Giving a lecture in the state conservatory, just yesterday the current chairman of the Lithuanian SSR Supreme Soviet attempted to evoke high emotions in the students. So that they might study music in, let us say, an elevated mood, with inspiration.

Today V. Landsbergis (and together with him, other members of the supreme organ of power, and Lithuanian Council of Ministers Chairman K. Prunskiene) is attempting to evoke emotions not in the university this time, but from the podium of the republic's parliament. This time he is discussing not Tchaikovsky and Chyurlenes, but affairs of state. And it must be admitted that in a number of cases the Lithuanian leadership did manage to raise the people into an emotional state. Not just residents of the republic itself, but also its young people serving military duty outside the Lithuanian SSR. As we know, they have been urged to abandon their units and return to the republic, to leave the "army of occupation." This appeal was heard in our district as well.

Many soldiers of Lithuanian nationality are serving in its units and subunits. In their overwhelming majority they are conscientious, diligent, disciplined soldiers. And it is no surprise that many of them have been rewarded, including with short home leaves. As things turned out,

some of them visited their homes during these anxious days. And they returned to their units without yielding to any attempts at persuasion (our newspaper featured them last week). But not all. Private K. Sharunas stayed in Lithuania.

Hero of the Soviet Union Colonel General B. V. Gromov, the district's troop commander, sent V. Landsbergis and K. Prunskiene a telegram on this account. It stated in particular that the anticonstitutional actions of the Lithuanian leadership and the policy it is pursuing are encouraging desertion and placing young people in a difficult position. It is in such a position that K. Sharunas, who went away on leave for personal reasons and did not return to his unit, has found himself. The commander also states

that criminal proceedings had been initiated against the soldier who violated the law.

Colonel General B. V. Gromov was also compelled to send a similar telegram to the leadership of the Armenian SSR. The failure of G. Khudoyan to return from a short leave was the cause. He was obviously caught up in the emotions evoked by the present situation in the republic and by the unceasing conflict centering on Nagornyy Karabakh.

Musicians follow the music. People live according to the law. Soldiers serve according to duty. Can things be otherwise? And he who plays a sour note—at a concert or in life—risks a great deal. It's a pity that not everyone understands this.

KGB Rejects Kalugin Charges

90UN22171 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian 23 Jun 90
Second Edition p 6

[Statement by USSR KGB Center for Public Relations]

[Text] The USSR KGB has taken a most serious view of the publications in certain Moscow print publications and radio broadcasts and also of the appearance in foreign news media of a number of interviews with Major General of the Reserve Kalugin, a former officer of the KGB. We are well aware of Kalugin's character. The statements he has made containing gross distortions and his attacks on the activity of the present state security authorities logically ensue from his conduct and behavior when he worked in these authorities. Nonetheless, Kalugin's assessment of the state security authorities as a political investigation organization and his charges of their having perpetrated criminal actions induce reflection on the goals their author is pursuing.

The KGB emphatically rejects such assertions by Kalugin and expresses indignation regarding the insults he levels at the professional honor and human dignity of USSR KGB officers. He should know full well, after all, that they operate strictly within the framework of current legislation, conducting a difficult struggle in the interests of our country's state security.

Knowledge of Kalugin's personal attributes leaves no doubt that, having taken the path of "sensational" public statements, he has decided to begin a new, "political" career and to use for this the domestic and foreign mass media. Kalugin evidently considered the situation suitable for this. A clear attempt to confuse public opinion, cast a shadow on the process of perestroika in the KGB authorities, and exert a negative influence on the relations of the Chekists and the working people which, thanks to the democratization and glasnost in our society, have been noticeably developed and strengthened, shows through in the publications.

The USSR KGB will make a comprehensive evaluation of Kalugin's statements.

System for Awarding Academic Degrees Called 'Conservative'*90UN1845A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
12 May 90 Morning Edition p 3*

[Article by Sergey Leskov: "Snowstorm Over the Heap of Dissertations"]

[Text] As we all know, Petrarch wrote about Laura for 31 years but never reached mutual understanding. Sometimes it seems to me that the most inaccessible beauties have nothing on bureaucratic departments—our entire press lacks sufficient powers to attract their attention. Just take the Higher Examination Board [VAK]. Here is that rarest of cases when the forces of society have closed ranks; lately the bureaucratic department of science has been criticized from all quarters—SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, OGONEK, IZVESTIYA, SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, LITERATURNAYA GAZETA. The stream of readers' letters and the meetings in scientific societies confirm how well founded these claims are.

What kind of medicinal root is it that lets the Higher Examination Board ward off these various onslaughts? In the 1920s, when young Soviet science was experiencing its stormy heyday and many discoveries were being made that to this day comprise its pride, no trace of an examination organ ever existed. This kind of license, naturally, did not correspond to the newly formed principles of the command-administrative system. So in 1932, in order to rectify this omission, the Higher Examination Board was created to provide support for science's cliquish bureaucratic foundations. VAK's structure is a multistage pyramid which the dissertation presented must climb; moreover, the authority of those individuals presiding at each successive stage grows in proportion to the decrease in their qualifications that is inevitable if only because of the avalanche of cases considered. This structure is one of the underlying principles of the command-bureaucratic system, no matter where it directs its appetites. It is a situation that is ruinous in all spheres.

In its years of existence the Higher Education Board has undergone cosmetic repairs several times, but science continued to lag more and more behind the world level. And so on 30 December 1989 a new—and long awaited in scientific circles—resolution was passed on the procedure for conferring scholarly degrees and titles, due to go into effect on 1 July 1990. But there is no joy in the scientific camp, harsh criticisms have been heard: the innovations have merely strengthened VAK's monopoly, making it even harder for science. It seems to me that a few democratic, antibureaucratic improvements in the examination procedure could still change the situation for the better. These would be eliminating the hostile opponent, giving the competitor a chance to familiarize himself with his own case, and allowing the special soviets to change opponents. It is another matter that positive changes seem rather like light poultices for a

gravely ill patient. VAK has no intention of rejecting principles even if they are ruinous for science.

"We are profoundly bewildered by the fact that the draft proposal has been approved without preliminary discussion and agreement in the Committee on Science, Education, and Culture of the USSR Soviet of Ministers. We feel it is rightful to put the transformation of the system of training for scientific personnel, including the procedure for conferring scholarly degrees and titles, under public control. The link between VAK and the USSR Soviet of Ministers must be eliminated and taken out from under the command-administrative system," write Academicians A. Yanshin, B. Raushenbakh, N. Moiseyev, V. Mishin, B. Sokolov, G. Arbatov, T. Zaslavskaya, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member S. Averintsev, and other authoritative scholars in a letter to the IZVESTIYA editorial offices.

Why is VAK, after a cursory touch-up, doing everything in its powers to defend its chief bastions? In my view, the reason for VAK's conservatism is that outwardly this bureaucratic formation, which is not terribly conspicuous in the colorful firmament of our mighty departments, is absolutely essential for the preservation of pre-perestroika principles of governing society. In essence, VAK fulfills the functions of a unitary personnel department auxiliary to all departments, for to this day an academic degree is the golden key that opens the cherished door to many leadership positions. So exposing the Higher Examination Board to reconstruction means encroaching on the holiest of holies bureaucratic dictatorship, which by its very essence must possess the unbridled ability to appoint people who have passed through its sieve to key positions.

In the understanding of this bureaucratic dictatorship, an academic degree is not only and not so much the recognition of genuine accomplishments in science. Often the acquisition of a doctoral candidate's or doctoral title in the absence of any real contribution to science would be looked on more correctly in line with other unearned privileges. As always, the less initiated one is in this delicate procedure, the less dangerous. There are 110 points in the regulation on the procedure for conferring academic degrees and scholarly titles passed in the "stagnant" year of 1975, but there was a 111th point as well, not intended for publication, on "issues demanding consideration of special circumstances and to be decided directly by the presidium of VAK." What are these "circumstances"? And wasn't this the article that let in all those relatives of Suslov, Grishin, and other dignitaries of the Brezhnev circle, entire families of whom provided themselves with high scientific titles, far surpassing the glory, say, of the French Curies? And wasn't the incredible ten-year limit on appealing dissertations set in this regulation intended precisely to conceal the unattractive machinations of other competitors and their protectors?

But perhaps this is all in the past. Democratic changes are under way all around, but VAK is unshakeable. After

all, the approved regulation retains the point not intended for publication about "special circumstances." Who are the new indulgences planned for? More about this below.

How easy it would be if all our troubles could be explained by the corruption of individual VAK employees! But the whole trouble is that even if you assembled a pure, unstained staff, it wouldn't change the system in any fundamental way. As in biology: an impaired organ revives if its function is retained. The system has its own interests, and one of its priorities is to fight reformism. Nowadays it's risky to do that out in the open. It's safer to pretend to agree with the criticism, to pass a resolution, but to take it to the point of the absurd and thereby discredit it. The operating principle of reform's opponents isn't new: the worse it gets, the better.

The quintessence of all the clauses on transforming the examination system can be expressed as the decentralization of VAK's bureaucratic functions and the formation of a scientific market at the expense of greater independence for the local special soviets. If a special soviet allows waste to slip through, endlessly retesting it would be a rotten job. "Irremediable" soviets need to be dissolved expediently and the remaining portion strengthened by authoritative scholars. If such a strategy were adopted, VAK's power would evaporate without a trace in the near future in the most natural way. Thus a fraudulent move is in order. The clause is formally adopted, but in fact the idea is imperceptibly altered and with VAK's blessing another clause passes—outwardly similar, but in essence possessing nothing in common with what has been proposed by broad scientific circles.

Late last year a special soviet was instituted for conferring scholarly degrees on specialists involved with the Kosmos space-missile system and the Buran [Snowstorm] spaceship. This special soviet has been granted hitherto unprecedented rights: the competitor does not write a dissertation; his brief 10-15-page report is not sent off to VAK; the scholarly degree is conferred in the special soviet itself and without any expert examination and is merely confirmed by the VAK presidium. Moreover, the competitor makes do without an opponent, without taking doctoral exams, and the list of specialties is many times broader than for the usual soviet. All this, it would seem, sharply contradicts VAK's departmental interests. But let us not forget about casuistical logic. What provoked such generous privileges for the special soviet created at the Energiya base (Chairman and General Designer, USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member Yu. P. Semenov)?

"This kind of procedure constitutes recognition of the competitor's services," explains special soviet member and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member B. Ye. Chertok. "Sometimes a paradox arises: many doctorates and doctoral candidates working under a person who himself does not hold a scholarly degree. Our overworked supervisors have no opportunity to put

aside their basic work for any length of time. Their work is too important to waste on a dissertation! We are also saving time because we don't have to collect responses from other organizations and ministries, we don't have to find experts from elsewhere. We know all the participants in the Energiya and Buran works very well, and we have specialists representing all fields."

Right now heated arguments are going on about the basic expediency of expensive reiterative systems. This topic is a separate discussion, true, and no convincing answer has been heard from space ideologists; however, a resolution has been passed as a result of which high titles are raining down—again on supervisors—in a golden stream. And not because our spaceship has only been tested in the pilotless version one time and is essentially incomplete. We can say with certainty: space science itself requires hothouse conditions; facilitated access to degrees will lead to no good. By the way, in the late 1950s, after the first satellites, in a state of euphoria, scholarly degrees were conferred in the space sector for "services" with Khrushchev's blessing. But the "undefended" scholars were the butt of jokes, and quickly the dubious experiment was curtailed. As it turned out, not for long.

What is the rebuttal to the main argument—supervisors' lack of time? It could not be put better than this: "There has been much complaining that a dissertation takes several years out of a life, which no talented researcher can permit himself. Don't believe anyone who tells you that he sat down and squeezed a dissertation out in a year and a half. If that's so, then his work is useless." Whose judicious words are these? VAK Chairman and Academician Ye. I. Shemyakin—only a year has passed since he published them in IZVESTIYA. What compelled him to make such a cardinal change in his convictions? It would also be curious to find out how VAK came to the conclusion that it was the Buran workers who don't have time to write a dissertation—is there more leisure in other sectors? Out of what considerations did VAK resolve simply to "name scholars" and give the green light to the aspirations of several supervisors to transform their own institution into an omnipotent monopoly? The precedent has been created—and the trampled path now beckons other general designers, who have every reason to feel that their field is at least as promising as Buran's. For success it is sufficient to prove that the work has great significance, straying toward science to one's disadvantage—and the path to "assembly-line" doctorates, which means a further lowering in the level of our nation's science, is open. A special case made for Buran's makers could become a typical and very dangerous phenomenon for the future of our science.

"We are particularly alarmed by the extensive paths of development for science that pursue quantity to the detriment of quality. The resolution about creating special soviets will scarcely promote the development of science in our country," write Academicians A. Yanshin, B. Raushenbakh, N. Moiseyev, V. Mishin, B. Sokolov.

G. Arbatov, T. Zaslavskaya, and USSR Academy of Sciences Corresponding Member S. Averintsev in *IZVESTIYA*. The concerns of these authoritative scholars can be set apart. We will be frank: scientific recognition is scarcely the sole moral stimulus for young people who, despite the absence of comparable material reward, have retained their devotion to their cause. But now, with the expansion of the practice of unregulated conferment of scholarly degrees another path will become desirable—administrative growth. Otherwise it would be simply stupid: for the ordinary scholar the examination jungle is nearly impassable, whereas in our special soviet four prominent supervisors successfully defended in March alone—from an NPO director up to the deputy general designer. The papers of the supervisors on the achievements of the divisions they head recall pedagogy's sadly famous "brigade method"—only here all the "pies" go to the "first" person. It's natural—in science the boss is the smartest. It's incomprehensible how given the adopted defense procedure VAK's declared requirements for "the author's personal contribution to science" and the "sole-authorship qualification work written" are to be defined. Evidently, members of the special soviet require very subtle psychological insight.

"Such innovations devalue true science," believes Academician V. Avduyevskiy. "From time immemorial scholars have left behind works written by their own hand that comprised their contribution to science, permitting it to develop further. The discreditation of science's accepted values could lead to the extinction of scholars and to their increasing outflow into profitable spheres and the conclusion of extended foreign contracts. This whole story is one more proof of the fact that VAK has outlived itself in its present form."

How did the amazing special soviet come to pass? As has been revealed, other than VAK, the Ministry of Defense, Minobshchemash, and Minradioprom too are now involved in training scientific personnel. Among the department leaders who have petitioned the special soviet is a doctor of sciences due to "special circumstances." Is there any point in wondering at the attachment to continuing such a practice? But as a result the sensible and very promising idea about decentralizing VAK's function, about granting the special soviets more independence (not by means of indulgences, naturally) and more responsibility has been discredited. It's a far-sighted course. This example has given the VAK apparatus a marvelous trump in arguing for its own irreplaceability and the impossibility of slackening its reins.

We have all been moved by the stories of impoverished scholars of the past forced to publish their scientific works with their last money. But it's much more immoral to enroll as scholars those who don't find the time to write scientific works at all. VAK—that unique bureaucratic institution for which there is no analogue anywhere in the world—cannot help but understand what would happen to science if the back door to it were

opened. VAK's lack of principle in allowing the cynical embezzlement of scientific degrees as well as other infringements on the true interests of science emphasizes the necessity for its subordination to the Supreme Soviet. The problems of scientific examination must be discussed with complete glasnost in the Committee on Science, Education, and Culture, taking into account the opinion of the broad scientific community and with consultations from experts of proven and indisputable authority. And this procedure cannot be put off—for starters there must at the least be discussion of the last normative acts of the Higher Examination Board, which concern not only the fate of science but also the perspectives for the entire country's development. For science and scientific-technical progress make up the pulse of the whole economy, the whole life of society.

Recently, *IZVESTIYA* has addressed the problems of scientific examination several times. And each publication has brought forth a stream of readers' letters to the editor citing blatant examples of nonobjectivity in conferring scientific degrees and titles. We have sent these letters on to the Higher Examination Board with a request to sort out the facts given. But we have been amazed at VAK's frank disinclination to respond to criticism, to establish the truth even in those instances when world-recognized authorities have drawn attention to dissertations that do not meet the requirements of science. One gets the impression that VAK is most afraid of establishing a precedent for the scientific community that might some way affect its monopoly right to punish and pardon.

While this article was being prepared for publication, events occurred attesting to the fact that the scientific bureaucracy has worked up an appetite and is attempting to expand the beachhead it has taken. Metastases from the privileged special soviet have spread quickly to spheres of science that do not bear the slightest relationship to "closed" topics. By order of the chairman of VAK, Academician Ye. Shemyakin, a special soviet has been created under the Military Institute of the USSR Ministry of Defense for the defense of one sole doctoral dissertation in pedagogical sciences. Are the secrets that great? Presented for the defense is a book published in the open press entitled *Foundations of the Theory of Instruction for the Understanding of Foreign Speech* (Preparation for Translators). Who are these hothouse conditions being created for? As always, the green light has been given to a member of the nomenklatura. The dissertation's author is the rector of the M. Torez Moscow State Institute for Foreign Languages, I. Khaleyeva, on the formal grounds that Rector Khaleyeva can't defend her dissertation in the existing special soviets because one way or another she is connected with them by her official position. Is it worth saying that this is a very strained interpretation and that there are enough appropriate special soviets? The absurdity of a classified dissertation in pedagogy is intensified by the additional fact that given the truly impoverished position in which that science now finds itself any new word

(if in the given instance it is heard at all) is literally gold in the balance. However, we're already used to VAK looking on considerations as to a matter's value as something secondary.

VAK is changing the regulations, but VAK remains VAK.

Uzbekistan Moves To Implement Language Law

90UN18681 Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 20, May 90 p 12

[Article by V. Khasanov, TASS Correspondent: "Language Law: Ways To Implement It"]

[Text] The "Ukituvchi" ["Teacher"] publishing house of Tashkent has published a curriculum and methodological recommendations for teaching conversational Uzbek to Russian-speaking preschool children. This is the first time a work like this has been published in Uzbekistan. The book owes its existence to the Law on the official language of the Uzbek SSR, which was passed last fall.

It is not surprising that, from the very beginning, implementation of the new law encountered many problems. One of them is the lack of texts, methodologies, and curricula. For this reason the teaching of language is seriously "ailing" not only in schools with Russian and other languages of instruction, but even in Uzbek speaking schools. The same problem exists in enterprises and organizations where they are developing courses for studying the official language.

"A Scientific Methodological Council on teaching the Uzbek language has begun to function in our republic," Yu. Abdulayev, deputy minister of education of the Uzbek SSR, informed us. "A permanent commission, which has become the center of the development of a methodology for teaching the official language, has been established. A plan for the publishing of material on teaching methodologies has been formulated for 1991-1995. A total of 73 different dictionaries, handbooks, and phrase books are slated for publication during the next 5-year period. And what is particularly important, 27 of them will be devoted to specialized fields.

Plans call for increasing the amount of time devoted to teaching the Uzbek language. Special classes in which the language will be taught in greater depth are being organized in Russian language schools, and there will also be experimental classes where children start to learn Uzbek at 6 or 7.

When asked how the law will be implemented in the higher educational institutions and whether Uzbek students at technical higher educational institutions will now be able to study in their own language, Yu. Abdulayev answered, "For this to be accomplished we would have to translate and publish textbooks in more than 70 technical disciplines. But those who are taught in Russian will have a new subject added to their schedule—

Uzbek language. We understand that before demanding that people know a language, we have to furnish them with all the prerequisites necessary for learning it."

Rector of Islamic Institute in Tashkent Interviewed

90UN1868B Moscow UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 20, May 90 p 8

[Untitled interview with Zakhidzhan Kadyrov, rector of the Islamic Institute of Tashkent conducted by special correspondents, I. Kolesnikova, A. Usmanov]

[Text] **Have you heard of the Islamic Institute imeni Al-Bukhary? Probably not. However, it is the only institute of higher education in the country that prepares priests for the mosques and it is here in Tashkent. We spoke with the 38th rector of the institute, Zakhidzhan Kadyrov.**

[Correspondent] Zakhidzhan Atakhanovich, is your institute closed to additional admissions, as from time to time are the Moscow State University for International Relations and the Institute of Nations of Asia and Africa, or is it simply a well-kept secret?

[Rector] Our institute is not closed. And it is not elitist. The fact that it is not widely known can be explained. Before perestroika where could we speak openly about this institute and indeed about the Moslem religion in general? We have 65 students. There are six or seven applicants for each place. And this, let me note, is without any publicity. Among our students are young men from Afghanistan, Bulgaria, Viet Nam. This year we want to increase the number of students to 100. The central subjects are studied in Arabic; and history, geography, and Russian—in Russian. Among ourselves we speak Russian. Why not Uzbek? Because our students are from various republics and countries and do not know Uzbek, but all know Russian. The students get stipends of 100 rubles. If they get a "[oor" they lose their scholarship, until they retake the exam. If they get three failing grades, we expel them.

[Correspondent] Today self-determination is being confidently introduced: election of rectors, voluntary attendance at lectures. You, as we see, have rather democratic relations with your students. Take for example the fact that the door to your office is open during this interview and students keep looking in. But will democracy go deeper, will it infiltrate the instructional process?

[Rector] We have had such relations with our students for a long time—since before the proclamation of democracy. As for self-determination or optional voluntary attendance at lectures, we will get along without them. Why? The Arabic language is very difficult. If you relax even a little, you fall behind. Once you fall behind, you never catch up. What good to us is an ignorant imam? It seems to me that freedom is not always

understood correctly. In particular, students here understand it to mean doing nothing. And priests must work very hard.

[Correspondent] Are your students the children of believers?

[Rector] Our students are believers. We don't accept them on the basis of their backgrounds. It is not important who a student's parents, his mother and father are. It is important who he himself is. Only those who truly believe, who are selflessly committed to Islam, God, and Mohammed, can study in our institute. We also get rather mature people, who have completed not only secondary school, but also medres [Moslem secondary schools] and training courses. They leave the institute at 28-29. At this age they have already developed a moral backbone and have formed a view of the world.

In previous years we could send them to study in Jordan, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Morocco, I myself graduated from the University of Libya. But in the last 7-8 years we have not been able to send anyone abroad. The USSR Council on Religious Affairs would not cooperate, although we have had invitations from these countries.

[Correspondent] Zakhidzhan Atakhanovich, not long ago we talked with students from the Tashkent higher educational institutions and they strongly condemned the followers of Islam for at times assuming an unjustified role and functioning as a kind of "regulator of perestroika." When there is unrest, the party secretary puts an imam in front of him. And the latter begins to preach, calling for submission and obedience...

[Rector] And what's so bad about that? In our country we have separation of religion and the state. But it has been impossible to separate religious leaders from society. They participate in all spheres of life and have some degree of influence on them. Islam forbids alcohol and the priests are the most passionate proponents of the anti-alcohol policy. Islam is against idleness, excessive luxury, human stinginess. In Surkhandarinsk oblast, for example, up to 1000 people gather for a wedding or funeral. How can this accord with the principles of Islam? How can such excess be moral? These are not religious rites, but rather purely ethnic ones. Recently there was a case of self-immolation of a woman. Islam categorically opposes such cruelty. In our sermons we speak constantly about this.

[Correspondent] You speak of Islam with such inspiration that you create the impression that it is the height of perfection. But after all, religion arose at a time when the height of technological progress was a hoe [ketmen], now everything has changed. Don't you want to look critically at Islam? Perhaps there is something you want to eliminate or improve?

[Rector] There is nothing I want to eliminate. I accept all of it out of conviction.

[Correspondent] Paranja too? This after all is a terrible invention of Islam...

[Rector] Paranja is not a religious custom. Islam permits women to uncover their face, hands, and feet. Paranja is an old Middle Eastern costume. People ignorant of Islam ascribe to it many sins of which it is innocent. Take a look at Moslem nations. There are bars virtually everywhere you turn. Yet Islam opposes alcohol. They are full of houses of ill repute. But Islam opposes debauchery.

[Correspondent] Some people have gotten the impression that the events in Fergan were rooted in religion..

[Rector] What difference in religions was there? Both the Meskhetin Turks and the Uzbeks are Moslems. Or take Egypt where Islam is the state religion. Moslems, Christians, and Jews live there very peaceably. There is no hostility between them. Among religious people as a rule there are no conflicts. We teach that a true Moslem must do no harm to other Moslems or members of other faiths, either with his hands or with his words.

During the election campaigns the person who had the power to act for our Mufti was the head of the Orthodox Church of Lev-Vladyko. The common major concern of these two men was and remains relations among ethnic groups.

[Correspondent] But how do you explain the Islam commandment "Kill the infidel"?

[Rector] This is not one of the five commandments of Islam. The call to "kill the infidels" is lawful only in holy places—in Mecca and Medina. In all the other points of the globe we must live peacefully and in friendship, helping one another, especially the poor and the helpless. Thus our policy does not diverge from the policy of perestroika. And those who are again trying to give us a bad name are misguided. It is very hard to build bridges between religion and the state. Why tear them down? That is not the Moslem thing to do.

Education Ministry Official on Uzbek Exchange Program

Uzbek Students Studying Abroad

90UN1849.1 *Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS*
UZBEKISTAN in Russian 24 Apr 90 p 1

[Interview with Viktor Trofimovich Nesterov, chief of the Administration of International Cooperation in the field of education and science of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education, by special correspondent Ravshan Alimov: "Are You Prepared to Study Abroad?"; date, place not specified]

[Text] **The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education intends to increase the number of students sent to study in the United States, FRG, PRC, and other countries. Our special correspondent Ravshan Alimov met with the chief of the Administration of International Cooperation in the**

field of education and science of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education, Viktor Trofimovich Nesterov.

[Correspondent] Uzbekistan will soon make the transition to full economic accountability, and we will require specialists knowledgeable of the world market, with mastery of issues of international politics, economics, and law. What is your administration currently doing for their training?

[Nesterov] Last year, 340 students went to foreign countries for production-familiarization work practicums. Some 87 others went for study and language training. The production practicum was held in the countries of Eastern Europe—GDR, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the language training, in PRC, India, Kuwait, Tunisia, Syria, and a number of other Arab countries. For the time being, we are sending them only to the United States and Poland for study. Among those sent to these countries, 60 percent comprise persons of the Uzbek nationality. I feel that the total number of students sent abroad from Uzbekistan is insufficient. The reason is the limiting quota on travel to the leading capitalist countries on the part of the USSR State Committee for Public Education. Another reason of no lesser importance is the students' poor knowledge of foreign languages. The Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education is taking measures to eliminate this gap. For example, a data base on foreign educational institutions is being created, and on the planned cooperation with our republic's VUZs. On the other hand, there will be created in Tashkent a center for foreign language training of young specialists concerned with foreign economic relations, and students among the reserves to be sent for study abroad.

[Correspondent] Foreign languages are studied in every VUZ. How will the republic center academic program differ?

[Nesterov] In the VUZs, they are being taught only to translate, read, and write, but training has to be done so that the students can communicate freely in foreign languages, to hear, understand, and relate information, to give a speech. Even the specialized courses created under the Tashkent Pedagogical Institute are calculated to accept only 100 people annually. The republic center must train 300-400 people annually. Classes there will be held 3 times a week for 4 hours per session, starting at 6 in the evening. The students can study foreign languages in the time they have free from other studies, with no fees, under the guidance of instructors with high qualifications.

We are now training a group of 18 students to send them for study in FRG. Our problem is that we learned very late of the number of spaces, or more precisely, we had not anticipated that after M.S. Gorbachev's visit to that country we would be presented with such opportunities... The selection is now taking place. Of course, the chief criterion is knowledge of the German language and excellence in scholarship. And the VUZs that send us

their candidates have probably also made their selection. Yet alas, people come in from everywhere with the recommendations "poor language skills." Until today, in the VUZs, great attention was paid to the English language. Even though 6 months still remain until departure for FRG, I am afraid that our students will not get past the commission in Moscow.

[Correspondent] From which VUZs are the students preparing to travel to the FRG?

[Nesterov] Spaces were received by Tashkent State University, Tashkent State Pedagogical Institute, the road and machine building institutes of the national economy, and by supplemental allocation, Samarkand State University and Andzhan Pedagogical Institute.

[Correspondent] Keeping in mind developing international relations, perhaps it is worthwhile to begin serious language training starting with early grades?

[Nesterov] I am in complete agreement with you, since it is easier to master a foreign language at school age. Tashkent has very good schools, numbers 17, 9, and 60, which in the course of only 3 years are sending students to the United States. School number 60 plans to send them to FRG as well. The question arises: Why was there such a lack of enthusiasm toward foreign languages in the past?... Because only a numbered few got to go. We are now opening the world up for ourselves. Life will probably force us to restructure our consciousness.

[Correspondent] You described the difficulties that arose in sending students to FRG, including, as I understood it, those due to haste. If, perhaps in the future, such groups could be formed, students could be informed of this as quickly as possible through the youth press, and the data on the number of spaces in the academic institutions of the various countries, and the competition be reported?

[Nesterov] Yes, probably. We want there to be a reserve in every VUZ so that after the first year of study, the dean's office can send the best students for courses in foreign languages, and conduct the necessary training. It will be easier when the republics receive greater independence. Yet even now, our Ministry of Higher Education is attempting to expand contacts with foreign countries. Relations with the higher educational institutions of PRC and Egypt are being strengthened. We will attempt to do everything possible. A form of training called "country study" [stranovedeniye] has been introduced. After selection of a travel group, a group of instructors in the social disciplines start to familiarize the students with the social structure, political situation, culture, and tenor of life of the countries to which they will go for study. We also pay particular attention to the students' knowledge of Uzbekistan, in order that our envoys can properly represent the republic abroad.

[Correspondent] Viktor Trofimovich, what would you like to wish the students?

[Nesterov] A great deal depends on the students themselves. We hope that above all, the students will recognize their role in the perestroika processes, and will promote their development.

Overview of Student Exchange

90UN1849B Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
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[Interview with Viktor Trofimovich Nesterov, chief of the Administration of International Cooperation in the field of education and science of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education, by PRAVDA VOSTOKA social correspondent T. Khikmatov: "A Tashkent Degree is Valuable Abroad as Well"; date, place not specified]

[Text] The student collectives of Uzbekistan are truly international. Today, young men and women of 57 nationalities are studying in the institutes of the Ministry of Higher and Secondary Specialized Education. Naturally, more Uzbeks than anyone else come to the VUZ classrooms—46,369 people, then the Russian (non-Russian speaking) "population" in the student milieu, 6,761, and the Karakalpak, 3,456.

There are students who represent their nationalities in the singular. For example, mastering science within the walls of our institutes are one Bulgarian, one Lak, one Lezgian, one Macedonian, and one Khakass.

These are our Soviet kids, the graduates of our Soviet schools.

Together, they listen to the same lectures as the people their own age who have come to the republic from abroad. Incidentally, they are studying only in Tashkent's VUZs. That means that our degrees are valuable abroad as well.

Who is coming to us to master science?

Viktor Trofimovich Nesterov, chief of the Administration of International Cooperation in the field of education and science of the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, says that "Coming for study is done within three channels. One of them is the intergovernmental treaty on cultural and scientific cooperation. A second stream comes through the lines of various public organizations, such as, for example, the Committee for Solidarity with the Countries of Asia and Africa, the Society for Friendship and Cooperation with Foreign Countries, the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], committees of Soviet women, and youth organizations. There are 15 such public organizations.

Since last year, we are training cadres for foreign countries on a commercial (contractual) basis.

The selection of candidates is conducted by the representatives of the USSR State Committee for Public

Education, who travel to foreign countries for this purpose. But the USSR Embassy does a certain amount of preliminary organizational work.

In Tashkent, under Tashkent State University, TI-IMSKh [Tashkent Engineering Institute of Irrigation and Mechanization of Agriculture] and the machine building institute, young men and women are finishing up at training departments, in each of which there are 650 people studying. Training is conducted according to the selected specialty: the fields of technology, the humanities, or medicine. The sub-departments also prepare students for our republic's other VUZs. In addition, there are preparatory departments with Russian as the language of instruction in Mongolia and in Cuba. The graduates of these departments are immediately counted as being in the first year of our institutes.

[Correspondent] And how many young men and women obtain knowledge in Tashkent?

[Nesterov] A total of 4,267. They are in training at 12 VUZs, 8 technical schools, and one professional-technical college. Four boarding schools have admitted Afghan kids. Students and matriculants have arrived with the passports of 80 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. We have more Afghan students than others—there are now 1,500 of them. Syria sent 266 of its young men and women; India, 290, and Cuba, 308.

[Correspondent] And our kids go abroad?

[Nesterov] We have a broad practice of bilateral exchanges of students on a basis not involving hard currency. Last year, 358 people left Tashkent for study; a corresponding number of foreigners came to us. Students of technical VUZs receive training in related institutes in the countries of Eastern Europe over the course of one month.

The language practicum for students and instructors of the humanities departments lasts from 6 weeks to 10 months. Last year, 111 people went for language training; primarily, these were representatives of Tashkent State University and the Institute of Foreign Languages imeni Engels. This year, kids from Nukus and Samarkand Universities and the Andizhan Institute of Foreign Languages went on such trips.

The chief criterion for their selection is good scholarship and mastery of a foreign language. We receive quotas from the USSR State Committee for Public Education and take them to the leadership of the educational institutions. VUZ candidates for travel pass through selection in the republic commission for foreign travel.

[Correspondent] May the institutes' leadership conclude direct contracts for bilateral exchange with universities and colleges of other countries?

[Nesterov] They may. This right has already been broadly applied at Tashkent University. Tashkent State University has made an agreement on basis that does not

involve hard currency with Seattle, Jordan, Cairo, and Beijing Universities. The Tashkent Institute of Textile and Light Industry has followed Tashkent State University's example in concluding a contract with Bombay University.

In the near future, such an agreement will be signed by the Uzbek SSR Ministry of Higher Education and the U.S. International Cooperative Consortium for Education, which comprises 36 colleges and universities of the southern United States.

[Correspondent] Are the foreign students released from the study of any sort of disciplines?

[Nesterov] Only from military training. But on the other hand, supplemental cycles are organized for them. For example, at the Tashkent Medical Institute, they study a course of tropical medicine; the students of the Tashkent Agricultural Institute, the features of crop raising and farming in countries with a tropical climate; in geology, the features of geological structure and the oil and gas potential of individual regions of the world. A course of design and construction of population points with consideration for the conditions specific to the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America has been introduced for those studying in construction departments.

In accordance with the "Statute on the training of citizens of foreign countries in the USSR," confirmed by the All-Union Soviet for foreign student affairs, foreign students enjoy no special privileges. They have no special dormitories, libraries, or academic classrooms. Their only privilege is a one-time R350 grant for the acquisition of winter clothing.

As far as the stipend is concerned, it is paid from the USSR state budget to students who are here in accordance with an intergovernmental agreement. Social organizations themselves pay a stipend to those they send.

The socialist countries, with the exceptions of Cuba, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, pay for their students' study in full.

Of the developing countries, only a few partially compensate the expenses—Iraq, Syria, and Egypt.

[Correspondent] Viktor Trofimovich, is it to our advantage to accept foreign students? What does the republic and the VUZs in which they study get out of this?

[Nesterov] Until recently, we had nothing for the training of foreign students who came via state or public organizations. All resources went to the state budget. However, we began to make contracts with certain foreigners starting last year. In this case, 70 percent of the monetary resources remain in the VUZ.

Tashkent State University has already concluded three contracts, and at the polytechnical institute, they are preparing to conclude five contracts.

If we manage to transfer 15 percent of the republic VUZs to a contract basis, then we will have 1 million dollars annually.

[Correspondent] There was a report in the press last year on the deportation of eight foreign students who were carriers of AIDS. Where are how frequently are foreigners checked for this virus?

[Nesterov] They are checked at Sheremetevo airport upon their arrival in Moscow. The remaining students are sent to the AIDS center under the city sanitation and epidemiology station. Those who leave for their own country for over a month are tested upon return; this was how the virus was detected in the eight Tashkent State University and TIIMSKh students you mention.

[Correspondent] The opinion exists that foreign students are allowed to do anything. Is this the case?

[Nesterov] Not at all. If a foreigner commits an illegal act subject to criminal prosecution, he is punished.

If the actions are not subject to criminal punishment, then the student is subjected to administrative penalties, and is deprived of his right to leave the country for a certain period of time, and cannot send or receive parcels. Of course, expulsion from the VUZ is possible.

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